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7PEFACE
It always includes efforts and difficulties to make any dream come true. You 
need to work hard on making your ideas, plans about co-operation with various 
different partners from different parts of the world real; this requires—among 
many things—empathy, openness and focussed minds to keep to schedules and 
workplans. In the case of the DRC Summer School series we are certainly lucky 
as we could set up and maintain partnerships and collaboration with numerous 
institutions and stakeholders for the sake of improving our framework and 
developing our ideas. The co-operation of Vienna and Pécs, and that of IDM and 
IDResearch in particular—including the respective higher education institutions 
from the two cities—has proven to be highly successful since . The present 
proceedings volume is another step forward in terms of academic and scientific 
co-operation, as it surely contributes with the help of young social scientists from 
the Dabube Region and beyond to understanding more about current issues of EU 
enlargement, security, regional development, social and economic issues of a new 
Europe, in light of where the EU stands in the global political arena. We are glad 
that since the launch of the summer school the Danube Rectors’ Conference has 
continuously offered an ongoing intellectual sponsorship under which it has been 
possible for us to plan ahead.
This third proceedings volume is a collection of  papers that were presented 
at the rd Summer School hosted by the Centre for Advanced Academic Studies of 
the University of Zagreb in Dubrovni, Croatia (August ). After the first two 
summer meetings in  (Pécs) and  (Eisenstadt) it became evident that there 
was a need in the young academic communities of Central and Eastern Europe, in 
countries along the river Danube, to enhance their nowledge, develop professional 
lins with fellow intellectuals and, most important of all, to engage in a thorough 
discussion focussing on current issues in various domains of the social sciences. 
It is inevitably a sign of success that increasing attention follows the wor we have 
launched, both among young scientists who have already taen part in and those 
who intend to join our networ, as well as leading professionals, university leaders, 
companies and scientific institutions. The DC Summer Schools are therefore 
not just events but an opportunity for networing. They offer the ground for 
establishing relations and collaborations that will affect our future.
8   
The programme of the Third Summer School could not have been made possible 
without our generous supporters whom in this way we would lie to than, too. The 
school was supported by the DC Presidency, the Central European Initiative (CEI), 
the Austrian provinces of Lower Austria, Upper Austria and Styria, the Woring 
Community of Danubian egions, the Hanns Seidel Foundation, and Erste Ban.
The  contributions of the current proceedings volume are organised into  major 
chapters. Chapter  covers topics connected with the enlargement process of the EU, 
especially as regards problems of transition and security. Balogh offers an overview 
of potential security threats in light of eastward enlargement. Glebov discusses the 
case of Uraine in relations with the NATO, the USA and ussia. Gözaman tals 
about how the EU can solve military crises. Plau presents a case study of osovo 
in terms of political developments and status negotiations, and Shehu taes a loo 
at omania’s accession to the EU. Chapter  is centred around regional, social and 
financial aspects of co-operation. While Trnsi analyses the EU’s regional policy as 
an instrument of solidarity, Cretu flashes up the case of Greece in terms of regional 
policy implementation. Gál critically uncovers various aspects of territorial co-
operation connected with integration. Pupazescu and Frunzaru address social 
problems such as divergence, convergence and pension reforms. Bejovsi tacles 
the case of Macedonia and the country’s social policy in the pursuit of social 
justice. Petsinis brings the case of Serbia for cross-border co-operation which can 
contribute to an accelerated integration to European structures. Boneva and Péter 
deal with budgetary and investment questions concerning the countries of the EU. 
In Chapter  Iliescu begins with decision-maing procedures with an eye on the 
Convention of Europe and its future implications for the continent. Dinu turns the 
spotlight upon the EU’s role in promoting democracy in the Arab World. Borgulya 
offers an insight into values and value orientations while taling about interaction 
conflicts. In her pragmatic approach rech shares her view on job opportunities in 
Brussels, and as a concluding piece Luács compares competitive and co-operative 
approaches in the EU. 
 
 István Tarrósy, M.Sc.      Dr. Susan Milford
tarrosy@idresearch.hu                      s.milford@idm.at
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EU ENLAGEMENT EASTWADS: 
A THEAT TO EUOPEAN SECUITY?
PÉTER BALOGH
‘ if all borders in Europe  become obsolete one day, some
borders might become obsolete much more slowly than others.’
S. A. Andreev (:)
INTRODUCTION
On May  , the EU once again postponed setting the final date for Romania’s 
and Bulgaria’s accession to the Union. Probably for the first time in EU-history the 
entry of candidate states remained uncertain until about three months before the 
date originally set. As a Christian Democratic Member of European Parliament put 
it, the EU will need to ‘put on the brakes’ in its enlargement project. In the case of 
the above two countries EU officials referred to their failure in speeding up reforms 
and fighting crime and corruption. However, the irony is that by postponing the 
enlargement the EU might actually make these tasks even more difficult to achieve, 
while the future of European security depends to a large extent on the successful 
integration of Eastern Europe into the Union.
The main goal of this paper is to extend the line of thought presented in 
my summary of Heather Grabbe’s article ‘The sharp edges of Europe: Security 
implications of extending EU border policies eastwards’ (). More specifically, 
it is an attempt to investigate why the European Union’s external security policies 
clash with the internal ones to a significant extent and consequently undermine 
them to some degree. 
SECURITY
During the Cold War period, security was generally understood in military terms. 
The term was largely equal to the survival and security of states and the use of force. 
This approach was, on the one hand, the result of the strongly bi-polarised nature of 
 http://www.diepresse.at/textversion_article.aspx?id=, visited --.
 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=, visited --.
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the international arena, in which most of the world’s states were siding or more or 
less forced to side with one of the two superpowers, either the USA or the USSR. On 
the other hand, the focus on state-centrism was also related to the fact that during 
this period states were the primary and in many cases the exclusive securitising 
actors as well as referent objects in the field of international security. In addition, 
the vast majority of international disputes took the form of inter-state conflicts. 
Under these conditions, it was less surprising that securing the survival and 
maintenance of the state was the primary objective of decision-makers prioritised 
over everything else. 
The post-Cold War period was the time for transition from a bi-polarised 
international arena towards a multi-polarised or uni-polarised one (depending 
on whose standpoint one is taing), as well as a star decline of traditional inter-
state conflicts. This did not mean that the world had become a safer place as some 
scholars, mainly Liberalists in I-theory, believed (e.g. Fuuyama: ). Instead, 
the number of intra-state conflicts and even civil wars rose dramatically. At the 
same time, the globalisation of the world-economy brought new opportunities not 
only for legal businesses but also for the blac economy; focus in the field of security 
shifted, inter alias, towards illegal migration and organised crime. 
Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the debate became 
increasingly pronounced between those who argued for a widened view of 
security and those who maintained that a broader interpretation of the term could 
undermine its essential meaning and should, therefore, be reserved for military or 
external political issues. This debate about the ‘wide’ versus ‘narrow’ interpretation 
of security has its origins in the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in 
international relations during the s and s and later in the rise of concerns 
with identity issues and trans-national crime during the s. 
The ‘wide’ approach’ has also been associated with the constructivist approach 
in social sciences. In simplistic terms, this perspective holds that security is what 
actors mae of it. This implies that since it is a social construction, its meaning may 
evolve over time and its content is subject to change. This explains to some extent 
why the term can become more or less inclusive, depending on whether its content 
widened or narrowed. 
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 Buzan, Waever & de Wilde () p. .
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In their boo Security: A new framewor for analysis the authors set out a 
comprehensive new framewor for security studies. Taing on the constructivist 
approach, they suggest a new, sectoral approach to the analysis of security. 
Five sectors are distinguished. The military sector is about the relationships of 
coercion and the political one is about relationships of authority, governing status, 
and recognition. The economic sector is concerned with relationships of trade, 
production, and finance, while the societal one with relationships of collective 
identity. Finally, the environmental sector is about relationships between human 
activity and the planetary biosphere. 
These categories, of course, rarely exist independently. They are distinguished in 
order to mae the identification of specific types of interaction easier, but they certainly 
remain inseparable entities of complex wholes. The main advantage of these sectors 
is that they allow the authors to confine the scope of inquiry to more manageable 
proportions because the number of variables in play is reduced in this way. 
Moving on to the levels of analysis, Buzan, Waever, and de Bilde identify the five 
most frequently used levels nown from I-theory. They consider levels as objects 
for analysis that are defined by spatial scales ranging from small to large; they are 
locations where both outcomes and sources of explanation can be located. It is 
important to note that nothing is intrinsic to the levels themselves that suggests any 
particular pattern or priority of relations among them. 
Today the international system is equivalent to the global level, while 
international subsystems are groups of units within the former that can be 
distinguished from the entire system by the particular nature or intensity of their 
interactions with or interdependence on each other (e.g. the EU). Units in turn are 
made up of actors composed of various subgroups, organisations, communities, or 
other entities that are sufficiently cohesive and independent to be differentiated 
from others and to have standing at the higher levels (e.g. states, nations). Subunits 
can be organised groups of individuals within units that (try to) affect the unit’s 
behaviour (e.g. bureaucracies, lobbies), while the bottom line of analysis is the 
individual.
 ibid, p. .
 ibid, pp -.
 ibid, pp -.
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Finally, it is important to mention in this context how the same authors thin 
about the regional dimension of security. In their view, international relations will 
tae a more regionalised character in the post-Cold War world, because the collapse 
of bipolarity has removed the principal organising force at the global level. 
BORDERS AND PERIPHERIES
The boundary is one of the main pillars of the state, since the state has exclusive right 
to define judicial relations on its territory surrounded by borders. The dualistic 
nature of the boundary means that it divides political institutions while it can 
connect various societies and communities. Thereby it can function both as a barrier 
and  a bridge depending on which of the above mentioned functions is pronounced. 
In this perspective one can tal of (a) dividing, (b) filtering and (c) open 
boundaries. 
A dividing or ‘closed’ boundary is nown for reinforcing the peripheral processes 
in the region at stae, such as emigration and the decay of labour maret, which, in 
turn, provoe the decline of the economy and the emigration of the population to 
regions where higher living standards prevail, quite often to the centre. 
The establishment of a filtering boundary is often a defensive reflex. It is 
usually in the defensive state’s interests to tae action against immigration caused 
by the different pricing systems, tax rules and living  standards, in other words 
economic differences between the two sides of the borderline. One example could 
be the EU’s Schengen Agreement. However,  it is usually the activities flourishing 
on the other side of the boundary that the defensive state tries to filter: the blac 
economy emerges and the smuggling of various products or persons may tae off, 
for example. The political map has—in many cases—provided opportunities not 
only for entrepreneurs but also for smugglers in search of profits. 
The main feature of an open boundary is that capital, labour, economic goods 
and even the population can cross it freely. Therefore, the previously restricted 
economic field can expand. According to Lundén, an open boundary usually implies 
that the number of crossing points is large, and its permeability is high. 
 ibid, p. .
 Lundén () p. .
 Hardi () pp -.
 Taylor & Flint () p. .
 Lundén () p. .
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Naturally, the above described categories only exist in a theoretical construction. 
In reality, these qualities exist in a rather mixed manner. Each borderline has its 
own unique history and characteristics. Still, the categories constitute a relevant 
reference point for the investigation of boundaries. 
The word periphery has a geographical connotation but it can also be related to 
the economy, for instance. In most cases, periphery refers to a region that is lagging 
behind the other areas in one way or another. The problem is that border regions, 
already peripheral geographically within the states, are often peripheries from an 
economic viewpoint as well. This is especially true when they are located near 
closed or filtering boundaries. 
EUROPEAN SECURITY THREATS
Traditionally, the EU has been a ‘civilian power’ concerned with welfare generation 
and economic regulation. However, as an international actor, the EU is ambiguous. 
The EU has always, and inescapably, been a foreign policy project, and as such, it 
has realised over the decades the need to develop a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). 
According to Winn, EU enlargements will, more than any other event, have the 
greatest long-term impact on European foreign policy and the European security 
order more generally. 
As it has been noted earlier, interpretations of the term have undergone a great 
transformation in the past decades; and the widening of the concept has been 
crucial. As Grabbe observes, the fear of tans and missiles arriving from behind 
the Iron Curtain has been supplanted by a fear of uncontrolled immigration and 
cross-border crime. 
Indeed, once focused on traditional war-related issues and regional instability, 
security priorities have recently shifted to include increased attention to terrorism 
and organised crime, both of which have become politically lined with immigration. 
In Europe, these issues are now especially controversial within the framewor of 
the European Union’s enlargement process, which itself has heightened sensitivity 
to security concerns. In fact, some of the central issues in enlargement debates 
 Éger () p. .
 Winn () p. .
 ibid, p. .
 Grabbe () p. .
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have been illegal migration, the smuggling of humans and human trafficing. To 
some extent, immigration in general has been framed as a security problem due to 
domestic political pressures, such as increased media attention to sensationalised 
tragedies related to illegal migration, and also due to the rise of the radical right, 
which has forced parties of both the centre-right and centre-left to tae more 
nationalist stances on the immigration issue. Moreover, fears about insecurity are 
natural when states cede sovereignty to supranational organisations such as the EU, 
especially when they feel that other Member States will contribute to insecurity 
with their important economic inequalities and structural inadequacies.
International migration has become one of the newly identified non-traditional 
security threats since the traditional military thining about international security 
issues has increasingly been abandoned. This trend is certainly related to the 
unprecedented scale of the phenomenon. 
The statistical-methodological difficulties of measuring the scale of migration 
that is taing place loo quite small compared to the difficulties of even estimating 
the dimensions of illegal migration coming from its clandestine nature. To get 
an idea of how little is nown for sure about the extent of this phenomenon, let 
us compare the following figures. In a report issued in  by the International 
Organization for Migration, the scale of illegal migration in the old EU  is 
estimated to exceed three million people. At the same time, in Jonas Widgren’s 
study from , the accepted estimates of the number of clandestine migrants in 
the EU range from , to ,. According to off, this is considered the 
most accurate data available today by migration experts and monitoring groups 
such as the IOM, even though it was collected ten years ago. What the various 
studies share is the observation that human trafficing and human smuggling have 
significantly increased in recent years.
Independently from the exact number that is at stae, the scale of clandestine 
migration flows is considered important and the European Commission has 
declared that ‘the reduction of illegal migration flows is a political priority at both 
national and EU level’. 
 Koff () p. .
 Kicinger () p. .
 Koff () p. .
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EU RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
As Kicinger put it, having recognised clandestine migration as a serious security 
threat, the Union has taken a comprehensive, multi-level approach to the 
phenomenon. In her working paper International migration as a non-traditional 
security threat and the EU responses to this phenomenon, Kicinger outlines the 
main tools the organisation has chosen to fight it. 
The list begins with preventive measures. One way of fighting the causes of 
clandestine migration is to establish co-operation with countries that are potential 
sources of illegal immigrants. This includes agreements combining migration 
policy with trade and development programmes; a co-operation programme that 
provides financial and technical assistance to such countries; and awareness-raising 
campaigns on the riss related to irregular migration in these countries. 
In fighting clandestine migration proper gathering and exchange of information 
is crucial for the success of these projects. The EU has also emphasised this from 
the beginning of its engagement in the issue. A more recent measure it has taen 
in this context was to establish the immigration liaison officers’ networ, the main 
tas of which is to collect the necessary data in non-EU countries and to improve 
the exchange of this information among Member States.
The Union taes increased efforts to restrict the admission of clandestine migrants 
onto its territory. Its main tool for doing so is to impose visa requirements on all nationals 
arriving from states representing a high ris of irregular migration. The EU has ‘a blac 
list’ of countries, the citizens of which will be ased to show up valid documents; and 
this list is occasionally updated. When it comes to travel documents it should also be 
mentioned that their security standards are constantly raised. One example here is the 
Schengen visa sticer, ragarded as a successful co-operation in this field. More recently, 
a Visa Information System was planned with a view of enabling national authorities to 
enter and update  visa data as well as to consult them electronically. 
Member States also closely co-operate in external border management. This area 
is sometimes referred to as ‘the European Union’s first line of defence’ and enjoys 
high priority when it comes to combating illegal migration. Last year, the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation was established in 
 Kicinger () pp -.
 ibid, pp -.
 ibid, p. .
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Warsaw. In addition, a common body of European border guards was also proposed. 
Even though it did not receive enough political support from several Member States, 
the suggestion is a good example for the EU’s intention  to strengthen its external 
boundary, and discuss the worload-sharing mechanisms with the Member States. 
Another measure for combating clandestine migration is the fight against 
blac labour, in various ways because it is assumed that woring opportunities 
represent an important motivating factor underlying illegal migration. In this 
respect, however, the EU’s competence is rather limited since the Member States 
bear sole responsibility for enforcing the guidelines set up by the Union. The final, 
and perhaps most controversial measure introduced in  is the transportation of 
illegal migrants bac to their countries of departure. 
EU RESPONSES TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND HUMAN SMUGGLING
Human smuggling and human trafficking are related but separate phenomena. Human 
smuggling involves assisting irregular migrants without valid visas or entry papers to 
enter a national territory clandestinely. Many claim that it is a ‘victimless crime’ because 
smugglers merely provide a service to would-be migrants and their would-be native 
employers waiting to exploit cheap labour. Human trafficking, however, describes 
entry assistance provided to illegal migrants for the purpose of gaining economic 
profit from illicit activities, such as forced prostitution, forced labour, or participation 
in illegal markets for human organs. This distinction is important because trafficking 
is profitable beyond the act of smuggling. However, the Council applies a similar level 
of punishment for both crimes, namely eight years of imprisonment. 
PROBLEMS WITH EU RESPONSES
According to Kicinger, if the Union had an ambition to develop and implement migration 
policy at the Community level, it would have to take into account the multidimensional 
character of this phenomenon, including its security aspect, and respond to it. In fact the 
process of creating a common European migration policy is still going on. Whereas some 
areas have already been covered by Community legislation (visa policy, external border 
control, and—to a considerable extent—the asylum system), others like labour immigration 
or integration policy are still referred to the competence of the individual states.
 ibid, p. -.
 Koff () p. .
 Kicinger () p. .
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EU immigration policies have traditionally emphasised issues related to border 
control and illegal migration. Government responses to immigration into the EU 
have narrowly focussed on security questions and border controls. The problem 
with this system is that migration flows have not stopped despite technological 
advancements in border control (such as the use of infrared glasses for ‘night 
vision’, or improved coast guard vessels). Since the end of the Cold War, migration 
has been forced underground and this has led to the expansion of human trafficing 
and human smuggling. The paradox which needs to be recognised in the advanced 
industrial world is that the more migration agendas focus solely on security issues, 
the more the phenomenon becomes uncontrolled, insecure and unregulated. 
Even though the European Parliament has attempted to pay increased attention 
to anti-discrimination and human rights agendas, the imbalanced distribution of 
power within the EU’s decision-maing structure has permitted the Council to 
firmly establish immigration as a security concern. There is still no comprehensive 
recognition that human rights should be considered as being of major importance 
in the CFSP. According to some scholars lie Winn, human rights and democracy 
clauses should be included in all agreements with third countries so as to contribute 
to the defence of democracy and basic freedoms throughout the world. 
EU Member States have increasingly closed their borders to labour migration 
since , creating a sort of ‘Fortress Europe’. Despite these measures, non-
European Union immigrants have continued to enter the EU. Studies have shown 
that human trafficing and human smuggling have increased significantly in recent 
years, and illegal migrants are estimated to represent one third of the foreign-born 
population that permanently resides on the continent. Moreover, organised criminal 
cartels have combined these practices with the smuggling of arms, drugs, stolen 
automobiles and illegal cigarettes. Within this context, the complex challenge of 
enlargement has contributed to an increase in uncertainty, given the difficulties that 
the old EU encountered in implementing effective border controls. 
The ways in which the EU and its Member States responded to perceptions of 
different threats were inconsistent in the s. This is partly because EU border 
 Koff () p. .
 ibid, p. .
 Koff () p. .
 ibid, p. .
 Winn () p. .
 Koff () p. .
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policies are themselves fragmented and patchily developed, following a chequered 
history of European integration in justice and home affairs. EU accession conditions 
contain a large number of security-related tass for the eastern applicants, but 
these are dispersed in a range of documents and agencies. Inconsistencies between 
the different tass are emerging, but are little debated in the EU owing to the 
technocratic nature of EU accession policy-maing. Since the early s, concerns 
to stabilise CEE have led the EU to stress peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes, 
fostering regional economic integration and sub-regional co-operation initiatives, 
as well as the integration of ethnic minority groups. However, EU policies for 
dealing with external borders have restrictive effects on the movement of both 
goods and people that are at odds with this emphasis on regional integration as a 
means of ensuring long-term stability and security. 
Migration cannot be stopped simply at the border because organised crime 
has developed technological and organisational solutions to bypass state controls. 
Historically, migrants have been nown for their flexibility, as they move in and 
out of economic sectors when opportunities appear. Because migration flows must 
circumvent the obstacles which the EU has placed before them, migrants often turn 
to criminal associations that guarantee passage into the Union. Once competitors, 
these groups have begun to collaborate, forming multinational smuggling 
corporations. Thus, by focusing migration policies on security issues and border 
controls, receiving states that are relatively ineffective in restricting migration have 
driven the phenomenon underground. In doing so, they have made immigration a 
greater threat to both public and human security. 
In addition, the EU’s focus on migration controls has isolated regional and local 
officials who have not received support for integration strategies. In off’s view, the 
EU has to date failed to adequately address this issue in the area of border regions, 
for example.
Worst of all, icinger sees no signs of the Union’s approach to the migration-
security nexus changing radically in the foreseeable future. The fight against all 
forms of irregular migration through various measures will remain the core of EU 
 Grabbe () p. iii. 
 Koff () p. .
 ibid, pp -.
 ibid, pp -.
 Kicinger () p. .
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engagement. The vital question is not in which direction but rather how fast and 
how far this co-operation will develop. 
A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO SECURITY
For Koff, migration is a market-based rather than a security-based issue. 
Immigration should not be perceived narrowly as a hard security issue but instead 
as an economic question best addressed in terms of markets.
The impression that enlargement will somehow weaen the Union’s migration 
regime, and that Eastern Europeans are going to ‘invade’ Europe, is unfounded 
according to most studies.
In addition, facilitators of illegal migration, namely criminal organisations, 
are not significantly active in the new Member States. These are transit countries 
for trafficers rather than sending countries. For this reason, one cannot expect 
an increase in trafficing as a result of enlargement since the characteristics of the 
trafficing system will not radically change. Trafficing networs will continue to 
originate, for instance, in various Asian states, Turey, Moldova, Georgia, and the 
Balans, and will pass through Eastern Europe in he future as well. 
One should eep in mind that the quality of life will improve in the accession 
states after enlargement,and they can be expected to become receiving states (a 
development which is already beginning), and this may actually, in the long run, 
alleviate pressure on Western Europe, as marets open up and illegal migrants find 
opportunity structures that are more favourable in the new member countries. 
Political debates surrounding migration and enlargement usually overloo the fact 
that, before the enlargement process began, most of the new EU member states were 
sending countries with significant smuggling and trafficing networs operating 
in them. Collective socio-economic improvements and institutional development 
have led to a decline in emigration flows, especially those of an illegal nature, most 
notably in Southern Europe. 
Chances are that the EU’s security-based approach will create a lot of difficulties 
for the new Member States in their struggle to control their borders. The extension 
of the external borders of the EU will create economic and identity-related problems 
in border areas that were integrated during the Cold War when all of these states 
 Koff () p. .
 ibid, p. .
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had Communist regimes. Many scholars have noted that border extension will 
probably have a negative impact on the local economies that have developed in 
border regions, such as those found between Poland and the Uraine, or between 
omania and Hungary: enlargement will bloc the relatively free movement of 
labour and trade which has developed in these areas. Similarly, ethnic minorities 
concentrated on separate sides of borders will be divided. There will be political 
and physical barriers between ethnic Hungarians living in Hungary and those 
residing in omania, for instance. Since the fall of Communist regimes in the area, 
this border has been easily penetrated by members of the Hungarian minority in 
both directions. These developments will surely contribute to human smuggling 
and human trafficing because migration for economic and family reasons will be 
driven underground, lie in Western Europe. Grabbe notes that the disruption 
of bilateral relationships and regional economic integration has important 
implications for security in the region. It is especially the imposition of EU-driven 
border policies and visa regimes that inhibits the ability of local and regional actors 
to co-operate on a range of sensitive issues, including minority relations, migration, 
local economic infrastructure, and institution-building. Therefore, she calls for a 
more inclusive accession policy; an end to discrimination between applicants in 
EU visa policies; supplementary financial aid and political support to the countries 
farthest from accession; more support to bottom-up sub-regional co-operation 
across CEE; the involvement of  applicants in external policies concerning their 
neighbours; and an overall EU strategy for the region that unites macro- and micro-
security concerns.
Few scholars argue that borders should be fully opened or that migration should 
be deregulated, for such a proposition would be dangerous and politically unfeasible. 
What they do argue is that the EU and its Member States should introduce some 
flexibility and foresight into migration strategies, as they do in their economic 
policies. If this can be done, enlargement will not pose as much of a threat to the 
migration regime of the old EU , instead, it will increase opportunities to manage 
migration and reduce human smuggling and trafficing. 
 ibid, p. .
 Grabbe () p. iii.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BORDER REGIONS OF HUNGARY, ROMANIA, 
UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA
The EU’s immigration strategies focus on protecting the sovereignty of the Member 
States from transnational labour markets. Koff has argued that this approach 
does not adequately address market forces that drive migration, either legal or 
clandestine. Instead, the EU should link its migration policies to regional sub-
national and trans-national development. Organised crime has already responded 
to the fundamental structural changes in labour markets that now extend beyond 
borders. Regulation policies should respond to these shifts as well in order to 
manage the flows of workers successfully.
The EU’s regional policies have always recognised the internal differences that 
exist in the national economic marets. It seems counterintuitive that this logic is 
not utilised in migration strategies. egional differences obviously create diverging 
needs for labour. In some EU-countries, most notably in Italy, regional governors 
have a voice in the compilation of the yearly migration quotas based on local 
economic requisites. Blanet border controls ignore these local needs, thus creating 
a maret for illegal migration. In the new Member States migration pressures are 
especially sensitive. These states face a need for inexpensive labour in expanding 
economic marets, administrative and economic difficulties regarding border 
controls, and significant blac maret economies. As it has been mentioned earlier, 
trans-national economies have developed in many East European border regions 
where maret and ethnic lins predominate over national security interests.
The point is that if the EU were to address the migration issue more in terms 
of economic development and less in terms of security,  enlargement could offer 
the Union the opportunity to manage migration in areas closer to the sending 
states. Instead of addressing the ‘immigration problem’, the EU should focus 
more of its efforts on building infrastructures in the new Member States, fighting 
organised crime and regulating the large blac maret economies. By concentrating 
on these issues, the Union’s member states could provide a greater pool of legal 
jobs in Central and Eastern Europe, similar to those created in Southern Europe 
during the economic miracle of the s and the boom of the s. Moreover, 
by combating blac maret employment and deterring owners from hiring illegal 
 Koff () p. .
 ibid, p. .
 Ibid
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migrants by invoing measures such as fines, Member States could diminish the 
opportunities open to this latter group and reduce contact between migrants active 
in the irregular labour force and recruiters for criminal economic marets. 
Turning back to security and boundaries, we should mention an important 
observation made by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde:
‘In Eastern Europe, an entire set of new or newly independent states are grouping 
toward a pattern of security relations for which no historical precedent exists. 
As the dust of the Soviet collapse settles, we could be looking at the formation of 
several new security complexes. Crucial to this process will be how well or how 
badly the EU handles the tensions of its integrative-disintegrative dynamics. Also 
crucial will be whether Russia succeeds in reasserting itself as the hegemonic 
player within the CIS and whether the EU and the CIS conduct their relationship 
so as to create one integrated security region or two separate ones.’ 
As noted earlier, the new Member States in East Europe are particularly sensitive 
to migration pressures. This is probably even more so in the border regions for the 
following reasons. 
The nature of boundaries is filtering at best. Therefore, they perform several 
of the activities described in the chapter on borders. Because of their location, 
the regions around them are more directly influenced by clandestine migration 
and organised crime, especially since these phenomena are taing place on their 
territories. This in itself maes them less attractive for the vast majority of the 
population to reside there. Lundén’ s setch helps to explain the structural problem 
that border regions encounter.
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Figure . A local but trans-national matter’s path 
in the administrative system
Source: Lundén () p. 
We can assume that a boundary has negative effects on a border region’s 
development since  a problem shared across the border should usually be tacled 
first by regional and then by national authorities. This is because the nation-state’s 
boundary divides  two hierarchical systems of decision-maing territories. There is 
often the  ris that information becomes distorted or de-prioritized. 
In addition, peripheral regions already tend to be less developed than more central 
areas within the nation-states, especially in Eastern Europe. This is partly due to the 
centralised nature of power and administration, and more generally, because it is in 
a state’s interest to integrate itself inwards, towards the centre. In principle, economic 
development taes place upwards in the hierarchy, which brings with it an increased 
significance of contacts, information and management on higher hierarchical levels, 
while lins between states or regions on lower levels lose in importance. As a 
result, infrastructure between states is still wea; exemplified by the remarably 
low number of border crossing points in the area. This is particularly unfortunate 
in a region that will probably once again become increasingly divided through the 
strengthening of borders, this time in the form of the EU’s external boundary, i.e. 
the border of the Schengen-zone. The number of crossing points should be increased 
immediately as well as co-operation with the Uraine and Moldova, in ways that do 
not conflict with CIS-interests. To begin with, the dialogue between EU- and CIS-
representatives has to be improved considerably. 
Finally, as scholars lie off and icinger have pointed out, sub-national 
or interregional co-operation is almost non-existent in security matters. Given 
 Lundén () p. .
 ibid
26
EU E E: A T  E S
27
EU E E: A T  E S
the relative successes of transnational organisations established within the EU-
framewor such as Euroregions and communautés de travail (AGEs) in economic 
and cultural fields, for example, it is surprising how little competence has been 
delegated to local and regional levels. The current situation shows the extent 
to which security is still reserved for the level of units (states) and limited for 
subsystems (international. organisations) and subunits (the sub-national level). 
The subunit level needs to become more powerful in tacling security issues as 
well, because it is strongly and directly influenced by them. Only thus can the 
negative consequences for Europe’s border regions be mitigated and future Eastern 
enlargements turned into a more successful and more ‘secure’ project. 
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GLOBAL AND EGIONAL SUBJECTIVITY OF THE 
EU AND THE CASE OF UAINE IN ELATIONS 
WITH THE NATO, THE USA AND USSIA
SERGII GLEBOV
The EU, with four G members out of eight and two constant UN Security Council 
members out of five, is the largest integrative community in the world with a 
perspective of federalization. It is doomed to play a super-active role in the process 
of constructing a multi-polar world by being one of its leaders. In this respect the EU 
tends to be a global player in order to fulfil such a mission successfully. At the same 
time, it is not accidental, that the question ‘are Europeans ready for global tasks?’ 
is still more than acute for the European community of political experts nowadays. 
The EU’s global subjectivity has been put to test by the EU–USA, the EU–NATO, 
and the EU–Russia relations. At the same time, with its Neighbourhood Policy and 
Common Foreign and Security Policy the European Union itself has made a huge 
impact on the pan-European and Euro-Atlantic relations especially after the last 
enlargement. In a capacity of undisputed center of power at least in Europe, the 
EU appears to be an even more dramatic contributor to the international situation 
in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Danube region, than, let us say, the 
NATO. For example, it is the EU and not the NATO, that drew the new borders in 
Eastern Europe in the course of the May ,  enlargement, closing the borders 
between the new EU members and the new EU neighbours, including the Ukraine. 
Either within the context of EU Neighbourhood policy or outside it the Uraine 
can be a test for the EU on its way to the global activity. As a result of the recent 
EU enlargement with its territorial restrictions due to the uncertain roots of the 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration, the Uraine has appeared in the middle 
of a ‘gray zone’ arising on the East of the European Union. Such ‘gray zones’ are 
products of the dissolution of the previous centers of power where ‘vacuum of 
power’ appeared and made them objects of the unfinished competition of the old 
and new global powers for the geopolitical domination over such zones. 
For the EU, the NATO and ussia the issue of the ‘gray’ neighborhood in 
Europe is not just a simple term. The international space between the enlarged EU 
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and NATO, on the one hand, and ussia, on the other, attracts serious interest, 
concern and involvement on the part of the USA as well, even when geographically 
the US seems to be far away from Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, there 
is not only the issue of common borders, but a larger scope of problems which 
are currently under consideration in iev, Brussels, Moscow and Washington, 
especially when the geographical factor plays almost no role for the White House, 
but political motivation and global national interests are all the more important. 
Each of the actors has its own vision of the future developments in countries lie 
Belarus, Moldova, the Uraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
In this respect, the EU is able to intervene as an equal global and regional 
player into the practical discourse and geopolitical tensions over Western NIS 
and especially the Uraine. Such tensions, when the EU prefers to remain in the 
shadow, develop primarily between the NATO and the USA on the one hand, and 
ussia, on the other. At the same time, some more active geopolitical efforts on 
the part of the EU could give opportunity for more dialogue, rather than just a 
passive support in the form of the great powers’ unilateral monologues about such 
‘gray zone’. On the one hand, the EU, despite all its recent criticism towards the 
US, is interested in continuing strategic partnership with America and relies on 
it within the NATO (especially when there is no serious alternative for NATO in 
Europe and the transformation of the Euro-Atlantic collective security architecture 
into just a European one is far from the reality). On the other hand, the EU is also 
interested to have the goodwill of and stable political and economic relations with 
ussia, especially in the face of the acute energy situation at the EU maret. (Energy 
Charter). When the geopolitical future of Uraine is concerned the EU—caught up 
between the USA, the NATO and ussia—shows almost no geopolitical ambitions 
that might contradict the policy of the NATO. 
Of course, we find big differences in the concrete mechanisms related to 
geopolitical ambitions of any single country and international unit, lie the EU 
or the NATO. Contrarily to the USA and ussia, the EU and the NATO do have a 
potential ability and capacity to integrate new territories and states in them and by 
doing this, to fill the ‘vacuum of power.’ The Uraine can be—at least in theory—
part of the EU and the NATO as an independent and sovereign state, but can not 
be part of the USA or ussia. At this point we should emphasise another important 
issue: the Western allies have more chances for successfully in integrating the 
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Uraine, because here we have the EU and NATO on the same side, while ussia is 
only trying to propose its mechanism of re-integration into  a ind of  ‘mini’-CIS: 
a Single Economic Space. Meanwhile, it is more or less evident, that NATO, as one 
of the integrative mechanisms of the West, shows considerably more geopolitical 
ambitions and appetite, than the EU. 
The EU and NATO appeared to be in the vanguard of the international 
processes, which are shaping the future of Europe. At the same time, tactical 
approaches to the EU’s and NATO’s Eastern borders and towards the Uraine have 
a slightly different meaning in both Brussels’ headquarters. The NATO and the EU 
are generally accepted in the Uraine, and not only as a homogenous West, that is 
true from the conceptual point of view (even if the NATO has mainly military and 
the EU economic priorities). At the same time, there is a ey difference between the 
NATO and the EU relations with the Uraine: the NATO, focusing on military and 
geopolitical issues is more pro-Urainian because of the global US position on the 
one hand, and the ussian factor on the other. There is no USA in the EU, so the EU 
is more selfish and less pro-Urainian because of its own high-standard economic 
interests and ussian dependence on energy and common military neighborhood. 
What is more, the issue of the Uraine in relations between the USA and the 
EU itself have become part of a contradictory never-ending story on European 
Eurocentrism and European Atlantism (though, it also resembles the case of Turey 
in the relations between NATO, the USA and the EEC/EU). 
Anyway, with this difference in mind and from a tactical point of view, we can 
say that it is easier for the Uraine to get a full NATO membership than to join 
the EU. At the same time NATO membership may be seen as a ey step for the 
Uraine on the way to the EU and may facilitate the process. European integration 
is sometimes seen as a continuation and integral part of Euro-Atlantic integration. 
It is both true and not true at the same time. It is ‘Yes’ for some Central and Eastern 
European countries, which became NATO members first and then members of the 
EU and ‘No’ for Turey, which became a NATO member a number of decades ago 
and has desperately been waiting for EU membership for almost the same period 
of time. Of course, there were different international situations—‘Cold War’ and 
‘Post-Cold War’ periods—when the decisions on the NATO and EU enlargements 
were taen. But still, the two organizations are so close to each other and basically 
co-operate as a single instrument, so for the outsiders there is almost no conceptual 
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difference between tactical membership in the EU and membership in the NATO 
on the way to the strategic aim—to be part of the democratic and stable Europe. 
Of course, there is an institutional difference for those European countries that 
are members of NATO, but not members of the EU, and visa versa, but no actual 
difference for those who are outside both organizations. Even for the neutral Austria 
or Sweden, for example, there is no urgent need to be part of NATO: NATO will 
remain ignorant of any military threat to these countries. They already are inside 
NATO’s zone of responsibility. For the Uraine this could also be the solution: to 
remain neutral, but to continue its way to the EU by building Europe within its 
frontiers. But today, when it is much more realistic to aspire to join the NATO 
within the next  or  years than to join the EU even within the next - years, it 
is important for the Uraine to tae this crucial step into the democratic European 
space by means of NATO membership which also requires not only military, but 
also political obligations to develop democracy and maret economy. 
This is why the question of the Uraine’s NATO membership can be negotiated 
and realized much than the Uraine’s EU membership. This is also the reason why 
the issue of Uraine’s NATO membership is so painful for ussia from several 
points of view, but the most painful fact is, that the Uraine may join the NATO and 
get out of the ussian zone of influence. ussia is more flexible and relaxed when 
taling about Uraine and the EU, because there is no reason to panic. The EU does 
not open itself up for Uraine institutionally either now, or in the foreseeable future. 
It would also be interesting to see ussian foreign policy towards the Uraine the 
moment, when the issue of its membership in the EU is seriously brought up.
Of course, the EU is more complicated as a single unit than the NATO. Here 
is another important aspect of the comparison between the integrative abilities of 
the EU and the NATO: What is it actually that maes the NATO objectively more 
flexible in its strategy of enlargement? Taling about the NATO enlargement, we 
stress basically the ‘widening’ of the Alliance. At the same time, the issue of the 
EU enlargement touches upon the painful issue of not only ‘widening’, but also 
‘deepening’ the integration. As far as we now, the EU faces more acute problems 
in this respect than the NATO. This is why the question of potential new members, 
or even the preparatory stage of negotiations and wor poses so many problems to 
the EU members. The EU’s internal problems and its complicated decision-maing 
mechanism manifested themselves in the failed story of the EU Constitution. 
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Current problems inside the EU, which go well beyond the discourse on the 
Constitution, show that the future membership of the Uraine in the EU is a big 
question not only for political reasons or a geopolitical choice of ‘widening’, but 
because of the specific parameters of ‘deepening’: i.e.economic, financial, maret, 
labour, social and foreign policy complications. The perspective of the next round 
of EU enlargement with some Balan states and Turey is also far from being 
solved. At the same time it is also clear, that covering more European space by 
future rounds of enlargement implemented at any price is obviously not a top 
priority for the EU. 
The opposite approach has been applied by NATO since the middle of the 
th century, when the idea to cover as much geopolitical space as possible at any 
price prevailed over the necessary criteria of membership. The case of an unstable 
South Caucasus and Georgia is more than instructive, because NATO is not in 
favour of new members, which have unsolved national or international military 
and territorial disputes. At the same time, the reason for including Georgia in 
the NATO—what the US is pushing almost on the edge of hysteria now—seems 
to be the same as it was in the case of Turey and Greece bac in : the level of 
democracy and military instability on the territory of the potential candidate is 
nothing compared to the geopolitical aim. In theory it was the communist threat 
to Turey and Greece that made the US protect the democracies neighboring the 
USS by including them into the NATO in the early s. The situation changed to 
ussian threat to Georgian independence in early . In practice, the US achieved 
the same objective both in the middle of the th century and in the beginning of 
the st century: to push ussia out of the Wider Blac Sea region by stretching the 
NATO zone of responsibility as far as the Caspian Sea. In this sense, the NATO 
does not fear the dangerous challenge presented by the unstable region. It was in 
these conditions that ussia’s Chief of Staff Yuriy Balyevsiy openly proclaimed in 
October , that NATO is the cause of the worsening relations between ussia 
and Georgia, explaining the source of the bilateral crisis, which put both sides on 
the edge of the war in autumn . The EU showed a different approach to the 
issue of enlargement during the period of EEC. Turey is still outside the EU and 
Greece was admitted as a member only when the political situation was ready for 
democracy in this Balan country in the early s.
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Of course, once again we must to point out, that NATO is basically a military 
bloc, while the EU is more economy oriented, and the interests of a military 
organization, may not necessarily coincide with the interests of an economic 
union. Anyway, we are coming to the ey question: Is it possible to be a global 
power without clear geopolitical ambitions? The answer is probably ‘yes’, taing 
into consideration, that the EU may play a leading role in Europe without the 
need to immediately integrate such European countries as the Uraine, into this 
organization, especially, when European integration as a process is much wider 
than just EU membership. In this respect, the EU still has a lot of potential and 
capacity to extend stability and democracy across Europe, including ussia, the 
Uraine and other New Independent States. The ey issues in this context are civil 
society building, establishing rule of law and strengthening maret economy in a 
wider European zone. By developing its neighbourhood policy, the EU is interested 
in sharing with its non-EU neighbours agendas that could also be considered as 
an expression of the EU’s geopolitical interest and even ambition in the Eastern 
European dimension. The same is true for the interest the EU has in maing the 
visa requirements easier and more flexible for the Uraine in the near future, and 
in establishing a free trade zone there, what will become possible when the Uraine 
obtains WTO membership. The suggestion that the EU’s neighbourhood policy 
could be treated as a geopolitical ambition of the EU seems to be confirmed by the 
fact, that it meets some obstacles and opposition from another EU neighbour—
the ussian Federation. In the centre of the EU’s geopolitical ambition we find 
concentration of will, wish, decisions, challenges and riss, which meet nearly the 
same level of opposition from the other side. 
The EU–ussia relations with the Western NIS in between of them are 
characterised by certain geopolitical tensions between the United Europe and 
ussia, even though they are less dramatic than the relations between ussia and 
the NATO. The European integration, which is in the core of the process, has no 
global political aims, but to spread European values in Europe. The strength of 
European values oriented on democracy is to be introduced also in the Uraine, 
now that the Uraine has constitutionally proclaimed itself a democratic country. 
The issue of democratic values is painful for the ussian Federation, which is subject 
of criticism coming from the European Commission and the European parliament. 
When the issue of democracy is high on the agenda of the EU–ussian dialogue 
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about the so-called ussian ‘near abroad’, the hottest and most controversial topic is 
the evaluation of the Presidential or Parliamentary elections in Western NIS. As far 
as common democratic values are concerned, the EU is interested in incorporating 
the post-Soviet space into a democratic European chain, but refuses to act more 
aggressively and propose institutional membership so as not to worsen relations 
with ussia. In this situation the EU faces some geopolitical restrictions when 
trying to deal with the ussian sphere of influence. 
At the same time, the EU has recently extended its borders as far as the Blac 
Sea by the institutional membership of Bulgaria and omania in January . Both 
countries shoo off the political influence of ussia in s, which restricted the 
chances of co-operation between the EU and ussia. In the field of regional security 
the EU and ussia have developed similar approaches: both centers of power are 
interested in eeping the Baltic-Blac Sea region in a state of stability, especially 
now that the EU has a common border with ussia in the Baltic region and strong 
energy dependence. The future Novorossiis-Burgas-Alesandropolis oil route and 
the Northern Baltic gas pipeline between ussia and Germany will only strengthen 
this connection. 
The most evident regional problem and source of conflict is the situation in 
Moldova and Transnistria. The EU and ussia have different approaches to the 
issue of Transnistria. At the same time, both Brussels and Moscow are interested 
in a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol, though 
Brussels is basically concerned with the protection of its boundaries in South-
Eastern Europe, while ussia is playing a long-term geopolitical game in the post-
Soviet space. Concerning this issue the foreign policy of omania towards Moldova 
may be crucial in defining future EU-ussian relations in the Wider Blac Sea and 
neighboring regions. Anyway, the geopolitical appearance of the EU on the Blac 
Sea shores maes the EU as a new regional player with a mission to stabilise and this 
should be received positively in the interest of security conditions in the region.
In this respect the EU may play a new stabilizing role in the region in order to 
escape tensions between the center-powers, i.e. the USA and ussia and eep the 
local conflicts within the Wider Blac Sea region, or at least in ‘frozen’ conditions. 
Here ussia may play on the EU-US contradictions, including the NATO dilemmas, 
dependency of the EU on ussian energy and the more than cautious attitude of the 
EU towards inviting the Blac Sea Newly Independent States in the ussian sphere 
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of influence into the United Europe. ussia may use the passive Blac Sea dimension 
of the EU policy in regional deterrence by banning American penetration into the 
Wider Blac Sea region.
At the same time, the rapprochement of the EU and ussia has another factor 
in the bacground. The interdependence of ussia and the EU based on ussian 
oil and gas and the EU’s financial possibilities to buy ussian energy maes the 
two sides important partners for a long-term. The Uraine plays a ey role in 
connecting ussian gas with the European maret. The gas transit crisis between 
ussia and the Uraine late -early  was looed upon as a serious threat 
for the energy security in Europe. The EU was shoced by the temporal instability 
in the gas supply and showed deep concern about its energy security. The idea of 
possible diversification of energy dependence on ussia does not seem a feasible, 
especially when it is quite hard to find alternative sources in a situation, when 
energy consumption is expected to be constantly increasing in the future. In this 
case the EU is interested in having a stable transit of ussian gas via the territory of 
Uraine in the future. Obviously, the EU intends to negotiate pragmatically with 
ussia directly, taing non-economic interests on the bac stage of relations with 
ussia and other NIS. The lac of geopolitical ambitions on the front of economic 
pragmatism may lead to a most unpleasant scenario for the Uraine namely, that 
the EU promises ussia not to give the Uraine membership perspectives, not to 
intervene into ussian–Urainian relations and to ‘close eyes’ to the deficiencies 
of democracy in the Uraine. In its turn, ussia can guarantee the stability of 
the ussian gas transit via the territory of Uraine. A weaening of the EU’s 
‘democratic pressure’ to push democratic reforms in the Uraine, may create the 
perfect external conditions for strengthening the non-democratic elements of any 
Urainian regime, which, under this scenario, become untouchable for the EU and 
ussia inside the Uraine; Uraine should side with ussian international interests. 
In this scheme the EU will strengthen its energy security and will not be bothered 
by Urainian claims for membership any more. ussia will eep the Uraine in its 
sphere of influence going as far as sharing and privatizing Urainian gas and oil 
transport systems, non-democratic Urainian regimes will do its business under 
cover on a pragmatic basis both with the EU and ussia. Such a scenario is not very 
favourable for the democratically oriented Urainian society and Urainian Euro-
optimists, who are not interested in having a Uraine that is just a passive object of 
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pragmatic negotiations between the EU and ussia ready to sacrifice freedom and 
democracy for the material stability of post-Soviet oligarchs and the energy security 
of the EU at any price. At the same time, such a scenario has a strong potential to 
become more realistic in near future. 
The relationship between ussia and the EU in the field of energy security on 
a broad scale will also test the EU’s ability to act as a global player, because the 
issue of ussian gas and oil touches upon a lot more than energy itself. The need to 
create a stable European energy security architecture in Europe including ussia 
and other NIS will have an increasing influence on the political, economic and 
military equilibrium of the whole Trans-Atlantic area. The process of ‘enlarging’ 
and especially ‘deepening’ of the EU in the forthcoming years, the dividing line 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe as well as the future role of the USA and ussia 
in Europe is highly dependent on the common approach of the EU to the issue of 
ensuring European energy security. In this sense, more attention should be paid 
to the ris that the EU has to face for not being able to maintain the common 
approach to the future of energy security. Energy ambitions of some EU leaders, 
namely Germany, may create complications in identifying the EU’s common 
foreign and security policy towards the outsiders: ussia, the Uraine and the 
USA. This is why the European Commission published a Green Paper on th March 
 on developing a common, coherent European Energy Policy, which aims at 
developing a common approach for all EU members. The unresolved instability of 
the European energy maret may weaen the EU’s regional and global positions, 
because it is quite problematic to pursue the balance of power with ussia and the 
USA on the one hand, and defend European positions on regional and global levels, 
on the other hand. When ussia (as well as USA) is acting as a single player with 
the adopted strategy and tactics, the EU—which ‘is not one, it is many’—is far from 
having homogeneity in decision maing, especially in foreign policy. The famous 
EU democratic collegiality towards any acute international agenda may not wor in 
a situation, when there are clashes of interests within the EU between particular EU 
members as a result of specific national interests in the energy sector. At this stage, 
EU members prefer to depart from the EU level of collegiality with its restrictions 
on egoistic (in a positive, natural meaning) national interests to the bilateral level 
to conclude deals, especially with non-EU members. Consequently, the common 
power of the EU decreases on the international level, and sometimes crises occur 
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in the internal relations while the positions of a concrete EU country may be 
strengthened separately both inside and outside EU. 
The recently developed energy relations between ussia and Germany are 
an excellent example for the above-mentioned case. The close ‘energy’ relations 
between Germany and ussia on the issue of creating a new, direct gas pipeline 
in the Baltic region obviously without Urainian involvement, worries Poland, 
three Baltic states and Sweden as well. The further rapprochement of ussia and 
Germany (which has been quite steady in the last - years) in the frame of the 
Shtoman deposit and the strengthened energy tandem of Germany and France 
established in October , may deepen dissatisfaction within the EU with the 
line ‘Old Europe’–‘New Europe’, which became evident some time ago in the course 
of the disputes on the role of the US in Europe and in the world as a whole. As a 
result, the close relations between Germany, France and ussia, especially in the 
energy field, will provoe the US and its ‘New’ European supporters to destabilize 
the rapprochement of the three.
The ‘New Europe’ which is in favour for the American political and military 
presence on the European continent will be interested in supporting all American 
initiatives to counter-balance the ‘Old Europe’–ussian initiatives. The Uraine will 
also be interested in developing its relations with the USA in order to strengthen 
its chances to join NATO, especially when the political situation in the country 
will be in favor of NATO membership and when the EU, basically led by Germany 
and France, will prefer to sacrifice the Urainian anticipations to become an EU 
member in favour of stable energy relations with ussia thus guaranteeing that the 
Uraine remains in the ussian sphere of influence. Turey will also be interested 
in having the USA as deeply involved in the Blac Sea region as possible to counter-
balance ussia and the EU, especially after the anti-Turish manifestations of 
France, directed against a potential EU and current NATO member.
Anyway, the EU has taen the challenge in order to strengthen its positions as 
a global power some time ago and by means of enlargement and wider integration 
has asserted itself as a powerful attracting pole for the international community. 
The lac of a global strategy is a natural factor for the international organization, 
which consists of  strategies. At the same time, it is not a problem, but rather 
an opportunity for the EU to be one of the leaders of the world, which is full of 
clashes. It may be against principles of the common foreign and security policy 
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of the EU, but it is involved into a global and regional competition together with 
other global powers. The Uraine may be seen as a ind of a geopolitical puzzle by 
the EU, because—by being in between ussia, on the one side, the NATO and the 
US, on the other—strongly contributes to the geopolitical subjectivity of the EU. 
By concentrating on the Uraine, the EU may intervene in the global competition 
between the USA and ussia. Paradoxically, the EU is already involved regardless 
of whether it is active in the integrative initiatives in the Uraine or remains 
passive, refraining from any constructive political step in relations with iev. In 
the first case, the EU supports the Western dimension of Urainian foreign policy 
by opening the perspective of EU membership to the country, helps the US push 
the NATO agenda for the Uraine and assists the country’s breaaway from the 
political orbit of Moscow. In the second case, the EU silently ignores the Western 
aspirations of the Uraine and strengthens the ties between iev and Moscow on a 
bilateral level. The global agenda is also in hands of Brussels, which is responsible 
for the scenario the EU chooses.
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THE EU AS A MILITAY CISIS MANAGE: 
ASSETS AND OBSTACLES
ARMAĞAN GÖZKAMAN
In early s, with the establishment of the ‘European Union’ by the Treaty of Maastricht, 
the twelve member countries pledged to have a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). Two main reasons led them to replace the EPC with the latter. The first one 
is related to the wish of incorporating security and defence issues into the community 
architecture. Conceived and implemented outside the community treaties, the EPC had 
achieved some success and become an important instrument for European integration 
over the years. Yet, maintaining the coordination between foreign policy and community 
acts was increasingly posing problems. CFSP was conceived to establish links between 
the supranational entity and the foreign policy practices of the member states. 
The changes in European security architecture represented the second reason for 
the passage from EPC to CFSP. Two strategic implications should to be highlighted 
in this context. Firstly, the monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat 
disappeared with the collapse of the communist bloc. The dissolution of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the disintegration of the USS in  put an end 
to the antagonism between the free world and the iron curtain countries. Secondly, 
a security vacuum appeared. Within this new environment, conflicts of a different 
nature broe out that the security organisations were not ready to deal with.  
The first implication could have provoed a divergence of views among 
Europeans. As Nicole Gnesotto put it, the post-Cold-War-era crises did not affect 
the vital interests of western democracies. Therefore, immediate solidarity and 
convergence of views related to the Soviet threat were not almost automatic anymore. 
Philip Gordon asserted a parallel view arguing that the end of the Cold War 
‘eliminated one of the strongest reasons for feeling the need of a collective security 
in Europe’. In the absence of a common enemy and the simplicity of the cold War’s 
bipolar system, ‘security interests were potentially more differentiated ’.
 Nicole Gnesotto, ‘Défense Européenne et Partenariat Atlantique’ in Françoise de la Serre & Christian 
Lequesne (Ed.), Quelle Union pour Quelle Europe. L’Aprés-Traité d’Amsterdam, Complexes, , p: .
 Philip H. Gordon, ‘Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy’, International Security, Vol: , No: , p: .
 Ibid.
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On the other hand, the new international context could be conceived as more 
favourable for the expression of a ‘European dimension’ of security. In fact, the new 
crises entailed serious concerns for the EU member states. Security and defence 
matters were subject of profoundly renewed discussions in the new era. It was thus the 
‘hour of Europe’ when a period of nearly half a century which had made all attempts 
to build an autonomous European security architecture inopportune was over. 
The new politico-strategic environment was characterized by the end of a bipolar 
dissuasive system and this made the emancipation of the various groups possible. 
Within this context, the EU had to undertae a new re-organisation. The substitution 
of the ‘European Security and Defence Identity’ with a ‘European Security and Defence 
Policy’ (ESDP) was a sign that the transformation would have practical aspects, and thus 
go beyond the conceptual discussions. However, in the words of Hans-Georg Ehrhart, 
it is not entirely unproblematic to spea of the Union as a crisis manager. It is true that 
the EU has made some serious achievements in the security and defence field (Chapter 
I). On the other hand, it has to confront some serious difficulties (Chapter II). 
PROGRESS OF THE ESDP
Since the ‘Helsinki Objective’ of , the EU has realized considerable developments 
in the field of crisis management. Related to military structures (a) and conceptual 
underpinnings (b), they are concretised in military and civilian operations (c).
a. Military structures
The Helsinki Summit agreed to set up a Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
to deal with all aspects of the CFSP. The Committee helps define the EU’s political 
guidelines. Charged with the preparation of the EU’s response to international 
crises, the PSC is the mainspring of the ESDP. In times of crisis, it provides 
‘political control and strategic direction’ for EU operations. Moreover, it maintains 
a privileged link with the Secretary-General/High Representative.
Under the auspices of the Council, the PSC taes responsibility for the political 
direction of the development of military capabilities. It wors in close connection 
with the Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
 Esra Çayhan, ‘Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası ve Türkiye’, Akdeniz İİBF Dergisi, , , p: .
 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, ‘The EU as a Civil-Military Crisis Manager’, International Journal, vol. , no. , 
Spring , p: . 
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Management (CIVCOM). Heads of crisis management operations, such as military 
commanders or EU special representatives, may attend its sessions. 
 The European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the highest military body 
established within the Council, is composed of the member states’ chiefs of defence 
who are represented at the weely meetings by their military representatives. The 
EUMC gives military advice and maes recommendations to the PSC. Monitoring 
the progress of military operations and evaluating the strategic options also belong 
among the Committee’s responsibilities. There is also a woring group (EUMCWG) 
performing the preparation of its wor. 
The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is the source of military expertise 
for the ESDP. The EUMS is to carry out early warning, situation assessment and 
strategic planning for Petersberg missions. This tas includes the identification of 
the European forces, either national or multinational, as well as the implementation 
of policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC. At this point, it is worth pointing 
out that the EUMS ensures the lin between the EUMC and the military resources 
available to the EU. It also ‘contributes to the process of elaboration, assessment and 
review of the capability goals’.
In addition to the above-mentioned bodies of the Council, the contribution of 
some agencies to the EU’s crisis management efforts is also worth mentioning. Based 
in Torrejon (Spain), the Satellite Centre is the successor of the WEU Satellite Centre 
meant to strengthen the EU’s early warning and crisis management functions. The 
PSC has been operational since January .  and is responsible for the political 
supervision of the centre’s activities related to information and analysis based on 
satellite imagery. Having its own legal personality in order to fulfil its mission, the 
centre also conducts research and development projects.
The EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) is another agency that was 
initially set up within the WEU structure. Established by the same Council Joint 
Action as the SATCEN, it aims to ‘help create a common European security culture, 
enrich the strategic debate, and systematically promote the interests of the Union’. As 
an autonomous agency, the EUISS performs three functions: research and debate 
on the major security and defence issues that are of relevance to the EU; forward-
 Council Decision //CFSP of  January .
 Council Joint Action //CFSP of  July . 
 www.eu-iss.org   
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looing analysis for the Union’s Council and High epresentative; development of 
a transatlantic dialogue on all security issues with the countries of Europe, Canada 
and the United States. 
The Council established a European Security and Defence College in July  
in line with the decision taen at the Thessalonii Summit of June . Operational 
since , it aims to develop a common security and defence culture among the 
EU member states. The ESDC is organised as a networ of national academies, 
colleges and institutes in the EU that are concerned with the above fields. Within 
this structure, the EU ISS will have an important role to play. 
The European Defence Agency was created in  to help EU member states 
improve their defence capabilities for crisis management operations under the ESDP. 
There are two main pillars to assist the Agency achieve its objectives. The first one is 
based on the encouragement of EU governments to increase defence expenditures in 
order to meet tomorrow’s challenges. The second is related to ‘helping them identify 
common needs’ and to ‘promoting collaboration to provide common solutions’. The 
Agency performs four functions covering the development of defence capabilities; 
co-operation in armament; the European defence, technological and industrial base 
and maret of defence equipment; research and technology. 
b. Conceptual underpinnings
In Thessaloniki the European Council adopted the paper entitled ‘A Secure Europe in 
a Better World. European Security Strategy’ prepared by the Secretary General / High 
Representative Javier Solana. This document is meant as an antidote for criticisms on 
the lack of a doctrine underpinning the EU’s foreign and security policy. 
The strategy paper devotes its first chapter to global challenges and ey threats 
to European security. It then puts forth the three objectives that the EU should 
achieve in order to defend its security and promote its values: extend the zone 
of security around Europe; strengthen international order by building effective 
multilateralism; counter the threats by combining military and non-military 
instruments. 
In the last chapter, J. Solana affirms that EU members should be more active, 
more coherent and more capable in order to mae a contribution to world peace that 
will match their potential. He goes on by emphasising the necessity to co-operate 
 http://www.eda.europa.eu 
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with partners, not without mentioning the irreplaceability of the transatlantic 
relationship. Before concluding on its contribution, he underlines the necessity 
for the EU to improve its capacity to wor with other ey actors and to extend the 
networ of partnership. 
By adopting the ESS, the EU declared the responsibilities it intends to tae in 
the international arena. In line with this development, the member states pledged 
themselves to become capable of responding to crisis management operations, by 
, in a rapid and decisive way. Interoperability of the forces, their deployability 
and sustainability are the focal points of the document called Headline Goal . 
The framewor of Headline Goal  incorporates the missions envisioned in 
the ESS (joint disarmament operations, the support of third countries in combating 
terrorism and security sector reform) and, thus it goes beyond the Petersberg 
missions. The document also points out the necessity for the EU to be capable of 
conducting ‘several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement ’.
A high readiness of force deployment is also envisaged. The units may be of a 
stand-alone type or parts of a larger operation enabling follow on phases. In what 
concerns the rapidity of decision-maing, the aspiration of the EU is to be able to 
decide on the launch of an operation ‘within  days after the approval of the Crisis 
Management Concept by the Council ’. Concerning the deployment of units, the goal is 
to mae it possible ‘no later than  days after the EU decision to launch the operation’. 
The concept of battlegroups was announced in Headline Goal , but other 
forums have also put it on their agenda. During the Le Touquet summit of  February 
.  France and the United ingdom affirmed their conviction of the necessity 
to improve, in order to meet the needs of immediate reaction forces, additional 
European capabilities ‘in planning and deploying forces at short notice, including 
initial deployment of land, sea and air forces within - days’. The discussions on 
establishing joint tactical groups composed of around , soldiers were renewed 
after the Artemis operation. 
Such a mechanism would allow the EU to improve its rapid reaction capability, to 
contribute to the initial phase of large operations, to carry out autonomous missions 
and to support United Nations operations. EU battle groups are to conduct two 
operations nearly simultaneously by . They will be sustainable for  days; but 
 Headline Goal  as approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on  May  
endorsed by the European Council of  and  June . 
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this timeframe can be extended to  days by rotation. The distance of deployment 
may reach out as far as , ilometers from Europe. The establishment of these 
groups is based on the principle of multi-nationality. A ‘framewor nation’ may 
prevail in its formulation. It is not surprising  that the ey criteria are the concept of 
‘interoperability’and ‘military effectiveness’. 
The European Capability Action Plan was another significant step for the EU. 
In November , EU defence ministers agreed to meet the capability gaps. This 
decision conforms to the declarations made since the Helsini summit. The main 
objective of the plan is to improve the capability of dealing with international crises. 
The importance of rationalizing the member states’ defence efforts and increasing 
the synergy between their projects for enhancing European military capability is 
highlighted in the plan.
ECAP is based on three principles. The first one is related to enhancing 
effectiveness and efficiency of European military capability efforts. The second is 
the bottom-up approach to European defence co-operation—which refers mainly to 
the voluntary basis of the member states’ commitments. The last principle is related 
to the coordination between EU member states and co-operation with NATO—the 
latter is meant, in a broad sense, to avoid wasteful duplication.
c. Military operations within the ESDP framework
After the disagreement on the Berlin plus agreement was solved, the EU could launch 
military operations. The first one is known as FYRM/Concordia. On . January  
the European Council adopted a joint action to take over from NATO the military 
operation known as Allied Harmony in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYRM). The decision was taken in conformity with the demand coming from the 
Macedonian government. Following the Macedonian government’s request, the mission 
was prolonged until . December . The mandate was not subject to change.
 Franco-British Summit Declaration on Strengthening European Co-operation in Security and Defense, 
Le Touquet,  February . 
 Concordia is the first military crisis management operation launched by the EU but it is the second in 
the ESDP framework.
 Council Joint Action //CFSP of . January .  
 Council conclusions on Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.Bulletin 
EU /- (http://europa.eu/bulletin/en//p.htm). 
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According to a Council document the mission had two main objectives. 
The first was to guarantee security and stability in the region and to allow the 
implementation of the framewor-agreement signed in Ohrid in . The second 
was to stabilise Macedonia to the extent that no international presence should be 
needed on its soil any more. 
Concordia had a modest size of -strong force, including a staff of  civilians. It 
was also the first concretization of the strategic partnership between NATO an the EU in 
this field. Within the ESDP framewor, the EU then continued to contribute to stability 
in the region with the EUPOL Proxima police operation as will be shown below.
Artemis is the second military operation implemented by the EU. On . May 
, the United Nations Security Council adopted unanimously esolution  
on the deployment of an interim multinational force in Bunia (Democratic epublic 
of Congo). As a reply to the call made by ofi Annan on all UN member states to 
provide for a temporary force, the Council of the EU adopted a joint action in order 
to intervene in the region. The aim was to improve security conditions and the 
humanitarian situation in Bunia. 
The mission in Congo, albeit accomplished in three months, is an important step for 
the EU towards becoming a global actor. It was the EU’s most rapid response ever given 
to an international crisis. Europeans wored in co-ordination with the United Nations 
Mission in Congo, without recourse to NATO assets. This was the first out-of-Europe 
mission which combined civil and military dimensions of crisis management.
EUFO-Althea is the biggest operation conducted by the EU, comprising 
around . troops seconded by  countries. Launched in late  as a follow-
on to NATO’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the mission is 
still continuing. It is carried out with recourse to the transatlantic organisation’s 
assets. EUFO aims to ‘contribute to a safe and secure environment ’ in the region, 
and support it to achieve its long-term political objectives.
 EU-Led Operations in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Master Messages, Council of the European 
Union,, /, Brussels, //  (http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en//st/sten.pdf). 
 ‘Council Joint Action //CFSP of  June .
 Michéle Bacot-Décriaud, ‘La PESD: Montée en Puissance et Perfectibilité’ in Patrice Buffotot (Ed.), La 
Défense en Europe. Avancées et Limites, La Documentation Française, Paris, , p:. 
 Alessia Brava, L’Union Européenne, Acteur Global? Potentialité et Limites de la PESC et de la PESD, 
Institut Européen de l’Université de Genéve, , p:.
 The operation is based on the Joint Action //CFSP adopted in // by the Council. 
 European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (http://www.euforbih.org/sheets/fsa.htm). 
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To date the latest military operation of the European Union—within the 
framewor of the ESDP—was launched in support of the UN mission in the 
Democratic epublic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process. The 
operation is nown as EUFO D Congo. The Council decision was taen two days 
after the UNSC esolution  authorizing the EU to deploy forces in the region. 
More than  people were seconded from  EU member countries and Turey. 
WEAKNESSES OF THE ESDP
There are some serious weaknesses that stand against the EU’s capacity to deal 
with international crises: the lack of political will (a), difficulties relating to the 
reconciliation of national and community interests (b), financial problems (c) and 
transatlantic ambiguities (d). 
a. The absence of a common will and a common strategy
One of the major problems of ESDP is the reluctance of member states to give up 
their political decision-making monopoly within a supranational entity. At present, 
risk evaluation in foreign policy remains a nation-state priority in which specific 
perceptions dictated by geographic, historic and political considerations play an 
important role. Policy makers can hardly overcome the priorities of national interest 
in favour of the Union’s interests. 
The rule of ‘political Europe’ remains the preservation of the principle of ‘national’. 
As a corollary, the European treaties on which governmental representatives agree 
reflect a complex architecture. In fact, the majority of governments accept that 
the CFSP must be provided with the necessary means to build a powerful Union. 
However, member states can agree neither on the institutional structure to be 
adopted nor the operational capabilities to be set up—not to mention the speed or 
the range of the reforms to be introduced. 
The former British Foreign Minister Malcolm ifind was right in saying that the 
Union does not have a vision of world that is coherent and shared by all its members. His 
argument that this vision is not bolstered by instincts that are profoundly infused within 
a nation-state, being thus—at the origin of foreign policy maing—also pertinent. 
 Council Joint Action //CFSP of  April . 
 Quoted in Peter Van Ham, ‘La Construction d’Une Europe Politique: La Politique Etrangčre et de 
Sécurité Commune’ in Anne-Marie Le Gloannec (Ed.), Entre Union et Nations. L’Etat en Europe, 
Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, , p:.
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Foreign and security policies of the member states continue to rely mainly upon 
‘national reflexes’. Political visions and cultures differ from one country to another—
a fact that obstructs the definition of a unique and coherent CFSP.
The reason why substantial progress was not made in terms of security and 
defence policy during treaty revisions is the lac of agreement among member 
states. Some prefer a pragmatic approach with reluctance to let community method 
extend to intergovernmental procedures. Others opt for a closer connection 
between European integration and the political domain. Even the countries that 
have closer views may not agree on how far to deepen the Union. 
Because of their differing diplomatic traditions, the member states adopt different 
attitudes in a crisis situation. Maing an exhaustive list goes beyond the aim of this 
paper, but pointing out some cleavages seems to be a pertinent effort. For instance, 
although all of the EU member states agree upon the legitimacy of an independent 
Palestinian state, some of them are more pro-Israeli than others. An autonomous 
European defence structure is not the best option for all member states, the transatlantic 
lins being more fervently defended by some of them. There is no agreement among 
EU capitals on the regions of the world that require priority treatment either. One 
can also argue that permanent member status in the UN Security Council puts two 
member states on a distinct platform in international relations. 
b. Difficulties of reconciling community and national interests
The sophisticated structure of the European Union is one reason for the 
inefficiencies observed in the field of ESDP at the institutional level. This is due to 
the peculiarity of the EU, which is a sui generis polity where national interests are to 
be reconciled with supranational (community) ones. As a result, the configuration 
of the CFSP/ESDP includes competing institutions. The Council has competence 
over the entire three-pillar-structure while the Commission’s initiative prerogative 
is limited to the first community pillar although it is involved in the CFSP process.
The Treaty on the European Union states that the Union shall ‘ensure the 
consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, 
security, economic and development policies’. The Treaty provides that co-operation 
between the Council and the Commission is necessary for such consistency. Each 
 Ibid. 
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of theses institutions, ‘in accordance with [their] respective powers’, will ensure the 
implementation of these policies.
However, the implementation of the above-mentioned article poses some problems. 
Pascal Gauttier points to the differences in the interpretation of the two institutions: 
‘[T]he Community approach advocated by the Commission, based on the mutually 
reinforcing nature of the CFSP with the first pillar, argued for a strengthening of 
its role in the CFSP; on the contrary, the Council’s intergovernmental approach 
held the CFSP to cover all aspects of foreign policy and security, and favoured 
adopting general positions to define strategies without going into specific details 
for their implementation. The Council of the EU thus deemed it possible to 
determine measures falling under the first pillar at the outset, while clearly 
imposing CFSP decisions on the Commission.’ 24
He also underscores that, in addition to this divergence of interpretations, 
there is also a competition between the administrative structures, exacerbated by 
the development of the ESDP. It is hard to refute his assertion. That institutional 
rivalries go against the will of the TEU in what concerns the harmonious 
functioning of the CFSP is a matter of fact.
c. Financial questions
Article  of the TEU, distinguishes between administrative and operational 
expenditures of crisis management operations. The Treaty stipulates that 
‘administrative expenditure, which the provisions relating to the areas referred to 
[the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy] entail for the institutions, shall be 
charged to the budget of the European Communities’. The same financing procedure 
goes for the operational expenditures, unless they arise from ‘operations having 
military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously 
decides otherwise’. 
If, in a given case, the expenditure is not undertaen by the budget of the 
European Communities, it will be ‘charged to the Member States in accordance 
with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides 
 Pascal Gauttier, ‘Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the EU’, European Law 
Journal, Vol. , no. , January , pp: -.  
 bid, p: . 
 Jean-Michel Dumond & Philippe SETTON, La Politique Etrangčre et de Sécurité Commune (PESC), 
Collection Réflexe Europe, La Documentation Française, Paris, , p. . 
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otherwise’. The TEU provides for the possibility to opt out from operations having 
military or defence implications. If member states resort to such a ‘constructive 
abstention’, they will not be obliged to contribute to the financing of the decision 
taen by the Council. 
Obviously, the TEU sets up a clear demarcation between administrative and 
operational expenditures. Yet, setting a common budget is of crucial importance 
for the efficiency and success of the rapid deployment of forces. For this reason, 
the Council has made some efforts in this field. On , June , it published a 
report on military operations, which mentions three different schemes for military 
expenditures. The first one can be summarised as ‘costs are paid where they are 
incurred’: the operations with military or defence implications will be financed 
by national budgets. The second shows some intervention by the Community on a 
case-by-case basis. The last one is related to common costs.
Another initiative of the Council came out in , with the ‘Athena’ 
mechanism. It administers the early financing of the EU Military apid esponse 
operations. The payment system functions in two ways. Member states can pay 
contributions to Athena in advance. Or, they can pay their contributions to the 
common costs of the operation decided by the Council, within five days following 
the call—unless the Council decides otherwise. A special committee has also been 
set up to guarantee the proper functioning of the system.  
The significance of Althea lies in its capability to translate political solidarity 
into financial one. But it illustrates how hard it is to overcome the financial problem 
which slows down progress in the security/defence sphere. One can legitimately 
argue that the financial contributions of the member states do not match the 
ambitions that are declared. 
d. Transatlantic ambiguities
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been of crucial importance for the Old 
Continent’s security ever since its establishment. After the end of the Cold War, 
its raison d’etre was questioned in various circles. But, contrarily to some gloomy 
expectations, NATO has not ceased to exist. Instead, it has been involved in a 
 Article  TEU. 
 Council Decision //CFSP of  February .
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process of reorganisation and incorporated new members from the former enemy 
bloc, leaving its doors open to new enlargements.   
However, Europeans and Americans do not agree upon all aspects of European 
security. The degree of ‘Europeanness’ of the latter constitutes one of the discords. 
Although successive US governments have encouraged the EU members’ efforts to share 
financial burdens, they have strong reservations on what Madeleine Albright called the 
three ‘D’s: duplication (of NATO assets), decoupling (from NATO) and discrimination 
(of  NATO members that are not in the EU). Unlie defenders of a more ‘Europeanist’ 
approach, some EU member states are also unwilling to lead the EU in that direction.
Besides, transatlantic partners face ruptures on several international issues. The 
National Security Strategy promulgated by the Bush administration in September 
 is an important example for this problem. The document relates the US 
strategy to the ‘Islamic Arc’, which has major implications for transatlantic lins. 
The latter may cause problems due to the disparity between the interests and policy 
perspectives of the European and American allies, and the role attributed to NATO, 
again in the centre of the discord. 
In fact, as argued by Anne Deighton, the EU has ‘neither the military capacity 
nor the political will to create a security or defence profile that is independent from 
NATO in the short term’. For more than half a century, Europeans have relied on 
the security guaranteed by the United States. Giving up on this comfort is very 
unliely for most European states. This reality is intensified by limitations both in 
financial and military terms. 
Nonetheless, the uncertainty raised about Europe’s future engagement in NATO 
could be a source of rivalry between the two organisations. Both Europeans and 
Americans have some question mars concerning each other’s position. How can 
the US mae the EU’s foreign action remain within the framewor of a structure 
over which the Union has a limited control? On the other side, the EU has doubts 
about the US sincerity in the light of NATO’s strategic reorientation towards out-of-
area and not-strictly-military missions. 
 Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘The Bush Administration’s Security Strategy: Implications For Transatlantic 
Relations’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. , Issue , Oct , pp: -.
 Anne Deighton, ‘European Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. , 
No. . 
 Christian Houdet, Colomban Lebas, Gérard Dréville, Une Défense Plus Globale «Par et Pour» Une 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The fact that the ESDP has been subject to significant progress is undeniable. It 
provides the EU with the opportunity to play a key role on the international platform 
and to contribute to world peace outside its territories. As a legitimate objective, the 
ESDP may build on concrete achievements in its future development. 
However, any contemplation on the future of the EU as a crisis management 
actor must tae into consideration two important facts. The first is that, at present, 
the ESDP is in an embryonic stage. All the achievements that have been accomplished 
within the EU’s framewor required long-term efforts. The same holds for a qualified 
progress of the ESDP, which will be slow and arduous. 
The second fact, which is closely related to the previous one, is the neeed 
for considerable determination on the part of the EU member states. The EU is 
certainly capable of establishing a framewor to develop a common defence. Yet, the 
biggest challenge the Union has to face in the development of its crisis management 
capabilities is the divergence of its member states’ foreign policy preferences. In the 
absence of a common strategy, the aforementioned framewor cannot be of use.
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The outcome of the negotiations on Kosovo’s final status is closely linked to the 
stabilisation and democratisation not only of this country, but also of the whole region 
particularly Serbia, Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, a 
clear political future and perspective is a crucial factor regarding the indispensable 
integration of the crisis-ridden country into European structures, values and norms. 
Seven years after the establishment of the International Community in Kosovo in 
, the Kosovan society is in a drastic flux and is experiencing a comprehensive 
democratisation and transformation process. Considering the fact that Kosovo is 
not only a post-conflict society, but also a country in transition, its approach to the 
European Union is a complex endeavour. The path towards stability and democracy 
is fraught with obstacles and difficulties. The development process in Kosovo is 
also hindered by the still undetermined status of the country. Therefore the field of 
responsibility of the International Community, embodied by the UNMIK (United 
Nation Mission in Kosovo), had to be expanded from pacification and democratisation 
to nation and state-building. The events of / illustrate quite clearly that other 
riots in the Balkans would have immediate security-political consequences for 
Europe. In view of this fact the successful approach to European structures including 
the prospect of EU-accession, which is associated with enduring stabilisation and 
democratisation is a key factor regarding the sustained stability of the region.
OBJECT OF RESEARCH AND STRUCTURE
This paper deals with the development of Kosovo towards stabilisation and 
European integration and with the approach it has made so far to European 
structures in the light of the negotiations on its future status. The paper will be 
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structured as follows: at the beginning Resolution —which forms the basis 
of the UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo)—and the Constitutional 
Framework will be illustrated. Subsequently the elections, including parliamentary 
and local elections, will be outlined as essential components of democracy. This 
will be followed by the analysis of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
(PISG) and their performance. Subsequently different aspects, implications and 
inconsistencies of the final status of Kosovo will be examined and—last but not 
least—the current process of the status negotiations will be presented.
Resolution  and the UN-Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Referring to chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations Organisation, on the 
th June  the UN Security Council adopted Resolution  as a legal basis 
for the mission in Kosovo and for the future status of the country. By emphasising 
the basic respect for the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Yugoslavia’ Resolution  establishes a comprehensive self-government in 
Kosovo within the framework of a ‘substantial autonomy’.
In order to guarantee this form of autonomy the esolution contains a provision 
for the establishment of an international provisional administration consisting of a civil 
and a military presence, which co-operate closely with each other. The quintessence of 
esolution  is ‘the definition of the objectives of the civil UN-Mission and of the 
international protection troops FO as well as their field of responsibility’.
Constitutional framework
In order to foster the gradual transfer of competences to the local institutions and 
to implement elections throughout Kosovo, a team consisting of international 
and Kosovan experts set to work on the compilation of a political and judicial 
framework for Kosovo. Despite some discrepancies between the Kosovo-Albanians 
and the Kosovo-Serbs as well as between the Internationals and the Kosovans, a 
compromise could be agreed: on the th May,  the ‘Constitutional Framework 
for the Provisional Self-Government’ of Kosovo was adopted. This framework—
 See p.  of Resolution : http://www.un.int/usa/sres.htm
 C. S// Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports//
sgrep.htm , Nr.  -.
 C. Hajrullahu/Salamun, () .
 Petritsch/Pichler, () .
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based on Resolution —is the foundation for the establishment of the provisional 
self-government and is therefore „the most important document of the UN-transit 
administration in Kosovo’. The preamble defines the form of governance as a 
parliamentary democracy and the economic system as a free market economy.
Elections
The parliamentary elections held on th of November  meant a step toward 
self-governance and the transfer of responsibilities to the local actors. The election 
of the members of the provisional parliament made it possible for the first time for 
democratically elected representatives to occupy the new Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government. This election was quite successful, also because there was a 
relatively high participation on the part of the Kosovo-Serbs, who were represented 
by a single list of candidates: ‘Coalition Return’ (‘Koalicija Povratak’).
On th October  elections on the community level were held for the second 
time in osovo, but they did not bring about any changes regarding the allocation 
of power. The LD (Democratic League of osovo) led by Ibrahim ugova who 
deceased in the meantime could eep the majority of votes. The League attained 
approx. , whereas the PD (Democratic Party of osovo) and the AA 
(Alliance for the Future of osovo), both under the leadership of the former UC-
representatives Hashim Thaci and amush Haradinaj, could attain almost  and 
,  of the votes respectively. This time merely  of the Serbian population of 
osovo participated in the ballot.
The second parliamentary elections which too place on rd October  were 
of great importance, as a new parliament and a new government were to be elected 
which had to participate in the negotiations regarding the future status. These 
elections were characterised by the significant involvement of the independent local 
organ CEC (Central Election Commission) in the preparation of the elections for the 
first time. The fact that the parliamentary elections of October  were boycotted 
by the osovo-Serbs is unquestionably a negative aspect. On the whole, all elections 
were considered to be fair and free, without any complications worth mentioning. 
 ebda.
 Kramer/Dzihic, () .
 Parliamentary elections : http://www.kosovo.undp.org/publications/ews/ewreng.pdf p.  and 
from p. . 
 Petritsch/Pichler, () .
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However, a certain political apathy could be observed: participation in the elections 
decreased more and more.
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG)
The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government are the following:
• the parliamentary assembly, 
• the government, 
• the president, 
• the courts and 
• the independent organs and institutions.
The constitutional framewor defines the principles which serve as a basis for 
the PISG. The most important rules are the following: the PISG ‘should perform 
their official functions only in accordance with esolution  and the regulations 
of the constitutional framewor. Secondly they should fully respect the rule of law, 
human rights, the democratic principles and the aim of  reconciliation between the 
ethnic groups as well as the separation of powers.’
Chapter  of the constitutional framewor provides that the parliamentary 
assembly  is the highest representative and legislative organ of self-government. 
The immunity of the deputies is limited only as regards activities or statements 
which may evoe inter-ethnic violence. Minorities do not possess the right of veto; 
however, there is the possibility of an appraisement of all parliamentary decisions. 
The SSG has the authority to revoe all decisions of the parliament in case they are 
not in accord with esolution  or if they have discriminatory features. 
The president of osovo shall represent the unity of the nation and shall 
guarantee the democratic functioning of the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government. The responsibilities of the president are restricted to representative 
and ceremonial activities.
The government consists of the prime minister and the ministers. ‘The 
Government shall exercise the executive authority and shall implement Assembly 
laws and other laws within the scope of responsibilities of the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government established within this Constitutional Framewor. 
 Comprehensive information on the assembly: http://www.assembly-kosova.org 
 S. Chapter . of the Constitutional Framework.
 S. Chapter ../ of the Constitutional Framework.
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The Government may propose bills to the Assembly at its own initiative and shall 
do so at the request of the Assembly.’
The most important components of the judiciary are the district courts, the 
Supreme Court, the municipal courts and courts for minor delicts. A specially 
set up  Chamber of the Supreme Court on Constitutional Framewor Matters 
can examine ‘the compatibility of laws with the constitutional framewor, settle 
disputes between the PISG’ and decide whether an institution of self-government 
has interfered unlawfully with the independent organs. 
According to the Constitutional Framewor, independent organs and 
institutions, such as the Central Election Commission, the osovan Commission of 
the Judiciary and Public Prosecutor` s Department, the Office of the General Auditor, 
the Agency of Monetary Transactions, the independent Media Commission and the 
Committee of Public Broadcasting, shall perform their activities independently 
from the PISG.
The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government do not dispose of absolute 
powers and their competences and capacity to act are still limited in certain 
significant areas, such as foreign affairs and defence. However, during the last years 
more and more responsibilities have been transferred from the UNMI to the local 
authorities in osovo. Irrespective of their restricted competencies, the performance 
of the PISG can so far be assessed as rather unsatisfactory because of the historic 
conditions and thus the lac of experience with consensus democracy and the 
lac of democratic political tradition. Nonetheless some progress has been made: 
‘inter-party communication among the osovar Albanians and their understanding 
of parliamentary practice and rules of procedure has increased. Another positive 
point is that within some committees there is good co-operation between the osovar 
Albanians and osovar Serbs’. 
 Petritsch/Pichler, () f.
 Kosovo Research and Documentation Institute (KODI): Kosovar Assembly: For the People or for the 
Party? () Report Nr. , Pristina, .
 The unclear status and the unclear political future is for many, especially Serbians, displaced persons 
and refugees a reason for not to return in Kosovo. S. SRSG Jessen-Petersen: ‘People want to know the 
outcome of the discussions (negotiations on the status) to know the kind of Kosovo they would be 
returning to.’ Soren Jessen-Petersen, () Status overshadows standards, in. B
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THE ISSUE OF THE FINAL STATUS
In view of the violent riots in March  which, for the first time, were addressed 
also against the International Administration (increasingly perceived as occupant), 
the International Community in Kosovo realised that the policy of the suspension of 
the status and the clarification of the status issue could no longer be ignored. 
The unclear status has negative effects on the political, economic and social 
development of osovo: it torpedoes political and economic progress, hampers the 
return of the refugees, causes legal uncertainty, enforces the ethnic conflict  and 
paralyses the stability and democratisation process. 
The problem of the still open status was first  brought up in April  by the 
German SSG Michael Steiner, who introduced the doctrine of ‘Standards before 
Status’. The so-called standards refer to eight criteria, such as the functioning of the 
democratic institutions, the rule of law, the return of displaced persons and refuges 
and the reconstruction of the economy, which are to be met before negotiations on 
the final status can be launched. This strategy proved to be inefficient, as it was 
bloced by the open, undetermined status: ‘The issue of standards as a priority 
is a problem because the most important standards are clearly lined to the final 
status’.
In face of this realisation the doctrine ‘Standards and Status’ was adopted. 
According to this formula the solution of the status shall be approached parallel 
to the implementation of the standards. In this context the Security Council of the 
United Nations authorised its Special epresentative ai Eide to assess thoroughly 
and in a comprehensive way the situation in osovo from June to September . 
The decision on launching or postponing the negotiations on the status should be 
based on the findings of Eide` s investigation. 
Despite the list of deficiencies, the Special epresentative recommended the 
start of the status negotiations: ‘There will not be any good moment for addressing 
osovo´ s future status. It will continue to be a highly sensitive political issue. 
Nevertheless, an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the time has come to 
commence this process’. 
 Soren Jessen-Petersen, () Status Overshadows Standards, in. B. 
 In August  Eide expressed his disappointment about the ‘insufficient progress’ in Kosovo and 
criticised the government in Pristina as well as in Belgrade for of its lack of co-operation with the PISG. 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung: (..) ‘Little Progress in Kosovo’. 
 Eide-Report, ‘A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo’, October . 
 Preface of Secretary General of UN Kofi Annan in: Eide-Report, October .
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eferring to Eide` s recommendation the UN Secretary General ofi Annan sent 
a letter to the president of the Security Council on th October , saying that in 
spite of the ‘irregular’ implementation of the standards the time has come to initiate 
‘the next phase of the political process’. Annan emphasised the need to continue 
implementing the standards ‘with greater commitment and results’. Thus, in 
February  the complex process of the status negotiations was launch. 
For the Albanians living in osovo the return of the control of Serbia in osovo 
is unimaginable after the incidents suffered since the abolition of autonomy in 
. In view of the repression under Slobodan Milosevic, the mass expulsion and 
the considerable number of victims particularly during -, the years of war 
osovo-Albanians are of the opinion that Serbia has lost its claim to osovo and 
deny Serbia the legitimacy of regaining control over osovo. 
In contrast with the political realities which have taen shape since the establishment 
of the International Community in osovo in ,  Serbia is characterised by the 
prevalence of perplexity and ambiguity regarding the further course of action. The 
slogan used by the Serbian government in reference to osovo: ‘More than autonomy, 
less than independence’ means an extensive autonomy but leaves open the way in 
which this ind of autonomy could be realised in practice. In the case of osovo’s 
reintegration into Serbia  of the total population in Serbia would be Albanian who 
would mae up  of the military forces and Albanian political parties would have to 
be involved in the government which is hardly imaginable for either side.
The solution to the final status of osovo is a precarious challenge with violence 
potential requiring a high degree of political maturity from both the osovo-
Albanian and the Serbian delegations. The International Community has the 
complex tas of woring out a compromise between two parties with ‘diametrically 
opposed’ positions.
 S. Bota Sot: ‘Belgrade shall not interfere with the internal affairs of Kosovo’, ...
 C. Soren Jessen-Petersen, (..) in: B: ‘Kosovo Albanians have a clear position on what they want 
for the future of the province, while Belgrade has only the vague policy of `more than autonomy, less 
than independence.`
 Jurekovic Predrag, (Juli ) „The Serbian policy in light of the unsolved status issue”: 
www.europaeische-sicherheit.de/Rel/_/Kosovo/,,,.html, download: ...
 Petritsch/Pichler, (), S..
 Dusan Reljic: (May ) Kosovo – a touch-stone for the EU, SWP – Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
Berlin: http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?id=, download. ...
 Der Standard, (..) „Positions of Belgrade and Pristina diametrically opposed. 
 Deutsche Welle: ‘Rigid fronts at the Kosovo negotiations’, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/
,,,.html , download: ...
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STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
Based on the recommendations that the Special Representative of the UN-Secretary 
General Kai Eide made in his report: ‘Comprehensive Review of the Situation in 
Kosovo’, the Security Council of the United Nations Organisation decided to start 
negotiations meant to determine the future status of Kosovo between the Kosovo-
Albanians and the government in Belgrade along with representatives of the Serbs 
in Kosovo. The former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari was charged with the task 
of the UN Special Envoy, whereas the Austrian diplomat Albert Rohan was assigned 
as his representative. The negotiation team UN Office of the Special Envoy of the 
Secretary General for the Future Status Process for Kosovo (UNOSEK) began the 
negotiations on st February  in Vienna, the  venue chosen for the purpose.
In the first instance certain ey issues, such as the problem of decentralisation 
and the protection of the religious and historical sites was discussed. Decentralisation 
in osovo means the reorganisation of the structure of administration to provide 
the osovo-Serbs with the right of self-government without violating the territorial 
integrity of the country. Whereas the Serbian delegation demands the formation 
of twelve Serbian communities and a connection to Belgrade as strong as possible, 
the osovo-Albanian party fears the development of ‘a ind of autonomy’ and the 
creation of a ‘parallel government system’. As expected, the first negotiations did 
not produce any satisfactory results. 
The definition of the Serbian population in osovo has been another 
controversial subject between the osovo-Albanian and Serbian negotiators. The 
Serbs reject the term ‘minority’ for the osovo-Serbs, because, as they stated, they 
‘cannot be minority in their own country’ and boycotted the tals on th and th 
August about the protection of the ethnic minorities in osovo. This is the reason 
why the international partners now prefer to use the term ‘national communities’ 
instead of ‘minorities’. 
On the whole it can be stated that the previous negotiations have confirmed 
the apprehensions of the UNOSE and have not been really successful. As it has 
already been mentioned the positions of Pristina and Belgrade diverge extremely 
and seem to be practically incompatible. Above  of the Albanians in osovo 
approve absolute independence for osovo and regard full sovereignty as the solely 
possible way towards a better future and stabilisation. The strong presence of the 
 Dusan, () .
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radical and nationalist parties in Serbia strengthens this opinion. On the other 
side, the Serbian government and leadership reject the idea of an independent 
osovo vehemently, arguing that osovo is an integral part of Serbia, which cannot 
accept the separation of a part of its territory and argument for autonomy. Many 
Serbs in Serbia and osovo regard osovo as the ‘cradle of Serbianism’ incited by a 
‘national-romantic transfiguration’ and ‘historical, cultural and last but not least 
also political reasons’.
As far as the final status is concerned, three possibilities are explicitly excluded: 
the partition of osovo, its unification with Albania and a return to the status 
before . Instead, evidence suggests that a ‘conditional independence’ with 
limited power will be an alternative for the solution of the final status of osovo. 
CONCLUSION
‘The key issue in the current final status process is the creation of a Kosovo that 
will have the greatest chance for lasting stability and development’. Whatever the 
future status may look like, it is certain that ‘entering the future status process does 
not mean entering the last stage, but the next stage of international presence.’ 
After the end of the negotiations the European Union will replace the UNMIK 
and will, therefore, have a decisive role in the development and democratisation of 
Kosovo. The transfer of know-how and capacity building will also be essential for 
the development of the country. The integration not only of Kosovo but of all the 
Western Balkan countries is a very significant factor. The decision of the European 
Commission to involve Kosovo in the stabilisation and association process (SAP) in 
the Western Balkans and to develop a mechanism which accelerates the approach 
of the country to the EU is a significant step toward the stabilisation of the crisis-
ridden region.
  Kramer/Dzihic, () 
 ICG: Kosovo – the challenge of transition () http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=& 
= download: ...
  Eide-Report, (). 
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OMANIA IN LIGHT OF EU ACCESSION 
THE DELAYED TANSITION
UJBIEN SHEHU
More than  years after the collapse of the communist system of Nicolae Ceausescu, 
which was seen as one of the cruellest dictatorships in Eastern Europe, Romania 
currently faces  accession to the European Union.
egarding economic growth omania has made some progress in the last few 
years. However, its bacwardness compared to the European Union member states 
is considerable. Statistically omania would need approximately  years to reach 
the current GDP-average of the EU-member countries, supposing that the current 
growth rate remains constant. While standard of living parity does not represent a 
criterion for entry into the European Union, the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria 
is considered the most important condition for the EU integration of the country. 
According to the last report of the European Commission, omania has fulfilled 
both the political and economic criteria of accession into the European Union and 
successfully completed negotiations with the European Union on December . 
On th April  the treaty of accession was signed in Luxembourg. 
Widespread corruption in numerous institutions of the country is a special 
challenge from the viewpoint of its integration into the European Union. The 
omanian government has ambitiously been trying to implement reforms in the 
fields of judiciary and police, in order to avoid a delay in the EU-accession. The 
results still are not satisfying and it is not realistic to suppose that the problem 
of corruption can be solved in a foreseeable time. The reasons can be traced bac 
particularly to the communist past not yet fully clarified and to difficulties in the 
development of an emancipated civil society. These are usually mentality-related 
and belong to the legacy of the authoritarian system in the Ceausescu era.
  Schlesak, D. (/) Hammer, sickle and and mercedes star, Die Zeit. 
 Progress Report of the European Commission on Romania, (May ).
 Franziska Annerl und Wolfgang Böhm: Romania/Bulgaria: Difficult Enlargement, Die Presse, 
(..); See also: Corrupt state with old cadre, MDR-Manuscript, (..)
 Annual progress report on Romania´ s EU-integration process, COM ,  final, .
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In contrast with the former communist states of Eastern Europe the change 
of regime in omania too place violently, via a revolution, which was initiated, 
controlled and led not by the citizens, but by the political elite of the old Communist-
camp. The partly puzzling events that too place around the fall and execution of 
the Ceausescus and the unclear role of Securitate, the omanian secret service still 
rest heavily over omania. Neither the political elite nor the main parties have 
been able to find a consensus about the evaluation of the upheaval in the year . 
The fact that coming to terms with the past is still to come and that the change of 
elite has taen place only quite recently is a serious obstacle to the consolidation of 
democracy in omania.
eferring to Wolfgang Merel s` concept of transition research, this paper 
deals with the changes in the political system of omania after the ‘revolution’ 
of  and with the country’s integration into the European Union. According 
to Merel the consolidation of democracy in a transition country depends on a 
complex cause, which leads to the fall of an autocratic regime and is followed by 
an institutionalisation and democratisation phase. In this context special attention 
should be paid to the question whether the execution of dictator Ceausescu has led 
to the democratisation of the country. Additionally, the role of the political elite 
in the transformation process should also be highlighted before the analysis of the 
present consolidation and the basic conditions for EU-accession.
THE UPHEAVAL OF 
In the late s Romania was seized by a serious economic crisis. Nicolae 
Ceausescu, who followed the deceased Georghe Gheorgiu Dej in  as head of 
the government, built  a Stalinist-type empire during his ‘reign’, similar to the one 
established by Enver Hoxhas in Albania. 
Minorities were systematically discriminated against, national feelings were 
mobilised, dissidents were persecuted and eliminated. Securitate, the omanian 
secret service which comprised around . officials and several hundred 
 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Special case Romania – Corruption, shortfalls of the party system, authoritarianism, 
Link: www.kas.de, download .., .
 Merkel names three main phases of system-transformation: End of the autocrat regime, institutionalization 
of democracy and consolidation of democracy. See: Merkel, Wolfgang: System transformation – An 
introduction to the theory and empiricism of the  transformation sciences, Opladen, (), .
 Rados, A. (),  The complot of Securitate – Romania’s betrayed revolution, Hamburg, .
 Ibid. .
 Official name: Securitatea statului;  English: safety of the state.
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thousand unofficial members, served as the most important means for the 
persecution of the so called ‘betrayers of the socialist model’. Ceausescu also used 
Securitate against potential competitors within the party in order to strengthen his 
influence and power. 
The development of an extreme clientelism led to a situation when fewer 
and fewer people believed in the national institutions and to mistrust of many 
communist and military functionaries towards the Ceausescu clique. The fall of 
the of Berlin wall, the collapse of communism in Prague, the increasing resentment 
of the population because of extreme poverty, prompted Ceausescu to further 
strengthen his power, in order to prevent a possible internal coup. 
Meanwhile, a networ consisting of dissatisfied and disappointed CP-
functionaries and Securitate-members was formed and eagerly wored on a 
revolution plan in the bacground. This networ, whose membership also included 
the CP-member Ion Iliescu and Securitate-member Virgil Măgureanu, intensified 
its activities striving to tae over power.
At the end of December , more and more young people, students and 
opponents of the regime gathered outside the palace and demanded the resignation 
of Ceausescu and an end to the dictatorship. In the course of the demonstration 
about a hundred civilians were illed and hundreds of people were injured. 
While the crowd tried to attac the palace-building of the Central Committee, 
Stănculescu, the minister of defence managed to convince Nicolae Ceausescu and 
his wife to escape in a military helicopter, by assuring them that the flight was 
necessary for their security. 
Meanwhile, the conspirators within the CP and the Securitate tried to 
monopolise power. Iliescu, who was significantly involved in the downfall, 
distinguished himself as a ‘leader of the revolution’. With the participation of 
several generals and other high-raning persons, such as Virgil Măgureanu 
and Victor Stănculescu, he tried to establish a provisional committee excluding 
dissidents and conservative groups. 
After consultations on nd December  Iliescu announced on the state 
television that the recently founded ‘Front for the National escue’ would soon 
organise free elections and that the claim to leadership of a single political party 
is hereby finished. In the two following days chaos prevailed in Bucharest. While 
people continued to protest, as they did not trust the new leadership, Securitate 
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members spread the message that armed Arab groups of terrorists and Ceausescu 
supporters would try to tae over the power. The following two days were 
characterised by demonstrations and shootings—the number of victims amounted 
to over one thousand.
At Christmas  the Ceausescus were sentenced to death after a fast procedure. 
Victor Stănculescu and Virgil Măgureanu (who was appointed head of the SI, 
successor of the Securitate) were present at the trial. When the execution of the 
Ceausescus was disclosed in the media and the state-controlled television showed 
some shots of the ‘trial’, the first reaction was enthusiasm, whereas those, who were 
critical of the manner of the trial, considered his execution as a lost chance to clarify 
important aspects of the uprising.
The proceure against Ceausescu and the seizure of power by the FSN, which 
could win the parliamentary elections in May , did not lead to the displacement 
of the old regime for omania, but rather to a continuity  of the political elite, 
which won its ‘democratic legitimacy’ by the execution of the Ceausescus.
In the first few years the new ruling powers governed with similar authoritarian 
methods as Ceausescu and proceeded with brutality against their political 
competitors. The state and security apparatus continued to be controlled by them. 
In contrast with most former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
the uprising in omania was led and controlled by the elite of the old regime.
The re-election of the post-communists in  and  was considered by a 
minority of intellectuals as a lost chance and an unfinished revolution. 
 Ibid, ; See also: Heinen, A., () The dictator’s death and the presence of the past: Romania -
, in: Leviathan. Magazine for social sciences, book , .
 Heinen, A., () The dictator’s death and the presence of the past: Romania -, in: Leviathan. 
Magazine for social sciences, book ; see also: Details in Timisoara Homepage: www.timisoara.com, 
in: Seitenblicke  (), Nr. , Abs. ; or: enigmatic revolution, DPA, ..; or Romania: delayed 
and violent revolution, bpb, from politics and contemporary history B -/.
 SRI: Servicul Român de Informaţie – engl. Romanian information service.
 Heinen, A., () The dictator’s death and the presence of the past: Romania -, in: Leviathan. 
Magazine for social sciences, book , .
 Lißke, M., () Shortfalls of the civil society and  political education in Romania, in BpB – 
Bundeszentrale der politischen Bildung, Veranstaltungsdokumentation, ., ; See also: Heinen, A. 
(): The dictator’s death and the presence of the past: Romania -, in: Leviathan. Magazine 
for social sciences, book .
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The negative consequences caused by the failure to replace the old political elite 
and the so- called ‘stolen’ or ‘unfinished’ revolution had its impact on omania’s 
development and democratisation process for a very long time. 
CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
With the fall of the dictator and the adoption of a new constitution establishing 
Romania as a semi-presidential system, the democratisation phase was far from 
completed. Both the first phase of the systemic transformation (replacement of the 
old regime) and the phase of institutionalisation were characterised by deficiencies 
and therefore failed to create favourable conditions for the consolidation phase. 
The new and, at the same time, old ruling powers promised the population 
efficient reforms leading to a free maret in order to improve the disastrous economic 
situation. Nevertheless, the socio-economic situation worsened increasingly. As 
a consequence of a dispute between Petre oman and Ion Iliescu in , new 
parliamentary elections were held. Iliescu could assert himself and won the elections 
again. The urgently needed replacement of the political elite failed to materialise 
again. Despite the introduction of some radical free maret reforms the ex- 
communists did not succeed in reducing poverty and modernising the country.
The state apparatus and the media continued to be controlled by the CP-successors 
and had  a negative impact on the development of a critical civil society. Clientelism 
and nepotism were still on the agenda. The strongly fragmented party system in 
omania led to a polarization of the political debates and, at the same time, to a lasting 
political instability: There were three cabinet reshuffles within one legislative period 
leading to the replacement of not only the Ministers but the Prime Minister as well. At 
the parliamentary elections of  the post-communists (PDS – later PSD) under 
the leadership of Ion Iliescu came off as winners. Adrian Nastase, PDS politician, 
whose government was tolerated by the Liberals (PNL) and the ‘Hungarian Party’ 
(UDM), became prime minister. The new parliament was dominated by parties, 
with a ‘dubious character’  as far as democracy was concerned.
 Lißke, M., .
 Heinen, A., ; See also. Lißke, M., .
 Romania – The delayed and violent revolution, bpb, from: Politik und Zeitgeschichte B -/
 Lißke, M., .
 Merkel, W. (): System transformation – An introduction to the theory and empiricism of the 
transformation sciences, Opladen.
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With regard to foreign affairs the Nastase-government could achieve some 
successes. The EU-integration process of the country deepened between  to 
.
Domestically the balance of this government was not necessarily favourable. 
Although the macro-economic indicators showed a constant economic growth in 
omania, the country was not able to benefit from the foreign portfolio investments. 
In this connection wide-spread corruption, red tape and the still common culture 
of clientelism are considerable obstacles. Many attempts at clarifying the role of 
Securitate in the upheaval of  and clarifying the past failed.
The networ of the members of the former Securitate, which torpedoed the 
political, social and economic development of omania for a long period of time, 
was a considerable obstacle to the establishment and consolidation of democracy 
and of a constitutional state. At the presidential elections in November  Traian 
Basescu, head of the Democratic Party succeeded in coming off as winner.
Although the leftist alliance between PSD and PU (Humanistic Party of 
omania) had the majority of the votes, the new president entrusted the liberal 
Calin Popescu-Triceanu and not the Socialists, with forming the government. 
The new government aims at combating corruption effectively and at launching 
programs against poverty. Additionally, it has successfully striven for the EU-
accession of omania in .
CONCLUSION 
With the return of the democratic forces in the government, Romania was given 
the opportunity to combat corruption and organised crime as well as to tackle the 
political past. The main challenges the country has to face are the break-up of the 
crusted mafia structures and the creation of a critical civil society with a culture of 
constructive scepticism and criticism.
 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Special case Romania – Corruption, shortfalls of the party system, 
authoritarianism, Link: www.kas.de, Download (..), .
 Romania: difficult search for a new government in Bucharest, Die Presse, (..).
 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Special case Romania – Corruption, shortfalls of the party system, 
authoritarianism, Link: www.kas.de, Download (..), .
 Lißke, M., .
 Forty kilometres state-security dossiers waiting to be opened in Romania, Siebenbürgische Zeitung 
(..).
 Corrupt state with old cadre, MDR-Manuscript, (..); see also: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: -.
 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, .
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Only a determined commitment against the old, corrupt nomenclature, which 
has established a ind of ‘autocracy’ during the  years of the transformation 
process in omania, could enhance a positive development in the democratic 
consolidation of the country.
Furthermore, there is a nee for a reform in the structure of the political parties 
because currently they are oriented towards individual persons and ideology 
rather than towards concrete social and economic programs and plans. As Merel 
correctly states, the consolidation of a civil society is a long process, which ‘can 
tae decades and can be sealed through a change of generation’. As a result of the 
‘lost revolution’ and the ensuing years of ‘defective democracy’ omania has lost 
several years in the consolidation process.
However, the prospect of the EU-entry has proved to be beneficial particularly for 
the institutionalisation of democracy in the country. During the last years a basically 
critical media has emerged, which—despite a certain lac of professionalism—is 
an important instrument of controlling the political leadership and has a positive 
impact on the formation of the civil society.
On th September  the European Commission (EC) recommended to the 
European Parliament and to the European Council the accession of the two candidate 
countries omania and Bulgaria in the year . Since certain deficiencies in the 
field of judiciary and administration have not been dispelled, the EC recommends 
the inclusion of provisional clauses particularly as regards the internal maret and 
the joint domestic and legislation policy. In its report the EC criticises that ‘… a 
fully consistent interpretation and application of the law in all courts has not yet been 
ensured; some elected CSM members continue to face potential conflicts of interest in 
inspection matters and individual ethical issues that affect the CSM’s reputation’. 
omania has attested further progress in the combat against corruption, especially 
through efficient, neutral ascertainment against high-raning office holders. 
Nonetheless ‘…there needs to be a clear political will to demonstrate the sustainability and 
irreversibility of the recent positive progress in fighting corruption’.
  Schlesak, D., (/): Hammer, sickle and and mercedes star, Die Zeit. 
  Lißke, M., .
  Merkel, W. (): System transformation – An introduction to the theory and empiricism of the 
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Neither EU-politicians nor omanian politicians or experts assume that the 
EU accession of omania would solve all problems, such as corruption, organised 
crime and clientelism, which are rooted mainly in the Ceausescu-era, overnight. 
The transformation process will not be finished automatically, whereby the chance 
of success and the duration of the process will depend on the speed of reforms and 
the will of the omanian government to introduce reforms. The main challenges 
for the government are, on one hand, the reduction of poverty and, on the other, the 
efficient and determined fight against corruption, which paralyses the development 
of the country.
Dealing with the communist past and condemning all individuals, who have 
proved to be corrupt or to have had abused their authority, as well as bringing about 
a positive change in the political elite are important steps toward the consolidation 
of democracy and a successful integration into the European Union.
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EGIONAL POLICY OF THE EU AS AN 
INSTUMENT OF SOCIAL SOLIDAITY
MARKO TRNSKI
INTRODUCTION 
In  the European Union’s cohesion policy entered into its seventeenth year 
of existence. Since its inception in , the policy has covered a significant 
part of the European Union (EU) member states’ territory and population. 
What distinguishes the EU’s cohesion policy from regional development 
policies undertaken by national governments in Europe and the regional policy 
implemented by the Community before  is that it represents a revolutionary 
change in the way development policies are conceived and carried out. While 
previous regional policy concentrated extensively on the role of the national 
administrative system or specialized development agencies in the implementation 
of projects, the present approach is characterized by an extensive involvement of 
different administrative levels and socio-economic groups in the formulation and 
implementation of the policy. The other elements that distinguish EU cohesion 
policy are the planning and implementation components that have been part of the 
policy from the very beginning, such as, quantified objectives (reducing regional 
disparities, restructuring regional economies, creating jobs, and stimulating private 
investment), a legal European framework, a specific policy structure (multi-annual 
planning documents and operational programmes), multi-annual budgets, five 
specific financial instruments (four Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund) and 
a multi-level and multi-subject form of interaction in the formulation of decisions 
and implementation of programmes and projects.
With the introduction of the cohesion policy in  the Commission was 
empowered to formulate the rules and regulations for the implementation of the 
policy on the part of member states and regions. The treaty basis for the cohesion 
policy is provided by the  Single European Act (SEA) as part of the measures 
for the creation of the European Single Maret in . The goal of cohesion 
policy as enunciated in Article a of the SEA was to ‘reduce disparities between 
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the various regions and the bacwardness of the least-favoured regions’ or the 
most recent phrasing of this commitment in the EU treaties is expressed as ‘...the 
Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of 
the various regions and the bacwardness of the least favoured regions or islands’. 
The significance of the wording of Article a in the Single European Act was 
that the Community placed emphasis on the regional dimension and abandoned 
the exclusive emphasis on the national level. In emphasising the regional level the 
EU had to devise a system for classifying territorial units if it wanted to avoid a 
nation-by-nation approach. It resolved the problem by adopting the definition of 
territorial units developed by Eurostat at the beginning of the s to differentiate 
the European territory into five levels of geographic aggregations: from sections of 
a country (NUTS ) to villages and towns (NUTS ). Aside from very small states, 
in most countries the five classifications defined territorial units at the sub-national 
level. The regional level was defined as NUTS , and this level became the basis for 
the definition of the focus of the EU’s territorialized cohesion policy interventions.
The concept of cohesion provides a response to the question of ‘what’ is the 
objective of the policy. The thesis of this volume is that cohesion ultimately represents 
a political goal tied to the pursuit of a more egalitarian and just society capable of 
creating opportunities for all EU citizens, no matter where they live. This goal has 
served to change since  the course of European integration by expanding its 
objectives and maing it possible to define political union as the ultimate goal of 
the integration process. In a parallel manner, cohesion has also helped to change the 
significance of the concept of economic convergence. Convergence is no longer only 
an economic process. It is instead the process by which a greater form of equity is 
achieved in European society. If the first concept (cohesion) represents the political 
objective, the second concept (convergence) is the means by which the political 
objective is achieved. Convergence provides the answer to the question of ‘how’ 
cohesion is achieved, and it becomes manifest as the socio-economic differences 
between countries and regions belonging to the European Union decline over time. 
If socio-economic convergence does not tae place, then the political objective of 
cohesion cannot be realized. In other words, cohesion is the overall outcome of the 
process of convergence.
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DIMENSIONS OF CONTESTATION
The literature on dimensions of contestation goes back at least to Lipset and 
Rokkan’s pioneering work Party systems and voter alignments () on cleavage 
structures. Lipset and Rokkan argue that political cleavages arose in response to 
major junctures in European political development that generated basic ideological 
conflicts. In their view, dimensions of contestation that arose from the class 
cleavage, the religious cleavage, and the center-periphery cleavage are enduring 
because they are rooted in social structure and political organisation. From their 
standpoint in the mid-s, Lipset and Rokkan believed that the resulting pattern 
of cleavages was frozen into place.
Figure : Lipset-Rokkan cleavage
Source: Zakošek, : 
To what extent is contestation over European integration related to the 
cleavages that structure domestic conflict in Western Europe and, in particular, 
to the ubiquitous Left/ight dimension? Interest in this question has intensified 
as the boundary between European and national politics has weaened during the 
past decade. Although Ernst Haas paid close attention to the domestic sources of 
opposition and support for European integration in his classic study, The Uniting 
of Europe, written in , most scholars continued to view European integration as 
the result of foreign policies conducted by government elites acting on a ‘permissive 
consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold, ). European integration was seen to have 
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little connection with the ideological moorings of domestic politics. European 
integration was thought to tae place among, but not within, countries.
This view has become untenable during the past decade as the EU has 
become a more openly contested arena for political parties, interest groups, and 
social movements (Hooghe and Mars, ; Mars, Hooghe and Blan, ). 
After the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, international relations 
scholars responded by adapting models of pressure politics to provide a domestic 
dimension to national decision maing. The alternative approach, one adopted by 
comparativists, is to explore European integration as an extension of domestic 
politics. Instead of inquiring whether European integration is the outcome of 
geopolitics or domestic politics—the question that has long motivated the neorealist/
liberal intergovernmentalist debate—these scholars tae domestic politics as their 
point of departure and inquire into how domestic politics influences, and is 
influenced by, European integration.
The application of comparative politics models to European integration 
in recent years has heightened interest in whether and how existing patterns 
of domestic contestation structure orientations on European integration. An 
important building bloc is Lipset and oan’s () argument that political 
actors have an incentive to interpret new issues in light of existing cleavages such as 
the Left/ight ideological dimension.
Figure : Cleavage about the EU
Source: Hooghe/Marks : .
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Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Mars (, ) identify a Left/ight dimension 
ranging from social democracy to maret liberalism and a European integration 
dimension ranging from nationalism to supranationalism. In their view, these 
dimensions are neither fused together nor orthogonal to each other. ather, Hooghe 
and Mars claim that certain aspects of European integration are liely to be absorbed 
into the Left/ight dimension. To the extent that this is the case, pro-EU and anti-EU 
and Left and ight become indistinguishable. However, not all aspects of integration 
are easily incorporated into the Left-ight dimension, and to the extent that they 
cannot be, a distinct prointegration/anti-integration dimension emerges.
Hooghe and Mars () hypothesize that the Center-Left is liely to become 
more pro-European as the debate about European integration focuses on maret 
regulation rather than maret maing. The Center-Left, including particularly 
social democrats, supports regulated capitalism, a project to build environmental, 
social, infrastructural, and redistributive policy at the European level. As regulatory 
issues are taen up at the European level, social democrats become more favourably 
disposed to further integration. Those on the political ight, in contrast, become more 
opposed to European integration. They wish to combine European-wide marets 
with minimal European regulation, and once economic and monetary integration is 
in place, they become sceptical of the benefits of further European integration.
Contestation in the EU policy space is therefore structured in two camps. Thus, 
Hooghe and Mars () propose a two-dimensional model of the EU political 
space where the Left/ight dimension and the national sovereignty dimension 
structure actors’ policy positions in the EU political space.
As one would expect, when national actors step into the European arena they 
bring with them ideological convictions from their respective national arenas. This 
is evident in the horizontal axis of Figure  which represents a ey dimension of 
contestation—concerning economic equality and the role of the state—imported 
into the EU from national polities. Alongside this left vs. right dimension, there is a 
distinctively European dimension of contestation: nationalism vs. supranationalism, 
which depicts the conflict about the role of national state as the supreme arbiter of 
political, economic, and cultural life. At one extreme are those who wish to preserve 
or strengthen the national state; at the other extreme are those who wish to press for 
ever closer European Union and believe that national identities can co-exist with an 
overarching supranational (European) identity.
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For actors with a neoliberal outloo, maret liberalization was a necessary 
step in limiting European integration to an economic enterprise dominated by 
insulated government elites. Neoliberals were strongest in the British conservative 
government, led by Margaret Thatcher, and within international capital. 
But there were other, very different, conceptions of the maret program. 
Some actors conceived of the SEA as a jump-off point for regulating capital at the 
European level. This view was put forward most strongly by Jacques Delors, then 
president of the European Commission. Goal was to create ‘organised space’ at 
the European level, regulating European capitalism in line with European social-
democratic and Christian-democratic traditions. In short, the maret program 
was the beginning, rather than the conclusion, of debate about the institutional 
configuration of the European polity.
It is important to realize that the institutional terrain is not entirely unfavourable 
to proponents of regulated capitalism. In the first place, unanimity, which is the 
decision rule in the Council of Ministers for major institutional change and for major 
policy initiatives, is double edged. Neoliberals have had to accept reforms involving 
positive regulation and redistribution in exchange for the assent of all national 
governments to liberalization. One of the products has been cohesion policy, a 
centerpiece of European regulated capitalism (Hooghe, ; Mars, , ).
REGULATED CAPITALISM
A variety of groups view market integration as merely the first step in a more 
ambitious project: regulated capitalism. Their goal is to create a European liberal 
democracy capable of regulating markets, redistributing resources, and shaping 
partnership among public and private actors. The most influential advocate of this 
project was Jacques Delors, who served as President of the European Commission 
during the critical decade from the beginning of  to the end of . 
) Positive regulation. A defining feature of the project is its friendliness to markets 
and its opposition to state control or ownership. When they speak of market 
reform, supporters of regulated capitalism argue for market-enhancing or market-
supporting—rather than market-replacing or even market-correcting—policies. 
) Partnership. Proponents of regulated capitalism have campaigned for voluntary 
co-operation among groups that are affected by, or who contribute to, a 
particular policy. With varying degrees of success, they have proposed a ‘social 
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dialogue’ among representatives of labor and capital in social policy; ‘social 
partnership’ among affected interests, particularly consumers and producers, 
in environmental policy; and ‘partnership’ among the Commission, national 
ministries, and regional authorities in cohesion policy. Like positive regulation, 
the policy is justified on pragmatic grounds. An inclusive strategy is likely to 
generate less social conflict than an exclusive strategy and should be easier to 
implement. 
) Social solidarity. Proponents of regulated capitalism stress policies that empower 
those who are less well off to compete more effectively in the market.
Support
Following social democracy, regulated capitalism involves class compromise; 
following Christian democracy, it involves subsidiarity. Most center-left parties in 
Europe have come to support the project. 
THE NEOLIBERAL PROJECT
Neoliberals have been on the offensive since the mid-s, though they were unable 
to block EU cohesion expansion in ,  and . By the late s, they had 
successfully put in practice elements of their project in most Member States as well 
as at the European level, including privatization, business-friendly taxation and 
labour market flexibility (Hooghe and Marks, ).
For neoliberals, cohesion policy distorts maret competition. The impact of 
neoliberalism on partnership is subtler. It induces cohesion policy-maers to frame 
policy in terms of competitiveness rather than social goals such as equality or solidarity 
and to restrict access to partnerships to economically productive actors. Neoliberals 
conceive the internal maret reform as a means to insulate marets from political 
interference by combining a European-wide maret under supranational surveillance 
with intergovernmental decision maing vested in sovereign national governments. 
By placing maret competition under supranational surveillance, neoliberals wish to 
constrain national barriers to trade. By resisting the creation of a supranational Euro-
polity, neoliberals minimize the capacity for European-wide regulation of economic 
activity. The competition that neoliberals have in mind is not simply among firms 
or worers, but among governments. Finally, the neoliberal project limits the ability 
of social groups, such as labor unions and environmental movements, to pressure 
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governments into regulation. The idea is to shift policy maing from domestic arenas, 
where it is influenced by historically entrenched social groups and popularly elected 
legislatures, to international area dominated by national governments. 
Support
The neoliberal project is a minority project. The first and most forceful champion 
of neoliberalism has been the British Conservative party, particularly under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Thatcher in the s and continuing with Prime 
Minister John Major. However, neoliberalism has broad roots among strategically 
placed political and economic elites. These include leaders of British and European 
multinational companies, industrial associations (including a majority of members 
of UNICE, the major umbrella association for European industry), financial 
interests (e.g. within central banks and international finance), pressure groups 
(including the Bruges group), think tanks, pro-business strands in the German 
CDU-CSU and FDP, and other liberal and conservative parties on the Continent, 
opinion leaders ( e.g. The Economist).
Neoliberal ideas have also gained ground in the Commission. Under the 
presidency of Jacques Delors, the Commission was deeply riven by ideological 
conflict between its president and right-wingers, led by Sir Leon Brittan, originally 
commissioner for competition and then for external trade. 
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THE IMPACT OF EUOPEANISATION ON 
INSTITUTIONBUILDING: 
EUOPEAN EGIONAL POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION IN GEECE
GABRIELA CRETU
The paper points out the role of European integration in promoting the 
institutional changes in Greece, in the last two decades. As mediating mechanisms 
between supranational and national governance structures and, consequently, 
as an important variable in the study of the multi-level system of governance 
in European public policy, the domestic institutions are becoming main actors 
in the Europeanisation process. Considering the European Regional Policy as a 
rich laboratory for examining the impact of EU implementation arrangements on 
institutional framework, the argumentation aims to emphasise the relevance of the 
structural modernization of the Greek institutions in implementing the reforms of 
regional policy.
Political and institutional traditionalism and centralism are deeply rooted in 
the Gree political development, Gree culture and the structure of the Gree 
political system, dating bac to the establishment of the Modern Gree state in the 
s. One of the striing features of the state morphology at the time of Greece’s 
accession was the gigantic size of the state apparatus and the over-centralised 
nature of the state and political system in general. The state occupied a hegemonic 
position in practically every aspect of Gree society. Gree social formation in 
that particular period consisted in: the existence of an inefficient bureaucracy, the 
prevalence of state intervention at all levels of economic and societal life and the 
mediation of this intervention through non-transparent and clientelistic political 
relationships.
In this context modernisation determined by the European integration emerged 
as a possible solution for fighting over-centralism and inefficiency. Despite this, 
success depended on the rather limited capacity of change manifested and promoted 
among the Gree political and social actors. 
E R P I  G E R P I  G
88
EUROPEANISATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
‘Europeanisation’ is used here to describe the ‘emergence and the development of 
distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions 
associated with political problem-solving that formalises interactions among the 
actors and of policy networks specialising in the creation of authoritative rules’. It 
is the independent variable that impacts upon domestic processes, policies, polities 
and institutions.
In theoretical terms, the issues of concern are the ways and the extent to which 
the supranational level and its institutions have affected the institutional reform in 
Greece and the impact on efficiency of the integrated institutional framewor. The 
topics of institutional evolution and allocative and adaptative efficiency within the 
emerging institutional framewor are in this way readdressed. Europeanisation can 
be seen as intrinsic to the process leading towards closer integration and used to refer 
to ‘the impact of EU-led changes upon at least two distinct aspects of Member States’ 
activities—policy and machinery’. Europeanisation, however, is not necessarily a 
one-way causality but rather an ‘iterative and interactive’ process, which involves 
what Blumer and Burch call ‘reception’, that is, national institutional adaptation, but 
also ‘projection’, that is the ability to participate in integration so as best to be able 
to ‘project’ national governmental concerns into the EU decision-maing process. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which member states project their national concern and 
receive direction and/or pressure for national institutional adaptation depends on 
the specific policy area. eception will be the strongest in specific policy areas 
where competencies have been transferred to a significant extent to Brussels, such 
as agriculture, trade and European regional policy and where the supranational 
institutions and the Commission in particular, are heavily involved, de jure and/or 
de facto, in the policy process. The extent of reception also depends on the stage of 
the policy cycle: the supranational level may—under the principle of subsidiarity, 
for example—have a significant input in determining the goals of policy but not in 
 Risse, T., Cowles, M.G. Caporaso (:).
 Bulmer, S., Burch, M. (:).
 Bulmer, S., Burch, M. ().
 As Edwards and Spence point out the Commission’s main roles may be summed up under five main 
headings: the initiative role (initiating legislation), the administrative role (in areas such as agriculture, 
which have been delegated to the Commission by the member states), a normative role, both as 
guardian of the Treaties and the acquis communautaire, a mediative role between the institutions and 
the member states, representative role—diplomatic representation in third countries. See Edwards, G., 
Spence, D. (eds.) (: ).  
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implementing it. In other words, the balance between ‘reception’ and ‘projection’ 
will depend on policy area, the competencies and specific institutions involved in, 
and the stage of policy process. Moreover, reception will be dominant if the ability 
of a member state to influence the course of events at European level is limited. 
This is also the case of Greece, where Europeanisation tends to be portrayed as 
‘modernisation’ or ‘catch-up’.
DOMESTIC POLITICS, POWER DISTRIBUTION AND INEFFICIENCY
The Greek government faced serious problems in dealing with regional policy. Firstly, 
the ‘gatekeeper’ i.e. the Ministry of National Economy, which was responsible for the 
preparation of the Regional Development Plan and the central co-ordination of the 
Community Support Framework, lacked the human resources and the appropriate 
horizontal units to produce detailed proposals (there was only one directorate and 
a staff of  people responsible for the job).  The allocation of competences was 
also limited: firstly, decision-making was kept closely within the political offices 
residing at the top of the administration, secondly, the input of sub-national actors, 
which lacked the knowledge necessary to perform the tasks of regional policy’s 
implementation, was of a limited scope. The lack of appropriate services at the 
regional level meant that the regional councils—headed by centrally appointed 
Regional Secretaries—discussed proposals arising from the more established 
prefecture level (nomos). 
Only a handful of these proposals were found to be compatible with the ‘overall 
development strategy’—if such strategy existed—and was included in the final 
egional Development Plan. Besides, the egional Development Plan was submitted 
under the political leadership of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement government, 
in March , but it too one year for Community Support Framewor - to 
be adopted. This was largely because of the political turmoil in Greece at the time. 
Between the time of submission of the egional Development Plan and the adoption 
of the Community Support Framewor, in March , two national elections too 
place, but no majority government could be formed. These developments would 
not have been very important if the Gree administration had been competent and 
‘autonomous’ or free from political and societal pressures. 
 Pagoulatos, G. ().
 Ioakimidis, P.C. (:).
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Similar was the state of affairs for the second Community Support Framewor, 
-. The egional Development Plan was submitted hurriedly on September 
, , by the New Democracy government in view of the national elections of 
October , which were held early due to an internal conflict within the governing 
party. New Democracy lost the elections to the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement 
and there can be little doubt that European funding had played its role. Following 
the loss of the elections by New Democracy, the new Pan-Hellenic Socialist 
Movement government submitted a proposal on December ,  to modify the 
initial egional Development Plan. A new version of the egional Development 
Plan was finally resubmitted to the Commission in March , but only with 
minor alterations. This may seem surprising given the political significance of 
managing European funds. One would have expected the new government to 
submit a new egional Development Plan to suit its own distribution of funds to 
the various national and sub-national authorities. However, due to time constraints, 
the national authorities chose to go along with the Plan submitted by the previous 
government in the expectation that the contract would be changed in due course.
In the early s, the implementation of regional policy was left almost 
entirely to the devices of the Gree system of programme implementation where 
and when that existed. This meant, however, that funds were fuelling the existing 
institutional framewor, which was filled with ‘blac holes’: the ‘anarchic’ nature 
of the state machinery meant that the division of responsibility was difficult, while 
the levels of accountability and transparency were very low. High absorption rates 
of the cohesion funds were sought through the inclusion of a larger number of 
projects than effective implementation would have allowed. For the European 
Commission, however, institutional malpractice was a far more important issue 
than the rates of absorption because it resulted in the inefficient allocation and use 
of resources. A large number of projects resulted from an effort to distribute funds 
so as to satisfy as many centres of power as possible within the central and the 
sub-national authorities. Ensuring that the funds were being used for the purposes 
for which they were intended in the first place, and assuring the quality of the 
actions, remained the overriding point of friction between national, regional and 
Commission authorities. 
It is liely that little would have changed in Greece had the Commission not 
intervened to alter the institutional arrangements regarding the implementation of 
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regional policy. The reasons for this can be explained in terms of the path-dependent 
nature of institutional failure. Once the Gree state had reached a point where its 
structures were found to be the cause of the inefficient use of European funds, 
the process of institutional reform had to be undertaen externally. The centres of 
decision-maing that could have initiated this process domestically were unable to 
do so; they were caught up in the vicious circle of institutional failure. The process 
of reform initiated by the Commission began, in essence, on the eve of the first 
Community Support Framewor. The Commission’s officials tried to change the 
Gree administration but it proved ‘semi-catastrophic’ and they had to create a new 
and separate administrative structure to deal particularly with European Union 
projects. It was helped by several factors in the first half of the s. First, there 
was the continuation and strengthening of, the  eform of Structural Funds 
through the  egulation amendments. Secondly, the experience and results of 
the first Community Support Framewor had exposed clearly the shortcomings of 
the domestic institutional framewor pertaining to regional policy. Thirdly, the new 
programming period (-) gave the Commission the opportunity to include 
its much more soundly based proposals in the Community Support Framewor as 
binding commitments. Forthly, the possibility of implementing the reforms by the 
mid-s was helped by the fact that the political will to comply with the demands, 
which came directly—or indirectly through the Ministry of National Economy—
from Brussels was at times in unison.
ORGANISING THE MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL POLICY: REFORM AND 
INNOVATION?
The path chosen by the Commission for improving the institutional framework was 
to push for the creation of structures for regional policy implementation process 
as independent as possible of the state-controlled sector, or at least structures 
endowed, as far as possible, with clear procedures and a high quality of human 
capital. In order to ensure the successful implementation of Community Support 
Framework -, a special Management Organization Unit for the Community 
Support Framework was set up under the instructions and control of the Ministry 
of National Economy but which was independent from the administrative structure 
 Council Regulation /, amending Council Regulation /; Council Regulation / 
amending Council Regulation /.
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of the ministry. The path towards the creation of Management Organization Unit was 
a tortuous one with the Commission constantly pressuring the national authorities. 
The law establishing the Management Organization Unit of the second Community 
Support Framework was finally passed by the Parliament, in December . On the 
day  the vote was to take place, there was a strike at the Ministry of National Economy 
and the banners protesting against the law were hanging over its entrance. The 
bureaucratic establishment saw the creation of the new body as a threat to its powers 
of decision-making and its role in the implementation of the policy and was opposed 
to the concept of an independent structure over which it did not have any control; a 
structure, however, with clearly defined aims, flexibility and integrity. It took another 
two years for the company to come into full operation, after many difficulties, ‘storms’, 
hurdles, which spring from the culture and institutions of the Greek society. 
The Management Organization Unit is a state-owned enterprise operating under 
private law with a Managing Director and a Board of Directors. The main role of the 
Management Organization Unit was stated as ‘the establishment of a ‘rationalistic’ 
spirit in programming, implementation and monitoring of development projects’. 
By mid-, the Management Organization Unit had formed ten teams. Six had 
effectively taen over the monitoring of the egional Operational Programmes 
and the other four had been attached to National Operational Programmes. The 
Management Organization Unit had to be invited by the relevant authorities to 
support their programmes. Invitations largely depended on the personal judgement 
of an Operational Programme’s political principal, which was generally biased 
against the employment of the organization since it was perceived as a threat to his/
her decision-maing powers. Thus, invitations to the Management Organization 
Unit, from the ministries in particular, were the exception rather than the rule. 
The regional authorities were not always een to accept the services of Management 
Organization Unit either. Some regions were forced by the Ministry of National 
Economy to accept them and it was decided that before the end of second 
Community Support Framewor and certainly for the third Community Support 
Framewor -, the Management Organization Unit would be monitoring 
all the egional Operational Programmes. 
 The original time schedule as presented by the Greek authorities to the Commission envisaged the voting 
of the law setting up MOU for August ,  and the operation of the first teams by October , . 
Law / was voted on // and took effect on //. 
 See the website of the company at www.mou.gr.
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It is noteworthy that the Commission was involved even in the selection of 
the Managing Director of the Management Organization Unit. Such environment 
arguably infringed upon the principle of subsidiarity. It was accepted by the national 
authorities in the case of the Management Organization Unit after the Commission 
put considerable pressure on them during the negotiations preceding the set-up of 
the Management Organization Unit. In general, the main means through which the 
Commission persuaded the national authorities of the need of transparency and 
precision was the use of its veto powers over the financial allocation of resources. 
In other cases, when then Commission did not pay attention to such ‘details’ in 
the setting up of the mechanisms, ‘the carcinogenic system’ appeared to erode the 
reforms almost immediately. Due to the apprehension of the political leadership of 
the Ministry of National Economy itself, the delays in establishing the Management 
Organization Unit were not so much related to the organization itself, but mainly to 
the efforts the Ministry of National Economy made to avoid political friction and 
the political cost that would have been incurred by getting into open conflict with 
the syndicated interests of the administration, among others.
One of the main dilemmas facing the Commission with regard to the 
implementation of the egional Operational Programmes was one concerning 
the increased involvement of the regional actors in the implementation process 
at the potential cost of hurting the effectiveness of such a progress. Ideally, the 
involvement of these actors would increase implementation effectiveness but the 
problem was that the Gree sub-national level remained atrophic and was unable 
to perform the basic tass arising during the implementation of European regional 
policy, despite the continuous calls for decentralization within the country. 
Although the regionalisation process in Greece was not an overriding goal for the 
Commission, it nevertheless pushed for the process and was willing to pay a certain 
price to maintain its momentum. Implementation Committees, proposed by the 
Commission at regional level, met less resistance than at the centre. The regional 
authorities, instead of complaining about the intervention of the newly created 
bodies often complained a) about their inability to perform the necessary tass and 
b) the lac of co-operation from the central authorities in achieving the objectives 
of the egional Operational Programmes. In fact, the implementation process of 
the second Community Support Framewor at the regional level was virtually 
conducted within the new structures instigated by the Commission. 
94
E R P I  G
95
E R P I  G
FINAL REMARKS
The most important aspect of institutional reform in Greece was the role played 
by the European Commission in creating new administrative structures to deal 
with the implementation of the regional policy. Although the interaction of 
sub-national, national and supranational levels of governance did contribute 
to the Europeanisation of national regional policy in Greece, its impact on the 
performance of the public sector (central and regional) was rather marginal. At the 
same time, the multiplication of communication channels between sub-national 
and supranational actors and the mobilization of local interests in the view of new 
funding opportunities contributed to the creation of various multi-level policy 
networks that, however, remain entangled in the national political game. 
Nevertheless, building the new framewor was a slow process and often created 
considerable friction between the national and supranational levels of governance. 
The reforms reduced the Gree government’s control over resources and affected 
the clientelistic relationship within the state apparatus. There is no doubt that the 
formal institutional framewor that gradually developed in the s improved 
the implementation of European egional Policy, by creating crunches of relative 
efficiency in the operation of the Gree institutions. Since these crunches were 
constructed for the sole purpose of administering European structural funding 
and because of their independence from the public administration, they could not 
directly ameliorate the massive inefficiency of the Gree public administration. 
Nor did European integration as a whole imply the elimination of the considerable 
institutional failure in the wider operation of the Gree state. However, institutional 
reform in Greece had to tae place even if political costs were high. Political 
leaders were liely to be constrained by these costs, which were inherent in the 
institutional framewor of Gree society. Although, generally speaing, the 
impact of Europeanisation has been positive by providing an impetus for domestic 
institutional reform, counterproductive institutional inertness still remains a major 
challenge for Gree society.
 Most notably, the implementation of the Community initiatives has encouraged some Greek local 
authorities to assume a more pro-active role by taking the initiative themselves to formulate projects 
and apply for funding (Koutalakis, C., :).
 Interpersonal relations, position in the party hierarchy and party identity, future political orientations 
of local leaders, personal profile, pre-electoral commitments, political parties and government 
strategies and the sponsoring of certain local politicians due to political considerations related to 
party competition, are crucial determinants of the abilities of sub-national politicians to mobilize local 
interest groups.
94
E R P I  G
95
E R P I  G
REFERENCES
Börzel, T. A. – Risse, T. (). When Europe Hits Home: Europeanisation and Domestic 
Change. European University Institute. ; Bulmer, S. (). The Governance of 
the European Union: A New Institutionalist Approach. Journal of Public Policy , 
(), -. 
Bulmer, S. – Burch, M. (). Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, the British State and 
European Union. Public Administration , (), -.
Bulmer, S. – Burch, M. (). The ‘Europeanisation’ of Central Government: The UK 
and Germany in Historical Institutionalist Perspective in Rhodes, R.A.W. (Ed). 
Transforming British Government – Changing Institutions, London, Macmillan, -.
Commission of the European Communities (). Greece: Community Support 
Framework, -, Brussels.
Commission of the European Communities (). Guide to the Reform of the Community’s 
Structural Funds. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Diamandouros, N. (). Greek Politics and Society in the s. In. Allison, G. T. and 
Nikolaidis, K. (Eds). The Greek Paradox. Promise vs. Performance. The MIT Press, 
Cambridge.
Edwards, G. – Spence, D. (Eds). (). The European Commission. Longman Current 
Affaires, Harlow.  
Hanf, K. and Setendorp, B. (Eds). (). Adapting to European Integration: Small States 
and the European Union. Longman, London.
Héritier, A. (). Differential Europe: National Administrative Responses to 
Community Policy. In. Cowles, M. G. – Caporaso, J. A. – Risse, T. Transforming Europe. 
Europeanisation and Domestic Change. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Hooghe, L. (Ed.) (). Cohesion Policy and European integration: Building Multi-level 
Governance. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hooghe, L. (). Reconciling EU – Wide Policy and National Diversity. In. Hooghe, 
L. (Ed). Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Ioakimidis, P. C. (). The Europeanisation of Greece: An Overall Assessment. http:
//www.ekem.gr/europeanization_en.html
Koutalakis, C. (). Local Development Strategies in the EU: An Evaluation of their Impact 
on the Greek System of Local Governance. Paper presented at the final workshops on the 
European Policy Process, organized by the Human Capital and Mobility Network, Dublin.
96
E R P I  G
Marks, G. – Hooghe, L. – Blank, K. (). European Integration from the s: State 
Centric v. Multi-level Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies , (), -.
McAleavy, P. (). Policy Implementation as Incomplete Contracting: The European 
Regional Development Fund. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, European University 
Institute, Florence.
Pagoulatos, G. (). Economic Adjustment and Financial Reform: Greece’s 
Europeanisation and the Emergence of a Stabilization State. South European Society 
and Politics , (), -.
Pierson, P. (). The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist 
Analysis.  Comparative Political Studies , (),-.
Plaskovitis, I. (). EC Regional Policy in Greece: Ten Years of Structural Funds 
Intervention.  In. Kazakos, P. and Ioakimidis, P. C. (Eds). Greece and EC Membership 
Evaluated. Pinter, London.
Risse, T. (). A European Identity? Europeanisation and the Evolution of Nation-
State Identities. In: Cowles, M. G. Transforming Europe. Europeanisation and 
Domestic Political Change. Cornell University Press, New York.
Risse, T. – Cowles, M. G. – Caporaso, J. A. (). Europeanisation and Domestic Change: 
Introduction. In. Cowles, M. G. – Caporaso, J. A. – Risse, T. (Eds). Transforming Europe. 
Europeanisation and Domestic Political Change. Cornell University Press, New York.
www.mou.gr – Management Organisation Unit, Greece.
97
UPTUES IN THE DANUBE EGION: 
TEITOIAL COOPEATION AS A 
PLAYGOUND OF EUOPEAN INTEGATION
ZOLTÁN GÁL
THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL SPATIAL STRUCTURES IN THE 
DANUBE STATES AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM
Europe is facing one of its biggest challenges at the turn of the millennium. 
Competition generated by globalisation, the establishment of the frameworks and 
the internal regional structures of European integration, the challenges of the eastern 
enlargement of the EU, the competitions with the economic power centres of the 
Americas and Asia make the old continent gather its energies on a large scale. It is 
not only the expansion of the external borders of the EU and the preparation of a 
prognosis on its new geopolitical changes that require hard preparatory work.
All these changes may have serious impacts on the small states of East 
Central-Europe which are unprepared for integration. Not only because their 
economies and democratic institutional systems need serious further efforts to 
meet EU requirements but also because the establishment of the inner regional 
structures requiring the decentralisation of the state may meet serious problems 
in these countries. The revival of nation states after the change of regime was very 
often accompanied by strong centralisation efforts which resulted in a total absence 
or a weaness of the decentralised institutional system and autonomies in countries 
of the region. At the same time, this very region may be the largest beneficiary 
of macro-regional co-operations as during the th century the borders of 
small states—very frequently established irrationally—are politically the most 
disputable since they do not match the ethnic borders and strongly limit the 
economic, cultural and residential interrelationships of lands historically bound 
together (Illés, ).
In the s the fundamental changes in macro-regional relations created 
new historical situations, challenges and riss for the often conflicting regional 
transformation processes. While West-European regional co-operation is 
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actually an integral part of a comprehensive process and the macro-regional co-
operation systems are parts of the integration process in the member countries, 
the East Central European macro-regional co-operations with their internal 
decentralisation processes and strengthening interregional co-operations may be 
regarded as the ‘test areas’ of European accession.
THE INTEGRATING AND DISINTEGRATING ROLE OF THE RIVER DA
NUBE IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REGION FROM A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Besides the future development programmes the study of the changing historical 
role of the river Danube in the formation of life, natural economy, the settlement 
network and the transport structure of the Danube countries also seems to be an 
issue of equal weight. 
The river Danube is the second longest river in Europe ( ilometres) 
connecting ten countries in Central East Europe and the Balans (Germany, 
Austria, Slovaia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, omania, Bulgaria, the Uraine and 
Moldavia). It is the only major river that flows eastward from Western Europe and 
connects very heterogeneous territories of the continent. The river Danube is not 
only a geographical notion but also a transport corridor and has been in the focus of 
several ecological, political and economic conflicts.  Its economic importance, its role 
in waterway transport has always changed in the course of time but the river itself 
has always had a minor role in the international division of labour.
The iver Danube has served several times as a natural border between 
civilisations, political systems and governments. The river Danube was already an 
important frontier zone separating the barbarian and civilised worlds in omans 
times and later as well maring the borders of several empires. Important military 
roads also crossed the river and its zone (Avarian, Fran, Byzantine, Bulgarian 
empires). From the early Middle Ages the commercial activity of the Danube 
nations increased but natural obstacles (water falls), the Blac Sea’s peripheral 
location and the fragmentation of feudal powers all hindered the use of Danube for 
long-distance commercial purposes. For several centuries the Central Danube Basin 
was a frontier zone between Christian Civilisation and the Ottoman Empire. For 
several centuries the river Sava and the line of the Lower Danube served as a ind of 
European frontier separating the civilised world from the Balans which should be 
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regarded in terms of civilisation as a gateway to the East. The Iron Curtain set up 
following World War II also ran along  the Danube region separating the Eastern 
and Western world. During the th century the river’s role as a natural state border 
was questioned several times, which further emphasised the river’s separating 
functions (Gál, a). (Table )
Table . The Danube as a border river
Country Length of the 
Danube in a given 
country (km)
e Danube as 
a international 
border (km)
e Danube as a 
regional border 
(km)
e Danube as a 
internal river (km)
Germany 647 cca 25 cca 4 cca 618
Austria 350 cca 35 cca 35 cca 280
Slovakia 172 cca 150 0 cca 22
Hungary 410 140 cca 230 cca 40
Croatia 188 188 0 0
Yugoslavia 588 cca 408 cca 90 cca 90
Bulgaria 470 470 0 0
Romania 1075 cca 853 cca 60 cca 62
Ukraine 163 163 0 0
Source: Illés ()
From a geographical aspect the Danube region is considered a land-loced 
continental area, although even in the early Middle Ages very important trading 
routes were set up in an east-west direction along the region. For centuries these 
routes served as important innovation channels and were considered to be the axis 
of Western civilisation. The hine-Danube axis running in an east-west direction 
had ey functions as the continent’s land-based and waterway transportation routes 
reached the Levant area along the river Danube. After the th century the role of the 
Danube axis in transportation was re-evaluated. Until the mid-s the Danube 
states served as suppliers of agricultural products for the industrialised West 
European countries as part of the European spatial division of labour. The ey role 
 The marking of the geographical borders of the Balkan Peninsula and the Danube region (Danube space, 
Danube landscape) is hindered by the fact that both space categories  identify a changing political, cultural 
and value content not only in a geographical but also in a historical sense. The geographical borders of 
the Balkan Peninsula are marked by the rivesr Sava and the Lower Danube but in the political sense the 
northern border of the Balkan cannot be exactly located. Some experts mark the Balkan Peninsula as the 
areas remaining from the th century, while others  identify the Balkans with the territory of the Balkan 
states including the new states formed after  (Romania and Yugoslavia) (Jelavich ). The frequent 
changes in the geopolitical relations between the Balkan states and the countries of Central Europe 
further complicate the marking of the border between the Balkan and Central Europe. This is based on 
the fact that the ‘Huntington’ civilisation (religional, cultural) frontiers not only separate but in several 
cases also divide the Danube region–the common terrain–in a mosaic like pattern.
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within this system was first played by the waterway route of the river Danube and 
later by the railway lines following the Danube axis (Gál, ).
From geopolitical and economic aspects the eastbound flow of the river Danube 
from West Europe to the European peripheries is a disadvantage for the countries 
of the Danube region because it may strongly wor against the river’s integrating 
force and role. Access to the Blac Sea via the river Danube was hindered by several 
factors. On the natural side Porţile de Fier (Iron Gate) used to be the major obstacle 
because, until the regulation of the river at the turn of the th and th centuries, 
and until the s it hindered both navigation of the river and access to the Blac 
Sea (Stephen G., ). On the economic side it was a problem that unlie several 
other smaller rivers in its neighbourhood which were, however, more important for 
navigation the river Danube avoided the Adriatic space and  flew into the Blac Sea 
across an economically more disadvantaged, loced-up and peripheral area situated 
outside the major routes of international marine transportation. Apart from the 
lower omanian section, important for the export of cereal goods, the river’s 
shipping traffic was very low (in  the whole length of the river produced a lower 
traffic volume than the lower section of the river hine) (East, ). The volume of 
shipped goods decreased after World War I. The common customs area of Austria 
and Hungary was broen up and the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy introduced high customs duties in  new independent customs areas. 
The first pea period in the history of Danube shipping was the expansion of Nazi 
Germany’s military economy to Southeast Europe, which—at the same time—put 
an end to the freedom of navigation. Imported food, omanian crude oil and raw 
materials for military use were mostly transported on the Danube into Germany 
and the turn of  - was the top year considering the volume of shipped cargo 
(áni, ).
In a geopolitical sense the landloced character of the Danube Basin was 
emphasised by the fact that it was surrounded by political (imperial) borders and 
the river’s area turned into a site the rivalry for the great empires. Granting the right 
of free shipping was a fundamental pre-condition for the navigation on the river 
Danube. This was granted by international treaties signed by the representatives 
of the Danube region’s great empires and by the Danube states. The Paris Treaty 
of  and the Versailles Treaty of  declared the river Danube an international 
waterway and set up the Danube Committee authorised with administrative 
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competences related to Danube navigation. With the election of the Danube 
Committee an international organisation was created to guarantee free rights for 
shipping on the river Danube. 
THE ROLE OF THE RIVER DANUBE IN THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL 
SPACE IN THE TH AND TH CENTURIES
The historical-political dimension of the Danube region and political tension in the 
area increased in the th century, which turned into several bloody conflicts during 
the th century. The spatial possibilities of creating nation states showed totally 
different perspectives from that of in Western Europe. While in Western Europe 
nation states resulted from the integration of smaller regions into a homogenous 
state, in the ethnically most mixed ‘Danube’ region of Europe multinational ‘nation 
states’ were formed at a later stage, only after the disintegration of the supranational 
(Hapsburg, Russian, Turkish, Soviet) empires (Breu, ). Unfortunately the 
establishment of the area’s nation states in the th century coincided with the 
increasing influence of superpowers and this led to a situation where decisions 
on the borders of the newly formed Balkan states depended mainly on those 
superpowers most capable of articulating their interests in the Danube region 
(Macartney, ). In the Danube region homogenous political structures have 
always been created by the pushing force of an external power or by economic 
pressure. During the th century the Danube Valley was a place where the interests 
of four superpowers conflicted the most (Germany, the Hapsburg Empire, Turkey 
and Russia/The Soviet Union). The political structures of the Danube space enabled 
the Hapsburg Empire to maintain an economically sustainable integration for  
years. The confederational efforts of the past two centuries emphasizing the need 
for the co-operation of the Danube nations against the external superpowers were 
also associated with the river Danube and considered it as a symbol linking the 
confederation of small nations (Hanák, ). Although the voluntary integration 
of the Danube Valley nations had no feasible alternatives, all its ideas and concepts 
remained mere plans. In the Danube region only superpowers were in a position to 
make decisions, consequently only superpowers contacted with the area’s peripheral 
zone could maintain integration systems quite often endangering each other’s power 
ambitions (Gál, b).
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of empire integrations, 
the Danube region still missed the preconditions for a conflict free integration. 
The EU’s initiative for a ‘Common Europe’ can be the only real alternative for the 
countries of the Danube region.
POSSIBILITIES FOR TERRITORIAL COOPERATION IN THE DANUBE 
REGION AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM
The River Danube is not only a transport corridor, a constant conflicting point of 
ecological and political issues but it is also an important spatial organisational power 
that may serve as a framework for interregional co-operations as well. At the turn 
of the s/s with the disintegration of the last great empire the Danube space 
is again disintegrating into nation states and this process is more intensive than 
it was after the First World War. With the collapse of the three socialist pseudo-
federations: the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (the disintegration 
of the latter leading to a bloody war) the Danube region continued its way towards 
‘cantonisation’ (today the region has  states).
Parallel to the region’s fragmentation the other side of Europe is undergoing 
a regional self-organisation and integration process within the supranational 
framewor of the European Union. In the s three alternatives seemed to be open to 
the countries of the Danube region reviving their old conflicts: () The confederational 
integration of the region’s small states (a new renaissance of the Central European 
idea), which was deemed to failure from the beginning. () The redistribution of the 
territory among superpowers which may be compensated for by the collective defence 
guarantees of the NATO’s eastern expansion and by the weaening powers of ussia. 
() EU accession could be an alternative for certain countries in the area but this 
would also create breapoints among the nations of the Danube space (Illés, ). 
The problem of integrating the Danube countries into a broader European space 
can be solved only by accession which could also terminate unreal expectations 
and worries. Being aware of the different scenarios we can now see that macro-
regional co-operations covering the area of Central and Eastern Europe may have a 
special role in integration, in the intensification of internal decentralisation and in 
terminating mutual distrusts and worries. 
There is an increasing and a widening trend in the co-operations crossing the 
borders of the former iron curtain states and the enlarged EU. The site and the 
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role of the Danube Basin co-operation should be examined from this aspect too. 
The Visegrád countries’ initiative for a Central European Free Trade Association 
(CEFTA) in , the Central European Initiative proposed by Italy in  for 
the replacement of Pentagonale and the co-operation of Danube regions in the 
institutional form of the Danube egion Woring Community since  may all be 
regarded as precedents of macro-regional co-operation of the Danube states.
eal macro-regional co-operations should meet two criteria: more than two 
countries should participate in it and it is not necessary for the full territory of 
all participating countries to be involved in it. Macro-regional co-operations are 
initiated not by the EU but rather by the participating regions or by a third party. 
Macro-regional co-operations may operate in the following forms: twin-city co-
operation, interregional co-operation (Danube regions) cross-border co-operation, 
macro-regional co-operation (CADSES), environment, water management and 
tourism oriented professional co-operations (Illés, ).
The increasing importance of cross-border regional co-operation in Europe is a 
very significant development of the last decade. Two reasons are worth mentioning 
of those that have lead to this situation. The first comes from the very nature 
of economic and environmental issues. Environmental problems do not stop at 
the borders—their efficient management requires cross-border co-operation. 
Economic issues cross the borders because a more efficient division of labour 
requires a better utilisation of competitive advantages. However, this presupposes 
roads, railway and infrastructure which also require co-operation on an international 
level. In East Central Europe the political motivation for such co-operations is even 
higher. egionalism has democratic functions too, which may counterbalance the 
predominance of state power in the centralised state systems of East Central Europe.
The importance of macro-regional co-operation in East Central Europe should 
be greater than in other parts of Europe. The countries of Central and Southeast 
Europe are small continental states with long land-based and non-natural borders 
in the majority of cases. While  of the borders of EU- member states are sea 
borders, this is true only for  of Central and Southeast European countries. This 
explains why these countries are in need of international regional co-operation. 
And last but not least the present state borders of Central and Eastern European 
countries were formed quite recently. Until the mid-s these countries had lived 
in an empire without borders to separate them in the majority of cases. The intensive 
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division of labour followed this pattern but today’s new state borders separate areas 
that used to be integrated in the past. None of the  nations in the Danube space with 
the exception of the Czech epublic no nations are living in full number within the 
borders of their state. There are  ethnic groups in the region with more than one 
million members living outside the borders of their own state. In this context there is 
no need to further emphasise the importance of cross-border co-operations.
The European Union has been supporting macro-regional co-operation in East 
Central Europe since the mid-s only. It was initiated in the middle of the 
s that besides the support limited to local cross-border co-operations only, a 
comprehensive strategy should be prepared for larger regional structures. This co-
operation strategy involves the following targets:
• The intensification of macro-regional integration processes within the region, 
the increase of the region’s internal cohesion through the promotion of 
decentralisation processes;
• The organisation of ‘actions’ and institutions to facilitate catching up and 
prepare the region for EU integration;
• The testing and involvement of the peripheral areas outside the EU as potential 
partners. This can be interpreted as an incentive for integration or as an 
initiative for creating a federal and influence zone as an external impetus for 
non-EU states for integration.
The Community Initiative INTEEG was prompted by the rapidly growing 
awareness of two essential truths: () the growing interdependencies of the various 
components of the European territory and () the considerable impact of many 
Community policies on territorial development and planning. ealising these 
challenges, the Commission of the European Communities—at its meeting on th 
June —decided to establish a Community Initiative for cross-border co-operation 
(INTEEG II A) and selected energy networs (INTEEG II B). Almost two years 
later, at its meeting of th May, , the Commission decided to include a third 
programme (INTEEG II C) for ‘trans-national co-operation in spatial planning’.
The main objectives of INTEEG II C were to contribute to a balanced spatial 
development in the EU, by reducing inequalities in development and improving 
the spatial impact of Community policies with regard to spatial development; In 
the next programming period (–) trans-national spatial planning co-
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operation programmes were continued. On th April  the Commission of the 
European Communities decided to establish a Community initiative concerning 
trans-European co-operation (INTEEG III B) for this period. In the previous 
period INTEEG II C allowed participants to gain some experience regarding co-
operation in  larger trans-national territories (Northwest European Metropolitan 
Area, Baltic Sea, Southwest European Space, North Sea, West Mediterranean 
and South Alps, Atlantic Area, CADSES), involving national, regional and local 
authorities, with a view of achieving a higher degree of territorial integration of these 
areas. The main challenge for INTEEG III therefore was to build on the positive 
experiences and progressively developing structures for such co-operations across 
the Community and with neighbouring countries. Due attention was to be given to
• the external borders of the Community, taking into account enlargement in 
particular;
• co-operation with the outermost regions of the Community;
• co-operation for the further stabilisation and association process in the western 
Balkans; and
• co-operation concerning insular regions.
Among the current macro-regional initiatives the Danube region is involved in 
CADSES (abbreviation for Central-European, Adriatic, Danubian and Southeast-
European Space) programme. The delineation of the CADSES area was one of 
the most hotly debated issues of trans-national co-operation, the reasons for 
which are manifold. The original definition of the CADSES area was not based on 
geographical criteria (Figure ).
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Figure  CADSES: Central European, Adriatic, Danubian and 
Southern European Space
Source: ESDP
The CADSES area is one of the largest co-operation areas of all the INTEEG 
III B areas, with its  co-operating countries (also the largest number among all 
co-operating countries) covering a total area of . million m with a population 
of . million (. and . of the EU, respectively). The primary and basic 
reason for defining and delineating the CADSES area in  was that it comprised 
the member states (Germany, Austria, Italy and Greece) neighbouring the eastern 
enlargement area and other neighbours beyond the external EU border. The 
fundamental goal was to establish spatial co-operation across the external border 
(former Iron Curtain) of the EU with larger spaces than the narrow border area. 
A special goal was for Greece to develop co-operation lins with EU partners in 
the North. The CADSES programme was by no means meant to homogenise these 
countries but to draw the attention of the EU to countries excluded from it in the first 
period and involve them to some extent into the integration processes (Illés, ). 
In the second programming period (-) the CADSES co-operation basically 
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fulfilled this tas. Various inds of co-operation networs were established, despite 
the fact that there was no or very modest EU funding for non-EU partners. In , 
at the end of the programming period, the European Commission proposed to split 
the space into two co-operation areas, arguing that it was too large (including  
countries) and hardly manageable efficiently. However, the historic moment was not 
suitable for implementing this change and the Commission changed their minds on 
that issue. At present  of the area covered by the CADSES programme is outside 
the EU territory and  of the population lives in these areas. Obviously, these 
non-EU regions have some common challenges with the regions of the EU, but 
they also have a lot of challenges and tass specific to these countries and regions.
The large number of partners and the high degree of heterogeneity significantly 
increase the difficulties of CADSES programme management for several reasons: 
a. Though the number of countries incorporated into the CADSES area was very 
high (), the number of EU member states among them, fully eligibile for ERDF 
financing was only four. There is no other co-operation area with so many 
eligible countries (the second largest is the Baltic Space with ). The number 
of eligible NUTS regions is  (the next highest number is  in Northwest 
Europe). It is certainly a very large managerial and administrative burden for 
the institutions involved.
b. Embracing old and new member countries in one and the same co-operation 
area is justifiable and even desirable. Nevertheless, the experiences of two 
programming periods have demonstrated and proved that the spatial planning 
problems and the priorities of the old and new member states are, in many 
respects, totally different. What is a serious and fundamental problem in the 
new member states (agricultural overpopulation, dramatic lack and weakness of 
SMEs, high number and ratio of the Roma population, large and deteriorating 
urban housing estates, lack and weaknesses of regional administrative and 
management structures, consequences of recent mass privatisation and so 
on) are not problems in the old member states. Similarly, problems of the old 
member states (large immigration, guest workers, displacement of workplaces 
 Macro-regional initiatives are bound to the geopolitical considerations of the EU- member countries 
selecting the regions they wish to establish a closer connection with for the enhancement of their 
(market and investment) relations. In CADSES the four participating member states are located in 
different regions thus they have different interest areas (Greece – Southeast Balkans, Italy – Adriatic 
Space, Austria South-Eastern Europe,  the Bayern Danube axis).
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to cheap labour areas and so on) are not (yet) problems in the new member 
states. Even in issues of common concern (environment, accessibility, natural 
and cultural heritage) the dimensions and priorities are different in the two 
groups of countries and regions. Therefore, to find common priorities for these 
mixed co-operation areas is not a simple task.
The fact that CADSES has a rigid management mechanism and the tendering 
system is appropriate only in the EU- member states also originates from the 
region’s heterogeneity. The macro-regional co-operation of Danube countries is 
hindered by the fact that the development potentials and the economic structures 
of the Danube Valley influencing  countries of Europe show significant spatial 
differences in the utilisation of the river and there are further differences in the state 
of the natural environment in the participating countries.
The delineation of the Danube region as a geographical unit is not an easy tas 
either as the river’s water catchment area (, m) is strongly fragmented, 
lacing a homogenous geographical space. It is a region of extreme differences in 
economic development since both Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, Europe’s and 
Germany’s richest regions are located in the Danube Valley and Europe’s poorest 
regions can also be found here. The difference between the GDP of Upper-Bavaria 
and Teleonnan, a county in omania, is twentyfold. Planning co-operation is an 
extremely hard tas in such circumstances.
The introduction of more intensive forms of co-operation is hindered by several 
factors. The low utilisation of the river Danube as an international waterway is 
not only the outcome of the Yugoslavian crisis because the low values of shipped 
cargo volume started to appear in the s (between - the volume of 
cargo shipping dropped to 1⁄4 of the initial value) and besides the deteriorating 
infrastructure the opening of the Danube-Main-hine Canal further decreased the 
volume of shipped goods on the river Danube (Erdősi, ).
The shortage of bridges is another hindering factor of cross-border co-
operation between the river’s two bans. The river Danube is a natural border 
between countries on nearly , ilometres ( ilometres precisely) which is 
 of its total length. This means that in these sections co-operation across the 
river Danube is at the same time a bi- or (trilateral) cross-border co-operation. 
This -ilometre section of the river is crossed by  bridges only. This means 
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one bridge on the average for every  ilometre. In these circumstances the river 
Danube as a border river has a separating rather than a connecting role. It is also 
striing that the  m section between omania and Bulgaria is crossed by one 
bridge only. This situation is unique in Europe (even if there are five ferry crossings 
along this section). The river Danube is crossed by  public road bridges.  of 
them are located in Germany,  are in Austria and the remaining  are scattered 
along the further sections of the river.
The coordination of environmental and water management tass is also a 
problem to be solved. Although the river Danube is not among the most polluted 
rivers of the European continent (thans to its self cleaning ability), in the vicinity 
of large cities and at the meeting point of some of its side rivers carrying  pollutants 
‘lethal’ for the river’s ecosystem (cyanide and tin) the values of pollution exceed 
by far the environmental limits. Environmental and water management problems 
can be tacled only in the framewor of international co-operation as  of 
Hungary’s,  of Moldavia’s,  of omania’s and  of Yugoslavia’s surface 
waters originate from other countries. There are some issues which should be solved 
by the involvement of not only the Danube countries but of the whole catchment 
area of the river. Such issues are water management and the protection against 
floods. The CADSES area as a whole, but within it especially the Danube area is 
seriously exposed to flood hazards. Probably due to human activities (deforestation 
in the Carpathians, reduction of the natural vegetation cover etc.) the level of f loods 
and their frequency increases year by year. 
Border areas and border regions should enjoy specific attention not only in 
cross-border, but in trans-national co-operations as well. The reason is that half of 
the length of European land borders (, m) is found in the CADSES area. The 
countries in the area are small states ( of them land-loced) with long continental 
borders. Sixty-five percent of the territory can be regarded as border region and the 
same percentage of the population is living there (the respective percentage in the 
EU is only  percent). Crossing these borders is still a problem in many places, 
because of the poor infrastructure and the control or administrative procedures.
Considering the development of the area, the conditions of entrepreneurship 
and sustainable growth should be among the priority topics in co-operation. 
Support for and strengthening of SMEs is a specific problem here, considering that 
 years ago SMEs did not exist in these countries. ural areas and their common 
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problems have special importance in this space. The share of agricultural and rural 
population is still much higher than in the countries of Western Europe. In some 
countries,  to  percent of the active population is still engaged in agriculture. 
In centrally planned economies the method of solving the employment problems in 
small and medium size cities was to establish there a single large industrial plant. In 
the period of transition a large number of these plants proved to be non-competitive 
and were closed down, consequently several of these cities remained totally without 
an economic base. This is a typical problem in the Eastern half of the CADSES area; 
therefore a common analysis of best practices would be very useful. 
While East-West transport and telecommunication corridors have developed 
dynamically, the development of North-South corridors is lagging behind for 
the time being, although they are of equal importance for the development and 
integration of the area.
Since the establishment of the CADSES area, circumstances have changed 
substantially. The original motivation was to group member and non-member 
states along the Eastern external border of the EU into one common co-operation 
area. In the meantime, however, the EU’s external borders have moved several 
hundred ilometres eastward and they will move even farther at the beginning of 
. Germany, Austria and Italy are not the Eastern border states of the EU any 
more. There are additional reasons for co-operation, first of all in order to enhance 
integration between the core area and the peripheries. However, this would require 
a new configuration and delineation of co-operation areas. The original definition 
of the CADSES area was not based on geographical criteria because the main 
factor defining the space was the external border of the EU. Consequently, the, 
application of geographical criteria would mean substantial changes in the present 
constitution of the area. It belongs now to the catchment area of four European seas 
(the Mediterranean, the Blac Sea, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea). If geographical 
and hydrological criteria were applied it should be divided into four parts. 
A comprehensive spatial planning perspective should be prepared not only for the 
co-operating areas as a whole, but also for their important and distinctive sub-
areas, lie the Danube Basin, the Adriatic Basin, and the Carpathians.
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CONCLUSION 
The Danube region’s sharp economic and social inequalities, the intensive 
conflicts, the low degree of decentralisation and the absence of a comprehensive 
integration process may restrict the possibilities of co-operation in the short term. 
The differences in the development and socio-economic structure of the Danube 
territories do not exclude the possibility of a broader territorial co-operation but 
surely raise difficulties in its implementation. By all means, cross-border and 
twin-city co-operations on a smaller scale are indispensable on the one hand as 
complementary programmes to macro-regional co-operation on the other hand for 
the benefit of the territories and cities involved. These co-operations will enable the 
participants to break out of the deadlock situation caused by the river’s state or the 
regional border character. The management of these territories within the framework 
of macro-regional co-operation requires different development techniques, similar 
to the EU’s community support programmes for the development of cross-border 
co-operations.
In summary we can conclude that the integration and the coalition of the 
Danube countries have not provided well adaptable examples yet. The Danube 
as a cultural and transport axis raises positive associations with the meanings of 
openness, the exchange of goods, ideas and the common fate of the Danube nations. 
During the past two centuries we could witness—instead of integration efforts—
mainly differentiation processes and political powers overstressing national 
interests, acting even against the interests of integration.
In its Europe + eport the European Union refers to the Danube Valley 
as a potential axis which might turn into a new power line for the development 
of the East Central European region and a territorial basis for the new division of 
CADSES macro-region. The river’s water catchment area can be a new direction for 
the enhancement of the integration process. Some common geographical, social 
and cultural features and the river Danube as an integrative line may bring a chance 
for the continuation of macro-regional co-operations and their complementary 
interregional co-operations.
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THE EUOPEAN SOCIAL POLICY AEA
BETWEEN DIVEGENCE AND CONVEGENCE 
RUXANDRA PUPAZESCU
The European Social Area is one of the elements of the European integration 
process which—for some time now—has been left behind. Its evolution has been 
marked by numerous institutional and political difficulties and it is only since the 
middle of the s that special attention has been given to social issues at this 
supranational level.
Due to the character and the institutional pattern which have been set since 
the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties for the social policy area, one can observe 
that the European Union still does not influence these particular decision-maing 
mechanisms to a great extent. As the essay will show, this is partly due to the soft-
law character of the governance process in what regards social issues and partly 
to the resistance of the national states and the practical inability of the Union to 
deal with problems which could be better covered by the Member States. Another 
important element which should be taen into consideration is connected with 
the character of the European Union, which means that it assures the normative, 
legislative aspects of integration, instead of playing a role in the redistribution of 
resources. Thus, thans to the existence of the subsidiarity principle, the Member 
States are still holding the power over the Union in social policy matters. As it will 
be presented later , there are several factors which play a significant part in allowing 
or inhibiting opportunities for further supranational actions in this sphere, the 
national political context being one of the most important among them.
On the other hand, the national welfare states had to face pressures coming 
from both inside and outside their ‘borders’. To name only a few, these include 
the burden of increasing unemployment rates, demographic growth and the fiscal 
pressures imposed by the Union as a result of the implementation of the EMU 
(European Monetary Union). The national welfare states were thus left with two 
options. Some authors consider that we can already tal about a retrenchment of the 
European welfare states whilst others (leinman, ) argue that the welfare state 
model has actually survived and managed to adjust itself to the situation. 
T E S P A—B D  C T E S P A—B D  C
114
Bearing these ideas in mind, the present paper focuses on unraveling the 
mechanisms which have led to the development of what is currently nown as the 
European Social Model. The main hypothesis of the study rests on the assumption 
that in analyzing the European social policy area one must pay attention to two 
intertwined processes. The first one is connected with the institutional development 
of the Union as such and therefore the role which social policy plays in the wider 
integration picture; while the second deals with changes in the structure and character 
of the national welfare states. I believe that one can better understand what is meant by 
the European Social Model and more precisely what its future can be only by looing 
at the lins which can be established between these two levels of governance. 
In order to be able to prove the above-mentioned hypothesis, I will attempt 
to develop an explanatory model of the problem under examination here. As a 
result, the study is structured as follows: The first part deals with the historical 
development of the European Social Policy Area. Its main goals are: to underline 
the increasing importance which has been attributed to the social dimension since 
the early beginnings of the Union, as well as to present its main institutions and 
their functions. The second part deals with the problems that the national welfare 
states have to face and tries to mae assumptions about their future. The third and 
last part is dedicated to conclusions. 
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY AREA EVOLUTION IN TIME AND THE 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN EUROPEAN ACTORS
The evolution of the European Social Policy Area can be described as having been 
rather slow since the beginning of the Union. The most important reason for this 
was connected with the desire of the participant member states to focus primarily 
on the economic and later on political integration. 
Economic integration was the purpose of the first type of collective decisions 
taen at the supranational level in Europe, namely the European Economic 
Community (EEC). This was created in  with the major objective of developing 
an economic unity which would be achieved through the free movement of goods, 
capital, services and labour. At the same time, the Treaty of ome (signed in ) 
emphasised the main structure which the community was bound to have from then 
on. This led to establishment of the European Commission conceived to represent 
the general interests of the Community as such and practice ‘the legislative 
T E S P A—B D  C T E S P A—B D  C
115
initiative and control over it’s implementation’ (European Navigator Site, ). 
It shared responsibilities with the European Council formed at that time by six 
representatives of the Member States. Its institutional function was to tae decisions 
and ‘coordinate the actions of the Member States and the Community’ (European 
Navigator Site, ).
The initial function of the Parliamentary Assembly was to represent the interests 
of the members of the community. It had limited legislative and budgetary powers.
At the time when the Treaty of ome was signed the question of integrating the 
social dimension into the development of the Union was of marginal importance. 
It would not be right to say that the social consequences of the integration were not 
mentioned at all; however, they were strictly connected with economic development 
(leinman, ). One of the provisions clearly referring to social rights was Article 
 which specified that women have the right to equal pay with men within the 
Member States of the Union (O’Connor, ).
However, this was not the only objective connected with the social sphere. M. 
leinman () presents three others which can be considered to have an indirect 
impact on the evolution of social policy at the European level. These deal with 
setting the criteria for woring conditions and the living standards of the active 
population, ‘a closer co-operation in the social field’ (leinman, : ) as well as 
the establishment of the European Social Fund.
As J. O’Connor () emphasises, a series of measures connected mainly with 
poverty were adopted between  and  ‘with a brea between  and ’ 
(O’Connor, : ). The significance of these actions was mainly political since 
their impact on reducing poverty was limited.
Another significant moment which mared the evolution of the European Social 
Policy area is connected with the ratification of the Social Action Programme in  
by the Council of Ministers. This document emphasises the importance of achieving 
the following goals: ‘full and better employment, an improvement in living and 
woring conditions [and] greater involvement of management and labour’ (leinman, 
: ). It is quite obvious that the provisions in this paper represent a further step 
towards the integration of the social dimension in the European process.
 Kleinman () underlines the fact that ‘the dominant philosophy of the Treaty [of Rome] was that 
welfare followed from economic growth, not from regulatory or redistributive public policy’ (Fallener, 
 in M .Kleinman, : ).
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In the early s, following the election of Francois Mitterrand as president of 
France and Jacques Delors as President of the European Commission, a new boost 
was given to the processes connected with the social area. The ideological platform 
which the two French politicians proposed differed significantly from what had 
been previously established at the European level. This was the moment when, for 
the first time, the idea of a ‘European social space’ was mentioned. M. leinman 
() identifies as main elements of the policy proposed by the two statesmen the 
importance which they attached to employment problems, ‘the need to develop 
social dialogue […] co-operation and consultation over social protection’ (Hantrais, 
; Wise and Gibb,  in leinman, : ). 
This particular political context helped the Union to come out of the dead-
loc prevailing between the late s and the early s. That was a period when 
not much was done for the social welfare of the citizens from a European point of 
view. The direction established by the Treaty of ome was followed and thus the 
Commission limited its actions only to areas connected with health and safety at 
wor and equal payment (leinman, ). 
The middle of the s as well as the beginning of the s were beneficial 
for the evolution of the social policy area. Thus, the Single European Act () 
and the Maastricht Treaty () included more responsibilities the Union should 
tae in relation to social issues. As it was previously emphasised, the concept of 
subsidiarity was embraced and thus—through the stipulations of the Maastricht 
agreement—the European Council was empowered to tae decisions regarding 
social policy measures, but only in relation to those problems which did not fall 
into the competency of or could not be solved at the national level. As leinman 
(M. leinman, ) notes the process through which decisions in this area 
were to be taen consisted of ‘…directives, minimum requirements for gradual 
implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtained in 
each of the Member States’ (leinman, : ). It can be thus concluded that 
apart from subsidiarity, the European Union was not ready to enforce decision-
maing patterns within the social sphere through hard, compulsory law (as it was 
the case with the monetary union, for example). Even though further steps were 
taen to accommodate a wider area of social topics within the agenda-setting of the 
Union, the decision-maing process for which the Member States opted was of a 
soft-law character respecting the subsidiarity principle. 
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Mention should be made here of the next important European document, 
namely the White Paper on European Social Policy adopted in  by the European 
Commission. This document pointed out several important elements which from 
that moment on were going to become the core of the debates concerning the 
social aspects of the Union. One of the significant achievements was that the Paper 
clearly spelled out the role which the European Social Policy should play within the 
integration process. Additionally, it defined and established as its main objective 
the development of a European Social Model. This is supposed to be based not on 
the commonalities which exist between the national welfare states, but rather on the 
‘shared core values’ (O’Connor, : ). They were identified as ‘… democracy 
and individual rights, free collective bargaining, the maret economy, equality of 
opportunity for all and social welfare and solidarity’ (leinman, : ). 
In addition to the previously established instruments the White Paper comple-
mented the decision-maing process with several dimensions. Thus, besides the 
legislative and collective agreements which had already been established, the financial 
aspects were also taen into consideration as well as ‘mobilization and co-operation 
and [the importance of] information and analysis’ (leinman, : ). 
From this point of view, the European Commission became the ey institutional 
player on the social scene. Starting from its initial legislative power it became also an 
important actor in the processes of disseminating information and ‘commissioning 
research’ (ibid, : ). Another important advancement which the Paper brought 
was a widening of the social areas in which the European Union could intervene. 
These included ‘jobs, sills and woring conditions, labour mobility, equal 
opportunities, social protection and social inclusion and public health’ (leinman, 
: -). Despite these achievements the priority areas still remained those 
highly connected with the labour maret and economic integration. Much less was 
realised, for instance, in the fields of social protection, social inclusion or public 
health. 
As it can be observed so far, the Treaties which dealt with social elements were 
much more preoccupied with questions such as: On which areas could the European 
Union have a significant influence and what should its character be? They too a 
diminished interest in how the decision-maing process should loo lie. However, 
this was the element which subsequent Treaties started to tae into consideration. 
For example, the Treaty of Amsterdam () set the objective of achieving high levels 
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of employment in the Union. This particular goal meant that the institutions should 
tae more concrete actions in this direction and the document even mentioned the 
need for more co-ordinated action on the part of the Member States (O’Connor, 
). The Treaty led to the establishment of an Employment Committee and it was 
followed by two important councils in Essen and Florence. These focused only on 
the labour maret conditions and job creation processes. 
By this time it was already clear that the decision-maing mechanism in social 
policy was headed towards the Open Method of Co-ordination. However, it was 
only with the Luxembourg Process in  that this line of development became 
visible. The summit brought more clarity in the employment area. It proposed the 
realization of National Employment Action Plans which meant the establishment of 
employment guidelines and the adoption of specific targets (O’Connor, ). 
This was followed by the Lisbon Council in  which established a similar 
decision-maing pattern but involved also the field of social exclusion. At the same 
time, the Lisbon Council clearly stated for that—for the first time—the economic 
and social goals were finally given equal priority. This is the reason why the central 
idea developed around the modernisation of the European Social Model. 
The historical presentation of the evolution of the Social Policy Area had 
the purpose to emphasise two important elements. The first is connected with 
how the priorities of the European Union have changed over the years in order 
to incorporate more socially related areas, whereas the second focuses on the 
institutions which have achieved the highest degree of power over the decisions in 
the social sphere. As previously discussed, these are the European Commission, the 
social partners and the European Parliament, the latter playing only a secondary 
role. However, according to Liebfried and Pierson () one should not neglect the 
growing importance of the European Court of Justice. Its role has been facilitated 
by the soft-law character of the social policy decision processes which do not 
require the member states to comply with all the social policy goals and objectives 
established in the Union’s treaties. 
 As D. Meulders and R. Plasman () present the European Council of Essen established the following 
priorities: ‘Improve job opportunities for the working population by promoting investments in educational 
training: particularly the acquisition of qualifications by young people; increase the intensity of the work 
content of economic growth; reduce unsalaried labour costs, particularly for non-qualified workers; 
improve the efficiency of employment policies by active ones; improve measures concerning assistance 
to groups that have been most affected by unemployment: young people, long-term unemployed workers, 
women, and older employees’ (D. Meulders and R. Plasman in W. Beck et al, : ). 
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DEVELOPMENTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF 
THE WELFARE STATE?
The first part of the present essay had the purpose to identify the main evolutionary 
elements of the European Social Policy Area. We had a look at the processes which 
have guided the formation of the social dimension from the very beginning of the 
integration process up until the present time. Nevertheless this is only one side 
of the story and—as it was presented in the introduction—the main hypothesis 
of the present paper rests on the assumption that any debate about the European 
Social Area has to take into consideration two dimensions: one connected with the 
European development as such and the other with the evolution of the national 
welfare states. This part deals with the latter of these two dimensions.
esearchers (Gough in Bec et al, ; leinman, ; Esping-Andersen, , 
etc) have emphasised to various extents the diversity and the ensuing problems 
which the current welfare states are confronted with. Any discussion about the 
European Social Model has to stop and tae these factors into consideration.
As it has already been underlined in the first part of the paper, the aim of the 
European Union through its Open Method of Co-ordination is to establish a better 
governing mechanism for the social area. This would be based on peer review and 
the development of National Action Plans as a result of the consultations between 
the Member States. This method would prove to be less coercive than the one used in 
the case of the Monetary Union and would allow a certain degree of independence 
for the states. There is, however, a question that should be answered in this context: 
To what extent can we tal about the harmonisation of the national welfare systems 
if there are fundamental differences between them as we are soon going to see?
In general, welfare development theories mention the existence of a wide variety 
of welfare states. The problem of the diversity of welfare provision throughout 
Europe (and not only) is thus considered to be one of the main factors which hinder 
a faster development of social provision at the European level. There are various 
types of interpretations and classifications of the European welfare states, but for 
the purposes of the current paper I will focus only on two such divisions.
The first and one of the most prominent in welfare literature is the perspective 
articulated by G. Esping-Andersen (). The author considers that any attempt at 
classifying the welfare state should start from two dimensions: the social structure 
and rights and de-commodification. The first element refers to the idea according 
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to which the welfare state is a system of stratification itself. The redistributive social 
mechanisms are not only based on a given social structure (trying to reduce the 
existent inequalities), but, at the same time, they strengthen or even create a system 
of stratification. In what regards rights and de-commodification, the author refers 
mainly to the choice which every citizen should have to opt out of the labor maret 
without suffering severe financial losses. 
Starting from these two dimensions, Esping-Andersen () goes further and 
defines three main categories of welfare states, namely: the liberal welfare state, the 
corporatist one and the social-democratic one. In what regards the liberal welfare state 
its main features can be synthesized as follows. It is characterized by means-tested 
benefits (assistance) and low levels of universal transfers. The main target group of the 
social redistribution plans is constituted by those people who are at the bottom of the 
social scale, partially or completely dependent on the state. The state encourages the 
development of the maret either through passive or active types of policies. 
From the point of view of de-commodification rights this type of regime 
minimizes its effects. This type of welfare state creates a social structure dualism 
between those equal in poverty and those in the majority who rely on the provisions 
of the maret (Esping-Andersen, ).
The second type of welfare model is the corporatist one. This is much more 
wide-spread in continental Europe in countries lie Germany, France or Italy. Its 
main feature consists in preserving the social structure and thus maintaining the 
differences between various types of social status. As a result, the sets of rights and 
benefits are ascribed to class and status (ibid, ). As leinman () points 
out, the main goal of the state is not necessarily redistribution. In fact, this model 
presupposes the existence of a strong, powerful state which manages the public 
sphere so as to incorporate the wide variety of social groups. At the same time, a 
heavy emphasis is placed on the important role which the family, the church and the 
larger community play in ensuring the social protection of the individuals.
The last model which Esping-Andersen identifies is the social democratic one. 
This is associated with the Nordic part of the European continent and is considered 
to be the model which is closest to the ideal type of universal benefits and equality. 
One of its main characteristics is that ‘equality [is achieved] by guaranteeing 
worers full participation in the quality of rights enjoyed by the better-off ’ (Esping-
Andersen, : ). From this perspective, de-commodification is present to a 
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higher degree than in the previous social models and the political ideology of this 
regime creates ‘…an essential universal solidarity in favour of the welfare state’ 
(Esping-Andersen, : ). 
However comprehensive this division of the welfare provision may be, the 
models proposed are considered to be ideal types. In reality the situation is much 
more complex and elements of each of these clusters can be found in the others as 
well. At the same time, if the theoretical lines of division are modified, other types 
of welfare regimes can appear. This is the case with Abrahamson in leinman 
(M. leinman, ). This author is of the opinion that there is another model 
which could be easily added to the types already described and that is the Latin 
model. It is typically found in the south of Europe and is characterized by a high 
degree of fragmentation and internal polarization. It places a heavy accent on the 
duties and responsibilities of the family. These states are considered to be ‘closed, 
particularistic […] with [a] relatively wea state apparatus’ (leinman, :). 
S. Liebfried (Liebfried, ) considers that the countries of the ‘Latin im’ are only 
partially developed as welfare states. They present elements which are common to the 
liberal model lie residualism combined with a stronger traditional emphasis coming 
from the influence of the Catholic Church. At the same time, an important element of 
these states is the lac of a full employment tradition, especially in what regards women. 
In addition, family is nown to play an important role in social protection.
As it can be concluded from the two theoretical models presented above, Europe is 
quite fragmented as far as welfare development is considered. The models which have 
been reviewed show very few commonalities and many differences and variations 
from country to country. As regards their common points these are mainly connected 
with the universal ideological commitments of these states. As A. Hemerijc 
(Hemerijc, ) points out, one of the most important points of convergence is the 
commitment to preserve social justice. This goal is shared by the members of all states 
and constitutes a solidarist way of sustaining those who fall through the safety nets of 
the systems. This ideology is deeply embedded into the recognition that social justice 
can contribute to economic development. To these elements Hemerijc (Hemerijc, 
) adds the institutional functioning of the welfare states. By this he understands 
the various types of bargaining mechanisms between the organizations of the maret, 
the state and the social partners. This tri-dimensional bargaining procedure lies at 
the core of the development of the national social policies. 
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Nevertheless, despite these convergence points the differences between the 
national welfare states are still prominent. Starting from the theoretical conceptions 
of Esping-Andersen and leinman we can say that the points of divergence can 
be analyzed according to the following dimensions: the development of specific, 
model and even country related mechanisms of redistribution and social justice; 
the evolution of a particular type of institutional setting (one in which unequal 
accents are placed on the state, the church, family or the maret) and last, but not 
least, an element which is not taen into consideration by these two authors, the 
value related dimension. This last aspect refers to the different types of value loaded 
attitudes which result from political ideology and the configuration of these welfare 
regimes. Just to give an illustration of this dimension, let us mention the various 
attitudes regarding wor or the importance of equality on the labour maret 
between men and women (bearing in mind that in the Southern European model 
women are not encouraged to wor). 
Having presented the convergent as well as the divergent aspects which 
characterise the European welfare states we should now focus on the issue of how 
these states have been able to cope with the regional and global economic, social 
and political challenges. The structure of this part of the paper follows the main 
convergence/divergence dimensions mentioned above.
Various authors highlight different types of social processes which could lead 
to modifications and even future commonalities between the welfare states. On 
the one hand, S. uhnle and M. Alestalo (uhnle and Alestalo, ) stress the 
importance of increasing female occupation rates in the development of the welfare 
states. Of course, female employment has been dealt with in different manners 
depending on the institutional, economic and value attached mechanisms dominant 
in the individual countries. Nevertheless, the authors point out to the increasing 
similarities in female employment patterns between the European countries. 
Another important element which is stressed not only by S. uhnle and M. 
Alestalo (uhnle and Alestalo, ), but also by M. leinman (leinman, ) 
is the rapid decline in fertility rates. As S. uhnle emphasised this phenomenon 
has affected Southern Europe to a higher extent, but the trend is also present in its 
northern parts. 
As regards the institutional dimension, S. uhnle and M. Alestalo (uhnle 
and Alestalo, ) thin that even though the necessity to reduce welfare costs 
122
T E S P A—B D  C
123
T E S P A—B D  C
is a common problem which the welfare states have to tacle, the responses to this 
particular issue differ according to the various types of institutional settings and the 
importance which is attached in each welfare model to its main welfare providers: 
the maret, the state (both national and local), the family and the civil society. 
From an economic point of view, G. Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen, ) 
mentions the effect of high unemployment levels in Europe. In his opinion the main 
problem for the welfare states in adapting to higher social security demands lies in 
the discrepancy between the programmes which are already set in place and the 
current needs of the present societies. He underlines the fact that from a historical 
point of view the welfare states were built on the existence of a rather homogeneous 
woring class present in the industrial period. Facing the multiple problems of post-
industrialization, citizens need more diversified social programmes aimed at social 
protection. At the same time, more attention should be paid to the loosening of 
social bonds and the modification of the one-breadwinner family model which have 
implications for the way in which the institutional structure of the welfare system 
is designed and functions. 
In conclusion and bearing in mind the ideas presented in this part of the 
paper we can state that despite the common problems which the European welfare 
states have been confronted with and despite some commonalities which can be 
approached from ideological, social or institutional points of view, the pressures for 
adaptation coming from both inside and outside the national borders are bound to 
be filtered through the specific sets of institutional agreements.  
Summing up the ideas presented in this paper we can conclude that it is difficult 
to foresee the direction in which the European Social Policy is going to be headed in 
the future. Consistent progress has been achieved at the supranational level in order 
to bring the social issues more into the center of debates. However, as it was shown 
in the first part of the study only certain social dimensions have been stressed—
mainly those connected with economic welfare. The others have been referred to 
the national states in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
At the same time, the option for a soft method of governance at the European 
level leaves the national actors a significant space for maneuver. Nevertheless, 
the Member States are themselves not ‘immune’ to the politics developed at the 
supranational level. They are affected mainly by the strict fiscal regulations which 
are the result of the European Monetary Union and which impose the maintenance 
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of the national budgets within strictly controlled limits. This has an indirect 
although no less significant effect upon the development of the welfare state. 
Under these conditions how can the future of the European Social Model be 
perceived? From one, obvious point of view, at present this model lies somewhere 
between convergence (i.e close to being achieved in areas such as employment) and 
divergence (as regards social exclusion, poverty, health care, family policy and so on). 
On the other hand, Begg and Berghman (Begg – Berghman, ) consider 
that under the current decision-maing process it would be normal to have ‘the 
basic policy options discussed and the major policy decisions taen at the European 
level’ (Begg – Berghman, : ) with the implementation left in the hands of the 
lower entities. The achievement of this particular objective requires the existence 
of two prerequisites. The first is connected with the manifestation of a societal 
need for the regulation of social policy at the European level. From this is derived 
the necessary legitimacy which should be associated with the process. The authors 
underline that the European Union does not hold a clear-cut position on either 
of these accounts. Even though Begg and Berghman (Begg – Berghman, ) 
envisage a pessimistic scenario for the social policy area which would continue 
to be managed as it was before, they do agree that the latest developments which 
followed the Lisbon Council in  could constitute a basis for a higher degree of 
convergence between the member states. This is made easier by the use of the Open 
Method of Co-ordination which currently allows for intergovernmental tals in 
what regards the social dimension of the integration process.
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THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF EUOPE AND 
SOCIAL POLICY IN MACEDONIA
SOLIDAITY, MUTUALITY AND THE PUSUIT OF 
SOCIAL JUSTICEGUIDING PINCIPLES FO 
A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA IN EUOPE
BORCE BEJKOVSKI
The European Union has a key role as a catalyst in change i.e. identifying the 
challenges and promoting solutions. We have much to learn from each other and 
Europe should provide more opportunities to share experiences, identify and share 
good practices, agree strategic targets and review progress.
 There is no single European Social Model because each Member State has its 
own, specific traditions, institutions and practices. The ‘European Social Model’ 
should be strengthened, not weaened in the face of globalisation and the ageing 
of population. A European Social Model that has  million unemployed is not one 
which we should defend, but we must modernise our social models in a way that 
enables them to cope with today’s challenges and promotes our common values in 
a manner that is open, not closed to the outside world. However, the differences 
are underpinned by shared values—solidarity, mutuality and the pursuit of social 
justice—which are distinctive features of European civilization.
 At the heart of these shared values lies the ambition to allow everyone to 
develop their true potential. High levels of employment and rewarding jobs are 
central factors in the realisation of this ambition. Jobs allow people to fulfil their 
potential while full employment allows everyone to share in rising prosperity.
A dynamic and competitive economy based on open marets, ensuring a high 
level of employment is the best form of social protection. The European Union must 
combine the economic strength of the Member States in a single open European 
maret for the benefit of all. The Single Maret allows us to trade freely with each 
other but should also secure a strong competitive position for European businesses 
in the rest of the world as well.
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Economic and social objectives should mutually reinforce one another. The 
welfare state must enable people to mae the transition from one job to another or 
from one stage of their career to another.
There are two major and urgent challenges the Europe has to face in the st century:
• Globalisation
• Demographic revolution
Firstly, let us see globalisation: Over the coming decades Europe will face 
increasing competition from the rapidly growing economies of China and Asia. 
The volume of world trade in goods gets doubled every decade with China’s trade 
doubling every three years. Twenty years ago a mere  per cent of manufactured 
goods came from developing and emerging countries. By  that figure will be 
 per cent. India’s biotechnology sector will increase fivefold in just the next five 
years and China has trebled its spending on research and development in the last 
five. With  million graduates a year from Chinese and Indian universities—global 
competition means high sills and, value added goods too. ‘By , China is liely 
to have become the third largest economy in the world—contributing nearly one 
fifth of global output. In order to maintain and improve its growth, Europe will need 
to manage the resulting structural changes effectively, allowing worers to move 
to more productive and profitable sectors’. China’s current growth rate is . and 
India’s is . as opposed to the EU’s growth rate of ..
These global competitive pressures will accelerate many of the changes that have 
taken place in the economy and employment over recent decades, namely:
• Changes in the structure of industries and occupations;
• Changes in the nature of work, with an aging workforce and more people 
working flexible hours;
• Faster rates of job change for many people;
• More movement of people between jobs, industries and nations.
 John Hutton ( February ), Minister’ speeches reviving the European economic reform agenda. 
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Secondly, let us have a look at demographic revolution: Over the next  years 
working age population of the EU will fall by  while the population aged  and 
over will increase by . This means that:
• the demands on the welfare state (particularly pensions and health care) will be 
greater than ever before and
• simultaneously, the number of people of working age who are able to provide 
the economic growth necessary to sustain the welfare state will be declining.
High levels of unemployment and inactivity already represent a direct threat 
to the sustainability of Europe’s welfare state. Achieving a higher employment rate 
should therefore be the overriding priority.
There is a lot of ground to be made up. The EU employment rate is . 
compared with . in the USA and . in Japan. It has increased by only . 
since the Lisbon employment target of  was agreed  years ago.
The decline in the woring age population means that Europe must rely 
increasingly on the sills of young people entering employment for the first time and 
on retaining the sills and experience of older worers. Several million more jobs could 
be generated within the EU through coordinated intelligent public investments, for 
example in human capital, and  & D, between Member States. However, the Union 
must accept that young people are becoming a rare and yet undervalued resource. 
The fact is that young people are finding it hard to get integrated in the economy:
• The unemployment rate for under  was . in December , compared to 
. for those aged  or over.
• Young people are sometimes exposed to discrimination on grounds of their 
age and lack of occupational experience, accentuated by other factors such as 
gender, social origin or race, all of which make it more difficult for them to 
integrate into economic life and society.
• The skills learnt at school are not always in line with the requirements of the 
knowledge society and the level of school failure is still a source of concern. 
In , some . of the – year-olds left school with no qualifications. 
There are many reasons for this. Measures to support families and their school-
age children associated with the modernisation of the teaching systems should 
reduce school failure rates.
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The education system will have to face a significant challenge: it needs both to 
raise the level of initial training and to offer more flexible pathways in which, for 
example, young people would be more liely to alternate education at college, wor 
and wor-lined training, in order to meet the needs of the economy. They should 
also have greater access to the opportunities provided by distance learning.
Demographic ageing does not necessarily mean an automatic solution to the 
problems of unemployment and integration. The social partners, the school system, 
the public authorities and local actors will all have to reflect on how best to improve 
integration pathways and combat discrimination against young people.
European objectives have been laid down for the prevention of long-term youth 
unemployment, combating school drop-out and raising the level of initial training. 
The structural funds help to attain them at grass roots level.
Again, Europe is not starting from a strong position. The employment rate for 
older worers (those aged -) is  in the EU compared with . in the USA 
and  in Japan. The unemployment rate for people under  is . in the EU 
compared with . in the USA and . in Japan. 
More than ever, raising employment levels should be a priority. Having a job is 
the best route out of poverty and dependency. The welfare state should focus more 
on encouraging and enabling people to move from inactivity to employment, from 
social welfare to independence, while continuing to support those who cannot wor. 
The aim should be full employment with adaptable and inclusive labour marets.
 The quality of jobs and the woring environment also mae a significant 
contribution to eeping people at wor by reducing the ris of occupational 
accidents and improving worers’ health, in particular the health of the oldest 
worers.   Anticipating these changes will help us manage the woring life cycle a lot 
better. It will also be necessary to develop incentives to change people’s behaviour 
with older worers and to combat discrimination.
In order to cope with the demographic changes Europe should pursue three 
essential priorities:
• return to demographic growth;
•  nsure a balance between the generations;
• find new bridges between the stages of life.
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We should foster not only full employment—but also quality employment. 
This means not only better health and safety conditions, worer consultation and 
employment rights across the EU, but also investing in research and innovation in 
order to facilitate job creation at the high end of the labour maret. Our European 
social models should also address the ways in which social justice is delivered in today’s 
changing society. Universality is at the centre of our approach, and for this reason, 
we must modernise social protection in order to provide it in today’s world. The 
emergence of new disadvantaged groups in our societies—lie single parent families 
and immigrants, including second and third generation immigrants —highlights the 
need to rethin our approach to social justice and assist these groups at labour maret 
and also in societal integration. Public policies—in social protection, employment 
and education—should also be modernised in order to address new societal issues, 
for example, to ensure a smooth transition for divorcing families, a period in which 
many women and children fall into poverty, and to start integrating migrants as soon 
as they arrive in our countries (including the right to language training).
FOCUS ON MORE AND BETTER JOBS 
Economic growth on its own does not increase employment. The right mix of 
employment and active labour market policies is crucial in increasing employment 
rates. Active labour policies are about getting people back in the labour force—they 
include policies such as lifelong learning, investing in skills and training and 
personal career coaching.
Member States which have invested in active labour policies see shorter periods 
of unemployment, vacancies are filled more rapidly, have higher and better targeted 
expenditure on training, and salaries are more responsive to maret conditions. They 
have also seen an increase in more flexible woring arrangements, such as part-time or 
fixed-term employment. Some  million people are inactive and  million unemployed 
in the EU. These inactive people, aged between  and  are neither woring nor 
registered as unemployed. They are out of the labour maret due to problems with 
education or training, not seeing wor, family responsibilities or disabilities. Many of 
them simply cannot find jobs—inactivity rates are highest in areas with few jobs—and 
the EU average inactivity rate is  of the woring age population. 
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‘Jobs and growth must be Europe’s top priority. It is a human tragedy and a 
terrible waste that  million Europeans are unemployed, which is the main cause 
of poverty in Europe’.
If they are to wor effectively marets, including labour marets, need to be able 
to respond to demand and competitive pressures allowing the necessary transfer of 
resources across firms, sectors and regions. 
Sometimes this will be uncomfortable. Global competition means that some 
jobs—particularly in labour intensive, low value added sectors—are being lost as 
companies get restructured. The answer lies not in protecting those sectors and 
jobs but in encouraging and enabling businesses to improve their productivity and 
performance—i.e. to move up the value chain—and in providing support mechanisms 
tthat enable those affected by change to move on to new opportunities. Europe 
should be acting as a catalyst for change both by promoting &D and innovation; 
by providing mechanisms of identifying and sharing good practicec and by helping 
Member States to develop approaches that can assist the process of transition. 
A vital element of improving European performance is to help businesses 
maximise the potential of their employees by encouraging a worplace culture 
that engages employee participation and commitment, encourages innovation 
and maes better use of the supply of silled worers. This will undoubtedly 
lead to improved productivity and performance. Ways of woring such as flatter 
structures, family friendly wor practices, and better information sharing will help 
create more agile organisations with greater innovative capacity. These are goals 
best pursued by management woring in partnership with employees and their 
representatives. 
BALANCING EMPLOYMENT AND PROTECTION 
As business and work have changed, the model of ‘a full-time job for life’ no longer 
applies. Protecting jobs through rigid employment regulation has been shown to be 
detrimental to employment. Europe should not focus on measures or systems that 
seek to protect individual jobs (or sectors) or erect barriers to competition. What, 
we need to do is promote employability and create a business friendly investment 
climate that fosters job creation. 
 David Blunkett, The work and pensions secretary, agenda for UK’s presidency of EU with call for 
workplace reform.
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Better regulation 
Changes of this kind can and should be brought about intelligently through 
‘better regulation’ so as not to stifle employment opportunities or workers’ choice. 
Protection needs to be designed so as to minimise the risk that the security of those 
who are employed should be achieved at the expense of those who are unemployed, 
economically inactive and socially excluded. Legislation is not always the answer. 
At the European level, attempts to legislate across the different labour market 
traditions and structures of the Member States carry the greater risk of inflexibility. 
Bringing more people into the workplace 
We also need to break down barriers to work. A diverse, highly skilled and 
adaptable workforce is essential for a successful labour market and Europe’s 
changing demographic profile needs more people of working age in employment 
over a longer working life. 
Equality of opportunity is an essential principle of a modern Europe; unfair 
discrimination is not an option. Wor must pay if we are to bring people into the 
worforce. Jobs must provide a better income and better long-term prospects than 
benefits. A modern economy should also offer flexibility and choice in ways of 
woring so that people can successfully combine wor and family life. Worers may 
want to wor longer or shorter hours depending on their circumstances at different 
times in their lives; to tae career breas if necessary; to develop their potential and 
increase their sills; to change jobs; to wor on short contracts as well as permanent 
jobs and to have different patterns of wor. While these are not on the agenda of 
European legislation we can learn from each other before deciding  which policies 
are effective in delivering results. 
Mobility should be considered a natural way for worers of acquiring new sills, 
adapting themselves to an increasingly fluctuating labour maret and obtaining 
better living and woring conditions. It is also an important means of creating a 
genuine European labour maret. It maes it possible for regions with specific needs 
to attract worers while, at the same time, reducing the overload in regions with 
excess sills, and therefore high levels of unemployment. Legal, administrative, and 
linguistic obstacles to the free movement of worers in the EU need to be tacled if 
we are to mae mobility of labour an opportunity, not a threat. 
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If the EU is to promote increased levels of employment, improve the quality 
and benefits of wor, bring more people into employment, and facilitate if for more 
people to stay on longer, labour maret reform should be governed by the following 
guiding principles. It is imperative 
• to promote the creation of more and better jobs in a dynamic and competitive 
economy with adaptable labour markets regulated according to ‘better regulation’ 
principles, balancing adaptability and security so as not to destroy jobs; 
• to break down barriers to work promoting a diverse and highly skilled workforce 
underpinned by equality, opportunity and choice; 
• to promote a culture of change in the labour market that can lead to an 
overall improvement for both business and workers—taking care that existing 
jobs should not be protected at the expense of those who are unemployed, 
economically inactive and socially excluded. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SKILLS AND LEARNING 
Skills lie at the heart of the challenges Europe has to face. An inclusive society 
demands access to the skills and competences demanded by the modern economy. 
Together with innovation, enterprise, competition and investment, skills are among 
the key drivers of productivity and are central to European competitiveness. Higher 
skills are essential for an overall shift to a modern, knowledge-based and high value 
added economy. We urgently need to improve skills and increase the demand for 
skills in order to improve levels of employability and to match business needs. 
This can only be achieved with more emphasis on lifelong learning and not solely 
on the acquisition of knowledge at an early age. Europe has an important role in 
highlighting the impact of different approaches and sharing experiences and best 
practices so that Member States can develop policies most suited to their needs.
Europe’s future agenda for skills and learning should be guided by the following 
principles: 
• learning throughout life must be based on a sound education system open to 
all—the bedrock for social mobility; 
• education and training policies should deliver skills needed by business but must 
also provide the means for people from all parts of society to fulfil their potential; 
• expanding and developing the stock of skills requires more effective investment 
in people. 
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PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW CONSENSUS 
We believe that by bringing together these key principles of welfare reform, labour 
market and skills, we can offer a sound basis for building a new European consensus 
on how to meet the challenges of globalisation and demographic change. The main 
steps are the following:
• to promote active inclusion, not passive welfare: the national welfare state 
should be a ladder of opportunity not a safety net; 
• to ensure that people are enabled to respond to economic change and to benefit 
from it; 
• to ensure that rights are balanced by responsibilities and that there is solidarity 
between the generations: The respect of society for the individual must be 
matched by the respect of the individual for society; 
• to promote the creation of more and better jobs through a dynamic and 
competitive economy with adaptable labour markets regulated according to 
‘better regulation’ principles and balancing flexibility and security so as not to 
destroy jobs; 
• to break down barriers to work promoting a diverse and highly skilled workforce 
underpinned by equality, opportunity and choice. 
• to promote a culture of change in the labour market leading to overall 
improvement for both business and workers—taking care that the existing jobs 
should not be protected at the expense of the unemployed, the economically 
inactive and the socially excluded; 
• learning throughout life must be based on a sound education system open to 
all—the bedrock for social mobility. 
• education and training policies must deliver skills needed by business but 
must also provide a means for people from all parts of society to fulfil their 
potential; 
• expanding and developing the stock of skills requires more effective investment 
in people. 
In February , the European Commission proposed to revive the Lisbon Strategy 
and refocus efforts around two principal tasks: 
• to deliver stronger, lasting growth and 
• to create more and better jobs. 
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The redesigning of the Lisbon Strategy aims to give a new impetus to the 
European economy and pursue wide-ranging social and environmental policy 
objectives. A ey element of the new Lisbon agenda is the complete overhaul of 
its governance mechanism maing a clear distinction between responsibilities 
and actions at national and Community levels and improving the consistency 
of tass and responsibilities. Another focus is now on enhancing the bilateral 
dialogue between the European Commission and the member states on a binding 
National eform Programme. This dialogue is embedded in the existing Treaty-
based economic policies and employment guidelines. In June  the European 
Council adopted the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs  for -, 
which serve as a basis for the member states’ National Programmes for Growth 
and Jobs. The design and implementation of the macroeconomic, micro-economic 
and employment policies is up to the member states as described in their National 
eform Programmes (NPs).
LABOUR MARKET AND EMPLOYMENT/UNEMPLOYMENT IN MACEDONIA
The changes within the total population, working-age population and active 
population (labour force) of the Republic of Macedonia have varied both in volume 
and intensity in the last two decades. The changes have been influenced not only 
by demographic factors (the natural and migratory movement of the population), 
but by socio-economic factors as well. The huge disproportion observed in the 
movements of the working-age and the active contingent whose sizes often mutually 
correspond signals a decrease in the demographic reproduction of the labour force 
and also a decrease in the growth of the active population. The changes could be 
explained with the loss of a part of the labour force induced by intensive migratory 
movements to go abroad,  an increase in the number of retired persons (for different 
reasons, primarily their premature exclusion from the labour during the transition 
process), as well as changes in the occupation structure affecting a part of the active 
persons (primarily moving from agriculture into non-agrarian professions).
Concerning the issues of employment, the epublic of Macedonia is singled out 
by the very high unemployment rate it has had for several decades now as compared 
with other countries in South East Europe. The epublic of Macedonia entered 
the transition period with more than  thousand unemployed persons and with 
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an equal number of over-employed persons because of the administrative, but 
unproductive employment practiced in the previous period. 
In the pre-transition period the epublic of Macedonia had a tendency of 
continuous growth in the field of employment. The largest number of employed 
persons was registered in  (about , persons), and then the tendency of 
continuous decrease began. Under the influence of the problems inherent in the 
transition processes, as well as other limiting factors (economic crisis, refugee crises, 
warlie situations) the second part of the nineties brought accelerated decrease in 
employment. In  the e number of employed persons registered decreased to less 
than  thousand. The administrative data provided by the National Statistical 
Office do not show the overall situation of employment in the country. For example, 
according to the Payment Office, the number of persons earning salaries in  
amounted to  thousand.
At the same time, the informal sector began to spread more intensively, together 
with the number of employed persons in this sector. The expansion of the ‘Grey’ 
economy to unseen proportion served as a ‘security valve’ in mitigating social 
tensions. In those circumstances it was a hopeless endeavor to assess the size of the 
formal and informal sectors. Several attempts were made to assess the size of the 
informal sector. The results of such research projects were characterized by very 
large deviations in the approximated numbers of employed persons.
In the new situation the surveys started in  were expected to bring a 
solution. The Labour Force Survey data, which encompass the informal sector and 
the economically active population in agriculture, show that between  and  
the number of employed persons amounted to  and  thousand. In , about 
 thousand active peasants were included in the number of employed persons,  
thousand of whom were non-paid family worers. 
The length of unemployment shows unfavourable trends that are manifest in 
a high absolute and relative increase in the number of persons unemployed for a 
longer period of time. ‘On the basis of data related to registered unemployment in 
, the share of persons seeing job for less than a year was only .. The share of 
persons unemployed between one and three years  was . and those unemployed 
over three years represented two thirds of all unemployed persons (.). The 
share of persons seeing job for longer than eight years is terrifying (.). The 
Labour Force Survey also confirms the longevity of the unemployment’. The causes 
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for long-lasting unemployment and its terrifying volume should be primarily sought 
in insufficient economic development, the stagnating and even negative economic 
growth, the discontinued development trends significantly emphasised by the period 
of transition from one socio-economic system into another. Besides, employment 
is also influenced by other limiting factors, such as foreign debt, the problems of 
structural transformation and structural harmonisation, stabilisation etc.
Long-lasting unemployment represents a huge loss for the nation, not only as a 
waste of  human capital, but also as a loss of the most vital part of the population, 
on whose generic forces, today and in the future, the development of the country 
should be based. The example of the epublic of Macedonia confirms that ’the 
enormous loss of the human resources is a sign of large inefficiency of the economic 
system and is provoing a deep crisis in the social sphere’ (OECD, , p. .). 
Unemployment is one of the basic causes of the large poverty increase. According 
to the latest data, about  of the total population in the country is poor. In spite 
of this, until now there has not been an employment-oriented strategy in the 
epublic of Macedonia developed with  a coordinated and integrated approach 
that the factors in the institutional and macroeconomic framewor could include 
both in their employment and labour-maret policy interventions. Macedonia has 
also failed to develop a consistent employment policy as a cross-sectoral policy that 
includes all policy fields affecting directly or indirectly the employment of labour 
as a factor of production. So far only partial and short-term employment-related 
measures have been used, restricted to some policy fields. 
As far as sectoral policy is concerned, there is no regional, industrial and 
agricultural policy. The regulative and macro-economic levels of economic 
policy have included some employment and labour maret related measures 
in the financial policy (taxes, contributions, subsidies), in the monetary policy 
(maintaining monetary stability) and in the wage policy (using the minimum 
wage as an instrument of social policy). The experiences gained with reducing 
employment contributions in the case of new jobs in  can be considered quite 
positive. It did have positive effects on employment, because quite a large number of 
unemployed persons could get jobs in this way. As a prerequisite for the economic 
development of the country, efforts were made to improve foreign-trade policy. 
 Based on those data, in  the share of the persons seeking job for up to one year was . per cent and 
those unemployed over three years was ..
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Several free trade agreements were signed, and the epublic of Macedonia became 
a member of the World Trade Organization in October .
‘There is a promotion policy for small and medium-sized enterprises and a social 
policy. During the transition period, in the circumstances of growing unemployment, 
social policy focused on protecting social peace in the country. As far as education/
training policy is concerned our government has adopted a strategy for the period up to 
. It is important to point out that serious reforms have already started at all levels of 
education. Also, several training and retraining programs are going on, together with 
the education of older persons. But, the measures that have been undertaen so far in 
some particular fields of employment policy, have not produced significant results in 
relieving this very difficult problem because of the lac of a coordinated approach’.
One of the ‘individual’ ways of solving problems related to unemployment 
and low standards of living is emigration from the country. Macedonia has strong 
traditions of migration, especially to the USA, Australia, Germany, Switzerland, 
Italy, etc. Emigration flows were also very strong in the last decade, in spite of 
unfavourable conditions. Visa requirements represent the biggest obstacle because 
Macedonian citizens are allowed to enter very few countries in the world without a 
visa. Unemployed persons face big problems in getting visas even for tourism, but 
the migration potential is really huge. Brain-drain is one of the biggest problems 
of the country, lined with loss of investment in human capital and creative wor 
force. Macedonia does not have a migration policy, which would be an essential 
preconditions for economic reforms. Politicians are aware of the brain-drain but 
without consistent policy and measures the situation cannot be improved.
 For example, when there is no development policy, especially industrial and agricultural policy, also 
when the output is diminishing, the expected positive influence of the concluded free trade agreements 
and  membership in the World Trade Organization will fail to materialise.
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SOCIAL POLICY
Labour market changes, especially the high rate of unemployment provoked 
changes in the social system meant to provide social security for the citizens. The 
Republic of. Macedonia started to build a new model of social protection in ’s 
and the Act on Social Security was passed in . According to the law, there are 
several types of social assistance:
• Regular financial assistance for persons unable to work, single parents and 
people over  without income;
• Financial assistance for the disabled and handicapped persons;
• One-time financial assistance for people who suffered from some disaster, need 
medical treatment, etc;
• Health protection according to different social policy criteria;
• Housing according to different social policy criteria;
• Social financial aid for the unemployed (who belong to the pool of active 
population), people with insufficient income for household, etc. 
All of them are financed by the state (. of the budget in ), and biggest 
‘social’ burden in the state budget are expenses of social welfare. The number of 
beneficiaries is constantly increasing. The highest number of beneficiaries are the 
unemployed () aged between  and  () or up to thirty (), and the low 
silled ().
The overall situation of the labour maret, expressed in the high number of 
people who have lost their jobs, calls for some ind of a mechanism to alleviate the 
situation. In , the Act on employment and insurance in case of unemployment 
was passed. It regulates the rights of both the employed and unemployed persons. 
According to the law, people who lost their jobs have right to regular financial aid 
of up to  of their salary (average received in the last  months) in the first year 
and  from the second year on. Beneficiaries can receive this aid for a period of 
 to  months, depending on wor experience. Beneficiaries over  and with more 
then  years of wor experience, can receive assistance till the next employment or 
retirement. All the beneficiaries also have right on health protection and social & 
pension insurance. The number of beneficiaries tends to increase.
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Table . Number of beneficiaries of financial assistance for loss of job
  
Number of beneficiaries of financial assistance . . .
Total number of unemployed . . .
Today the epublic of Macedonia is considered a country with a medium 
developed industry, and continuing growth of industrial production. The most 
important sectors are agriculture and industry.
The Macedonian economy has recently made a sluggish recovery, though 
the extent of unemployment, the grey maret, corruption and a relatively 
ineffective legal system hinder growth and cause significant problems. The official 
unemployment rate is  ().The active population totals , people, 
, of them unemployed. However, many of the employed go unreported, 
therefore it is more realistic to estimate unemployment rate around  percent.   
egarding the European Union’s regulation concerning labour and social 
relations, the EU document on the basic social rights is of special interest for 
Macedonia together with about twenty directives. The harmonization of our laws and 
regulations with other directives of the Europe Union in this area is still to be done. 
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THE EUOPEAN UNION’S EMPLOYMENT 
POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
PENSION EFOM.
OMANIA AS A NEW MEMBE STATE
VALERIU FRUNZARU
In the context of demographical changes and fierce global economic competition, 
a more integrated European Union (EU) needs systematic and efficient policies 
that must act synergically in order to make it the most competitive economy in the 
world. In this article I only focus on two policies: employment policies and pension 
policies, underlining that without a substantive employment policy meant to 
ensure a high level of employment the individualisation of the pension systems can 
only lead to a high level of poverty of elderly people. In the last part of the article, 
I analyse the Romanian case, pointing out both its strengths and its weaknesses.          
THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT POLICYBETWEEN MUST AND WINE 
As must needs time to ferment in order to become wine, the EU policy in the 
employment field needs time to become mature and substantive. After more than 
fifty years of EU/EC history concerned with laying down the rules, the rights, the 
goals and the guidelines for labour within the common market these issues still raise 
lots of problems and disputes. The must needs some more time to become wine.
From the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steal Community to the 
Council Decision //EC that set the guidelines for the employment policy 
of the Member States (MSs) till , employment awareness has been subject to a 
continuous development. If at the beginning ‘the EU’ ground was a political project 
accomplished with economic means’ (Andreescu and Severin, : ), now the ‘EU 
ground’ has an economic and social nature. The EU, according to the frequently 
quoted Lisbon goals, wants to be ‘the most competitive and dynamic nowledge-
based economy’ with ‘more and better jobs’ and socially included citizens. 
Preoccupation with the employment issue in the context of increasing 
unemployment caused by the oil crises found its expression in the Treaty of 
European Union () which calls for ‘a high level of employment and social 
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protection’ (art. ). The Maastricht Treaty points to the need for the development 
of an employment strategy that should create jobs, especially highly qualified 
jobs, adaptable to a flexible maret and encourages co-operation between the MSs 
regarding employment policy (art. -). After the Maastricht Treaty, the next step 
towards building a common EU employment policy was taen by the Amsterdam 
Treaty with its Title VIa, Employment. egarded as ‘a matter of a common concern’ 
(art. o), the employment issue can now be tacled at EU level by the European 
Council, after a proposal from the Commission and consultations with the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the egions, 
the Employment Committee, and social partners. The Council has to draw up with 
qualified majority guidelines that MSs should tae into account in the building 
up and implementation of their employment policies (art. q). Even if in reality 
the Council prefers to wor on consensus (Casey, : ), the change from the 
unanimous to majority vote is a significant step towards the strengthening of the 
common EU employment policy. The difference between the way of voting on the 
employment guidelines, on the one hand, and on the social security and social 
protection of worers (even if is quite difficult to draw a clear line between them), on 
the other hand, shows the reluctance of the MSs to give up their national autonomy 
in the social field. 
The guidelines set by the Amsterdam Treaty in  were anticipated by the 
five employment goals established by the European Council in Essen in December 
 (Essen Strategy), which sustained the fight against unemployment, especially 
through investment in training and the encouragement of the economy to produce 
jobs, particularly for young people, long-term unemployed and women. 
The first EU guidelines were drawn up by the extraordinary Luxemburg 
Job Summit of November , which launched the European Employment 
Strategy (EES). Four comprehensive goals were set for  as follows: to improve 
employability, to develop entrepreneurship, to encourage adaptability in businesses 
and their employees and to strengthen the policies for equal opportunities. Two 
characteristics of these guidelines have to be stressed. First, the guidelines contain 
a mixture of the social and economic means in order to tacle the employment 
issue, because ‘there is no real, lasting prospect of expanding employment without 
a favourable economic environment …’ (European Council, : paragraph ). 
Second, the final goal is a high level of employment (as established in the Maastricht 
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and Amsterdam treaties) and not full employment as set up in EU Social Agenda for 
- and at the  Lisbon Council meeting. 
The Lisbon and Stocholm (European Council in March ) targets are part 
of the guidelines drawn up for the employment policies of the MSs from , and 
collected under the title: ‘A European strategy for full employment and better jobs 
for all ’. The ten guidelines are comprised in three broad goals which are no longer 
so strongly lined to economic policy: full employment, improving quality and 
productivity at wo and strengthening the social cohesion and inclusion. 
The overarching goals and the benchmarks from the  guidelines can also be 
found at the beginning and at the end of the  Council decision on guidelines for 
the establishment of EU employment policy until . But the  guidelines are 
different from the ones identified in , which gives the decision //EC an 
unorganised and even unclear structure. For - there are  guidelines, from 
 to . The first guideline, which comprises the three main goals from , can 
be achieved by focusing on three priorities: 
1) attract and retain more people in employment, increase the labour supply and 
modernise the social protection systems;
2) improve the adaptability of workers and enterprises;
3) increase investment in human capital through better education and skills.
These priorities are the overarching goals for the next  guidelines that combine 
social, economic and educational means. As result of all these efforts a number 
of benchmars should be achieved by  regarding employment (an overall 
employment rate of , a  employment rate for women, a  employment 
rate for older worers), education (including training and participation in lifelong 
learning), the provision of childcare, and the increase by five years of the average 
effective age when people leave the labour maret. 
Two questions can be raised in this context. Can the EU cope with the problems of 
all the social groups which face difficulties integrating in the labour maret? To what 
extent can this policy be made successful at the national level through the guidelines? 
We have to point out that the target is to increase the level of employment 
and not to decrease the level of unemployment, because early retirement could 
help decrease unemployment but would be counter-productive to the effort of 
increasing the average effective exit age in the case of retirement. Besides the policy 
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of eeping older worers in the labour maret, the EU policy also tries to control 
discrimination and to promote access to employment for all the disadvantaged 
categories: women, young worers, low silled or disabled people, immigrants and 
minorities. For older worers, women, and unemployed young people (and not just 
for the young people) benchmars have been set for . 
Of all these issues, I will focus on the gender equality because, together with 
unemployment, it is probably the most important issue in the EU employment 
policy. The issue of gender equality was raised, for the first time, in the Treaty of 
ome, where art.  advocated equal payment for equal wor. Gender equality 
has not been a charitable problem either at the beginning of the EU or today, but 
an issue with very concrete political and economic outcomes. If at the beginning, 
gender inequality had to be eliminated because it created social dumping (Leibfried 
and Pierson, : ), now, in the context of demographic change and the 
individualisation of the pension systems, gender equality is a source of human 
resources and a way to fight against the feminisation of the poverty (Arber and 
Attias-Donfut, : -). But, despite the intentions, the policies don’t reach 
the goals and, what is worse, some of them have contrary results. For example, 
the policy for a more flexible employment through the development of part-time 
jobs favours the traditional family with the husband as a full-time worer and 
breadwinner (Guerrina, : ). According to the Council’s ecommendation 
of  on the implementation of the employment policies by the MSs, the Dutch 
government is recommended to tacle the reason of the gender pay gap through 
transition from part-time jobs (involving about  of the worforce) to full-time 
jobs. Thus, instead of strengthening awareness of gender equality, feminists sustain 
that ‘the failure of member states’ governments to challenge structural inequalities 
continues to separate rhetoric from the reality and reaffirms traditional division of 
labour’ (Guerrina, : ).
The problem that arises in the face of these criticisms is to what extent soft 
regulations can be expected to have a real impact. If ‘those measures [taen by 
the Council in the field of the employment] shall not include harmonisation of 
the lows and regulations of the Member States’ (Amsterdam Treaty, art. r), how 
can the EU policies have actual effects at the national level? erstin Jacobson tals 
about a ‘discursive regulatory mechanism (DMs), that is a mechanism related to 
language use and nowledge maing and thus fundamentally to meaning maing’ 
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(Jacobsson, : ). This soft and subtle form of determination has more effects 
today than in the past on the MSs employment policy because of the increased 
interdependence and the ris of externalities, and because of the fact that ‘high 
regulation is highly politicised and benchmaring and peer-review exercises are 
at the spring summits lifted to the level of the Member States’ (Jacobsson, : 
). The common language, goals, and social indicators, the open method of 
coordination (OMC) and the pressure on governments for transparency exercised 
by peer-reviews will lead to the implementation of the EU policy at the national 
level. We can assume that on the one hand, EU employment guidelines will induce 
a gradual Europeanization of certain elements in national the employment policies; 
on the other hand, the NAPs [National Action Plans] will probably encourage 
national action pacts on employment issues’ (Goetschy, : ).
Even if, compared to OECD, the EU employment policy is more socially 
orientated (Casey, : , Jacobsson, : , Watt, : ), ‘at the 
substantive level from the trade union’s perspectives, the EES is quite clearly not an 
encompassing strategy to achieve full employment…’ (Watt, : ). 
In spite of the progress achieved in drawing up an employment policy at the 
EU level, because of the unclear and changeable EESs, the lac of control by the 
EU over the national employment policies and because of the gap between rhetoric 
and reality, we can conclude at this point that the EU employment policy still needs 
time, lie wine, to reach maturity. 
EU PENSION POLICYFROM BISMARCK AND BEVERIDGE TO A MULTI
PILLAR SYSTEM
Developed for the first time in Germany by Bismarck, who considered insurance 
as a way of making workers obey the monarchic authority, too (Esping-Andersen, 
: ), social insurance after World War II, should be interpreted as a solidarity 
instrument to fight against the five ‘Giant Evils’ of Want, Disease, Ignorance, 
Squalor and Idleness as stated in lord Beveridge’s report (). In the context of the 
economic boost, the high birth rate, the low level of unemployment, and the small 
number of retired people, the mandatory pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system worked. 
Today, because of the high rate of dependence (the rate between the number of 
pensioners and the people between  and ) and the huge pressure on welfare 
states caused by the globalisation of the economy, the national states should reform 
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their pension systems through parametric changes (within the PAYG systems) and 
develop fully funded pension schemes. 
In spite of the wide recognition of the need to build a multi-pillar system 
(European Commission and European Council , World Ban , Gillion et 
al., ), there are arguments that the individual funded schemes are not a panacea 
for the crisis of the pension system. Nicholas Barr, Joseph Stiglitz and Peter Orszag 
consider the idea that the pension fund is a solution for demographic pressure to be 
a myth (Barr, : , Stiglitz and Orszag, : ). What is more, the individual 
accounts will not ensure a bigger rate of return than the PAYG schemes, will not 
increase the national savings with great positive effects for the economy, and will 
not diminish the role of the state (and the corruption) in the new pension system. 
Instead of adopting these sceptical attitudes, the EU MSs have implemented the 
parametric and systemic reforms (European Commission and European Council 
, Nordheim, , Zaidi et. al, ). The EU calls for a multipillar pension 
system in which the first pillar is a public-earnings related scheme, the second is a 
private occupational scheme, while the third is an individual retirement provision 
(European Commission and Council, :). In accordance with the Lisbon goals, 
the OMC and the principle of subsidiarity, the European Council launched  common 
objectives under three headings: adequacy, financial sustainability, and modernisation 
(responding to changing needs) at the Laeen summit, in December .
Analysing the EU’s common pension objectives, we can draw at least  conclusions:
1) The EU does not abandon its social dimension, i.e. sustaining solidarity from the 
first pillar, but, at the same time, it calls for the development of a fully funded 
system. The EES ask for a ‘right balance between flexibility and security’, where 
active employment policy should not hamper economic competitiveness (European 
Council, 2003: paragraph 12, European Council, 2005: guideline no. 21).
2) Out of the 11 pension policy objectives, 4 are, at same time, employment policy 
objectives, too. Objective 4, raising employment level, is the main goal set in 
the employment guidelines. Objective 5, extending working life, corresponds 
to the EES benchmark of increase by five years the EU effective exit age till 
2010. Objective 9, adopting more flexible employment and career patterns, can 
be found in guideline 21 of the EES for 2005-2008. Objective 10, struggling for 
greater gender equality, is, as we have seen, an issue addressed in all the EU 
policy areas, even if there are criticisms for the lack of substantive outcomes. 
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3) Both policies contain references to a common ‘language’ and a common 
‘knowledge base’ that can create a common ‘discursive regulation mechanism’ 
in order to achieve the EU’s common goals at the national level.
ROMANIALOOKING FOR ITS WAY 
Starting with st January , Romania will be a Member State of the EU. Three 
years after the last enlargement wave, when  ex-communist countries joined the 
EU, Bulgaria and Romania will share the same common policies with all the other 
MSs. Before adopting the EU employment guidelines, Romania, as a MS, should go 
through a period of transition. For this purpose, the Romanian government drew 
up a Joint Assessment of Employment Priorities in  and in  and  the 
National Action Plans for Employment (NAPE) for the periods - and 
- respectively. In its - NAPE, Romania engaged in taking active 
measures in order to implement the  EU guidelines established in . 
In the field of pensions, the omanian reform is lagging behind hindered by 
electoral implications. The parametric reform of the PAYG system started only  
years after the fall of the communism (with the Act on Pensions /), while 
pillars two and three are still in the shape of bills. 
150
T E U’ E P   C   P R
151
T E U’ E P   C   P R





1. prevent social exclusion Yes e poverty rate for elderly people is equal or smaller 
than in other age groups, but, compared to the EU, the 
poverty rate for elderly people is very high.  
2. enable people to maintain living 
standards
No ere is no second pillar. e replacement rate is 
under 40%.
3. promote solidarity Yes e public pension system promotes inter and intra-
generational solidarity.
Financial sustainability
4. raise employment levels No Seemingly, the employment rate is close to the EU 
average, but, if we figure out the large number of 
persons working in agriculture, the situation changes 
dramatically. It would be more relevant to use the 
number of salaried persons.
5. extend working life Yes is  was possible because of the new pension law 
18/2000. It’s on the agenda to equalise the retirement 
age for women and men.
6. make the pension system 
sustainable in a context of sound 
public finances
No High rate of dependency.
e state will continue to support the budget of the 
public pension system.
ere is no buffer fund.
7. adjust benefits and contribution 
in a balanced way
Yes e burden of the pension system in crisis is shared 
by all social groups: employees, employers, pensioners, 
and other citizens.   
8. make sure that private pension 
provision is adequate and financially 
sound
- No private pensions exist so far.
Modernity
9. adapt to more flexible 
employment and career patterns
Yes All persons with an income higher than three average 
salaries per year can get insured.  But for the people 
working in agriculture there are no incentives to pay 
insurance because they don’t share it with an employer 
(the contribution is about 30% from the insured 
income).    
10. meet the aspiration for greater 
equality for women and men
Yes Law encourages equality, more specifically.:
• the unemployment rate is lower for women;
• the legal retirement age is lower for women;
• the employment rate is higher for men;
• the average income is higher for men 
compared  with women. 
11. demonstrate the ability of 
the pension system to meet the 
challenges
No e public pension system is not transparent.
e only forecast is made by the World Bank. 
 
In Table  we can find an evaluation of the omanian pension system from the 
EU’s perspective. It is very difficult to answer questions regarding the fulfilment 
of the objectives that don’t involve benchmars and to compare the omanian 
figures with the EU average while ignoring EU diversity. As it is almost impossible 
to answer in a Manichean way with yes or no, the question whether omania has 
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fulfilled the EU’s pension objectives. I have attached observations to the answers, 
which should qualify them. 
Taking into account the information given in Table  we can draw up three 
conclusions regarding employment, pensions and the poverty risk of future retired 
persons in Romania:
1) Even if, according to the figures provided by the Romanian Ministry of Social 
Welfare and Family, the overall unemployment rate was 5.1% in June 2006, and 
only 4.5% for women, Romania faces big challenges in the field of employment. 
Firstly, about 35.6% of the labour force work in agriculture, compared to less 
than 5% in the developed countries (Romanian Government, 2004:5). These 
people increase the rate of employment figures, but they are low skilled and, in 
general, not insured. Secondly, a huge number of Romanians have emigrated to 
richer countries (especially to Italy and Spain) in the hope of a higher quality of 
life. Many of them live and work unofficially, and for this reason it is impossible 
to give a reliable figure regarding their number (according to unofficial data, 
about 2 million Romanians work currently abroad). All the Romanians who 
do undeclared work, outside and inside the country, will face a big poverty risk 
when they get old. The emigration of mainly younger people is one cause of  
aging and increases the rate of dependence.
2) Romania does not have a multi-pillar system yet and it introduced a parametric 
reform of the state pension system very late. Even if the PAYG system is 
now entirely career-related, it remains of a welfare type and depends on 
state subsidies. The development of the funded schemes will lead to the 
individualisation of the pension system; the first pillar should ensure only a 
minimum standard of living.
3) Undeclared workers and agricultural workers will face a high poverty risk when 
they get old. Without any pension or with only a small one, they will be the clients 
of the future social welfare system. Women, because of the gender pay gap, and 
the workers with low salaries and/or career breaks will receive smaller pensions.
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CONCLUSIONS
The EU has a great ambition to become ‘the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy’ with socially included citizens, by . To reach this 
goal, it has to solve at least two problems: the high level of unemployment and the 
ageing of the population. The MSs’ pension reform, even if it does not eliminate 
solidarity (from the first pillar), will introduce more individualistic schemes. 
EES tries to increase employment rate and eliminate the gender gap, but until it 
succeeds, if it ever does, the low and/or interrupted contributions to the pension 
systems will cause low pension benefits and high risk of poverty.
For omania, this ris is even higher. The large number of people who wor 
in agriculture and the emigrants who do not contribute to the pension system will 
need, in their old age, social security benefits. The unfinished transformation of the 
omanian pension system will end up with more earning-related pensions. In the 
current employment context, the new pension system will bring poverty to a high 
number of old people.
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COSSBODE COOPEATION IN 
SOUTHEAST EUOPE AS A PELUDE TO 
EUOPEAN INTEGATION: 
THE CASE OF SEBIA
VASSILIS PETSINIS
What will be discussed in this paper is Serbia’s prospects within the framework of cross-
border co-operation in Southeast Europe and European integration. Special attention 
will be paid to the Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina and its participation 
in the ‘Danube-Kris-Maros-Tisza’ Euro-region. Then the bilateral relations between 
Serbia and the European institutions will be assessed. It will be demonstrated that the 
prospects for Serbia’s integration into European structures can be facilitated through: 
a. the willingness of regional authorities and entrepreneurs to participate in the cross-
border co-operation schemes; b. the willingness of the European Union to remove 
potential impediments to cross-border co-operation (e.g. the Schengen visa regime). 
But first, a theoretical definition of the term ‘Euro-region’ should be made.
A Euro-region can be defined as any form of structured co-operation, established 
between local and regional authorities across national borders with the objective to 
jointly adopt common goals and pursue them in a co-ordinated and sustained way. 
The scope of activities undertaen within a Euro-region may range from projects 
aiming at the development of the regional infrastructure to ethnic reconciliation 
in those borderlines where national minorities are present. On the whole, there are 
three types of Euro-region operating throughout Europe: a. Euro-regions without a 
legal status (woring communities of interest); b. Euro-regions that rely on private 
law; c. Euro-regions that function in accordance with public law. 
The concept of Euro-regions is the result of a bottom-up process, initiated 
and carried out by regional governments and social entrepreneurs (e.g. NGOs). 
Therefore, the proper functioning of such schemes relies on the decentralization of 
the state administration and the strengthening of regional and local governments. 
With special regard to Eastern Europe it can be observed that the whole concept 
acquires an interesting dimension since it facilitates the application of pre-
modern elements, specific to the region, to a post-modern state of affairs. More 
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specifically, the Habsburg era of multiethnic cohabitation was succeeded by an era 
of hard, sometimes impenetrable national borders, in the last century. During the 
interwar era, this was accompanied by internal policies of intense homogenisation 
in accordance with a standardised model of national identity. In the Cold War era, 
old nationalist disputes between neighbouring states were often interwoven with 
an antagonism at the ideological level (e.g. the Transylvanian question, as far as 
Communist omania and Communist Hungary were concerned).
The East European Euro-region schemes may help restore communication 
between borderline populations that prior to the establishment of hard borders 
were in close interaction with each other. An additional contribution of such 
schemes might be the encouragement of grass-roots participation in the decision-
maing process. This might be in itself a notable development bearing in mind that 
in many parts of the West political apathy has mainly resulted from the deficient 
participation of citizens in the local decision-maing procedures.
The Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina is part of the ‘Danube-ris-
Maros-Tisza’ Euro-region, established on November st , together with four 
municipalities in the omanian Banat and four Southern Hungarian counties. 
Comparing Vojvodina’s administrative status to that of its fellow-participants, 
the DMT region comprises different levels of authority. According to Article  
of the Founding Protocol, the project was launched with the aim to intensify co-
operation among the participating entities in the fields of economy, education and 
science. An additional objective is to secure the adequate protection of minority 
rights within the bounds of the DMT, in accordance with international law and 
the national legislations in question. The DMT region consists of a presidential 
forum, a consultant office, a secretariat and a variety of woring groups. The 
projects organised within the bounds of the DMT are to be financed by: a. public 
financial bodies based in the Euro-region’s constituent entities; b. European and 
international organizations (e.g. the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe); c. other 
sources. According to Article  the DMT is not a legal person. Joint projects that 
have been undertaen so far are include a. the cleaning of the Bega-Tisza canals 
and their preparation for international traffic; b. the construction of the Szeged-
 For further discussion of this issue see Dimitrijević : -. 
 The Founding Protocol of the DKMT Euro-region was agreed upon on November st, , in Szeged 
(Hungary). For a full text-version of the document see: http://www.dkmt.regionalnet.org. 
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iinda-Timisoara railway line; c. the construction of the road route E-, lining 
Belgrade with Szeged and Szeged with omania.
There are both strengths and weanesses with regard to DMT’s prospects. 
First of all, mention should be made of some positive prospects for the protection 
of minority rights within the Euro-region. This has been facilitated by the 
conclusion of agreements on the protection of national minorities by the states 
whose administrative units participate in the DMT, for example the agreements 
concluded between Serbia and omania (October th ), Serbia and Hungary 
(December th ) and Hungary and omania (December nd ). With 
special regard to Vojvodina, certain provisions of the Serbian law on national 
minorities (Article ) facilitate the co-operation between Vojvodinian Hungarian 
institutions and their counterparts in Hungary in educational and media issues. As 
a matter of fact, all minority groups within the DMT are interested in close co-
operation with their ‘motherlands’.
Positive prospects have also opened up regarding co-operation in educational 
and cultural matters. The universities based within the DMT have undertaen 
quite a few joint projects so far. This has also been the case of co-operation 
among museums and other cultural institutions. The establishment of a egional 
Chancellery for Cultural Co-operation, financed by the Stability Pact for Southeast 
Europe, is being envisaged as well. Optimistic prospects have opened up also in 
the field of economic co-operation. These have been generated by the free trade 
agreements concluded among the states whose administrative units participate in 
the DMT. For instance, on December th , an agreement was reached between 
Serbia and omania, including a list of industrial and agricultural products that 
would be exchanged at lower customs rates. Some months earlier, on March th 
, a similar agreement between Serbia and Hungary exempted  percent of 
all industrial products and one-third of agricultural produce from customs duty. 
Hungarian and Serbian officials estimate that this agreement can boost bilateral 
trade by an average of - percent within the next two or three years.
Nevertheless, some difficulties have been experienced as well. First of all, 
in certain parts of the DMT the economic infrastructure is not very highly 
developed. The Hungarian Csongrad County, for example, has remained a 
primarily agricultural area to the present day. Salaries and other income are lower 
than the Hungarian average and only  percent of the gross value of industrial 
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fixed assets belongs to the county. The local industry is poor and obsolete, and 
the health care system is not well developed either. More important is, however, 
the considerable damage that was inflicted on Vojvodina’s infrastructure by the 
NATO bombing. The bombing destroyed part of the petrochemical and metal 
industry plants in iinda, Novi Sad and Pančevo. Quite a few bridges were 
also destroyed. The reconstruction of the total damage has hampered and still 
hampers the Vojvodinian initiatives within the DMT. Apart from the bombing, 
Vojvodinian industry was negatively affected by the UN embargo as well. The 
technical equipment in many factories has remained outdated, since the import of 
new machinery was impossible. Furthermore, the chemical industry was seriously 
affected by the shortage in natural gas supply and other primary sources.
The prospects of the DMT are equally hampered by the inadequate functioning 
of the regional and local administration in the participating entities. This has been 
the case, for example, of the omanian municipalities within the scheme. As far 
as Vojvodina is concerned, the provincial and municipal authorities often do not 
have access to the projects organised within the DMT since all major decisions are 
taen in Belgrade. Indeed, Vojvodina’s cross-border aspirations are good arguments 
for the devolution of a certain set of competencies to the province.
Finally, a crucial problem is the fact that the funds mad available by the EU and 
other organizations to the DMT and other Euro-regions have not been sufficient. 
This is a crucial problem, considering that the projects under way within the DMT 
can only be completed successfully if more funds are invested. In Vojvodina, some 
local political circles have even accused the EU of ‘using’ the DMT for its short-
term economic interests (e.g. conducting tax-free trade with ussia via Serbia) 
without any genuine interest in regional development.
The following steps have been recommended as possible solutions to these 
problems. First of all, the governments in the region, along with the Stability 
Pact for Southeast Europe and the regional bodies involved in the DMT, should 
jointly see to engage the European Commission in a policy dialogue towards the 
harmonization of EU instruments for financial assistance in Southeast Europe 
 Jolan, (). -. 
 Tomić and Romelić (). -. 
 Interview with local representative of the Democratic Party of Serbia (Novi Sad, March th, ).  
 For a list of similar proposals see Council of Europe Publishing House : -. 
 For a listing of similar recommendations see Batt (): -. 
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(primarily the CADS and INTEEG programs) so that the availability of funds 
can be guaranteed. As an interim solution to the shortage of funding, the same 
agents should jointly engage the national governments in the region to allocate 
funds within their national CADS budget to cross-border co-operation. A basic 
condition is that the Southeast European governments should consult with the 
regional and local governments involved, when they negotiate the terms of their 
CADS assistance. This, of course, is subject to genuine decentralisation in the 
Southeast European states in question.
Furthermore, it is essential that the EU should move towards a strategy that 
supports more coherently regional development and cohesion processes within 
Southeast Europe and between Southeast Europe and the EU. This strategy should 
rely on the experiences acquired by the EU in the course of the Accession Process, 
particularly focusing on the experiences with programmes aimed at preparing 
countries and regions for the absorption of the Structural and Cohesion Funds (e.g. 
the PHAE, SAPAD and ISPA programmes). The adoption of such an approach is 
essential in order to convince the local political elites within the DMT about the 
genuine interest of the European organizations in regional reconstruction. 
Finally, the governments whose units participate in the DMT and other Euro-
regions in Southeast Europe should, together with the European organizations, 
wor towards a solution of visa-related barriers to cross-border co-operation. 
This may initially tae the form of schemes facilitating easy access lie long-term 
visas or border passes for borderline communities. Innovative proposals should be 
elaborated in consultation with the regional and local authorities.
The more effective operation of cross-border co-operation schemes in Southeast 
Europe depends on the utilization of ‘strengths’ as opposed to ‘weanesses’. The 
term ’strengths’ refers to the positive elements that can be found in the society and 
culture of the regions/municipalities involved, the development of the civil society 
in the participatory entities and their economic capacities. ‘Weanesses’ refer to 
the inadequate preparation of the local self-governments, poor administrative co-
ordination and counterproductive relations between local authorities and central 
administration. Both strengths and weanesses are considered inherent in the 
cross-border co-operation system.
There is also a number of external potentialities and obstacles that have to be 
exploited and overcome respectively. These potentialities are: a. the propensity of 
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the administrative units to cross-border co-operation; b. the co-ordination among 
the communities and authorities involved in the Euro-region; c. the level of co-
operation in economic activity. On the other hand, external obstacles are usually of 
institutional, economic and interethnic character that can be detrimental to trans-
frontier co-operation.
With regard to cross-border co-operation between Serbia and omania in the 
DMT, a strategy focusing on the high rate of inner strengths and the existence 
of equally strong external opportunities should be pursued. On this occasion, 
the omanian as well as the Serbian authorities along the borderline have 
demonstrated their intention to expand their co-operation at all levels. Moreover, 
no such problems as tensions related to the aspirations of the omanian and Serbian 
minorities on either side of the border have been experienced. One problem that 
has emerged recently, though, is the imposition of a visa-regime to Serbian citizens 
by omania and the swift reaction of the Serbian side with regard to omanian 
citizens wishing to travel to Serbia. 
As regards Hungarian-Serbian co-operation within the DMT, the  strategy 
to be pursued should focus on the inner strengths and external opportunities and 
should be strong enough cope with outer threats. In this case both the Hungarian 
and the Serbian regional elites have demonstrated their willingness to co-operate 
within the project. Moreover, the free trade between the two states, as well as the 
joint agreement on national minorities, will contribute to the restriction of external 
threats that might prove detrimental to the functioning of the Euro-region. 
Apart from the DMT, Vojvodina, or more precisely the Novi Sad municipality 
also participates in the Danube-Drava-Sava Euro-region. A micro-region, consisting 
of the municipality of Novi Sad, the Bosnian canton of Tuzla and the Croatian 
municipality of Osije, has operated within the bounds of the Euro-region since 
. The establishment of this micro-region is a positive step for the economic 
activities of the province, considering that transactions with Croatia and especially 
Bosnia-Herzegovina have been quite profitable for Vojvodina.
The recommended strategy for cross-border co-operation between Croatia 
and Serbia should highlight the role of inner strengths and external opportunities 
in order to reduce the effects of inner weanesses and external threats which are 
of disturbing importance. In this light, the free-trade agreement between Serbia 
and Croatia signed on December rd, , is a positive step in this direction. 
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Nevertheless, the co-ordination between Novi Sad and Osije within the micro-
region has not been sufficient. Also, the visa regime in force between Serbia and 
Croatia hinders the movement of people and merchandise across the border. The 
most important issues include the repatriation of the evicted Serbs to Croatia, and 
the regulation of the Croatian minority’s legal status in Vojvodina as obstacles in 
the path of trans-frontier co-operation between the two states. Indeed, the search 
of a regulatory formula regarding these issues is vital for the development of inter-
state co-operation between Serbia and Croatia.
egarding Serbia’s EU aspirations, the problems of political instability and 
economic malfunction still represent serious difficulties in the country’s European 
integration. To these we might add the aftermath of the NATO bombing, as well as 
the friction between Belgrade and the EU over the Hague Tribunal. On the other 
hand, some positive developments have been witnessed too, over the last few years, 
in Serbia’s integration to the European structures. First of all, since April rd, , 
the state has been a full member of the Council of Europe. Moreover, the country 
is a beneficiary of the EU’s special trade measures and custom tariffs have been 
abolished for Serbian imports into the EU with minor exceptions. 
As far as the EU enlargement is concerned, the whole process has caused a 
‘collateral damage’ to Serbia, which has been suffered particularly by Vojvodina. 
This has to do with the visa regime between Serbia and Hungary. The imposition 
of the Schengen regime has caused certain difficulties to Serbian entrepreneurs, 
especially those operating in Vojvodina, since the Schengen visa is expensive for 
them. As a matter of fact, Hungary realised considerable profit from its transactions 
with Serbia in the ‘s. 
The imposition of the visa requirement has had a relatively negative impact 
also on the Serbian citizens living along the borderline. A significant degree of 
economic interdependence had been built up on the Serbian-Hungarian border, 
mainly based on informal trade and commuting for employment. These activities 
have been of vital importance for the economic survival of the most peripheral, 
often impoverished, rural communities of Vojvodina.
At this moment, the following suggestions could be made to the EU and other 
relevant organisations. First of all, the EU member-states should co-operate with 
each other in order to set up joint consular facilities or it would be even better 
to delegate visa-issuing authority to common EU consulates in the borderline 
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regions. This would save the residents of Vojvodina and other regions on the EU 
border the trouble of having to travel to the EU member states’ embassies in the 
national capitals. It would also be essential for the EU to advise regional authorities 
on applying to the Stability Pact and other sources for funding, since people in 
Vojvodina and other peripheral regions are often uninformed and inexperienced 
concerning these issues. Finally, the EU should invest in the establishment of 
additional border-crossing points along the Schengen border.
In conclusion, we believe that it is the positive role of Euro-regions should 
be emphasized. Flourishing Euro-regions could avert the danger of economic 
malfunction in the borderlands, together with the ensuing implications of 
rising criminality and emigration pressures. The introduction of EU monitoring 
mechanisms might be suggested as an additional measure for the effective control 
of such phenomena. Finally, the EU should support the current achievements of the 
East European Euro-regions in ethnic relations and facilitate the materialization of 
these regions’ aspirations to assume the role of ‘gateways to Europe’ for their less 
developed hinterlands. This is very much the case of Vojvodina in relation to the 
rest of Serbia. As regards minority issues on the borderline, the EU should always 
be careful to consult with the national capitals so that no misunderstandings should 
occur. In other words, the EU should manage its role so as to be perceived as strictly 
neutral in the light of any political and national antagonisms in the region.
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THE COUNCIL AND THE EUOPEAN 
COMMISSION ON BUDGETAY DISCIPLINE 
AND IMPOVEMENT OF THE BUDGETAY 
POCEDUE FO 
SVETLA BONEVA
ESSENCE AND SCOPE OF THE IIA
The IIA on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure 
(COM ()  final) is a document, reached as a result of the negotiations 
between the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission 
(the Commission). The aim of the IIA is to provide a set of agreed rules concerning 
the multi-annual FF (Financial Framework) and the sequence of operations in the 
annual budgetary procedure.
The IIA is a tool to frame the annual budgetary practice within an agreed 
multi-annual FF. Its renewal updates and simplifies the existing agreements and 
joint declarations on budgetary matters. The agreement aims at finding the balance 
between budgetary discipline and efficient resource allocation.
The purposes of the IIA concluded between the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission (the institutions) are:
• to implement budgetary discipline and to improve the functioning of the 
annual budgetary procedure; and 
• to initiate co-operation between the institutions on budgetary matters.
Budgetary discipline covers all expenditure. It is binding on all institutions 
involved in its implementation for as long as the IIA is in force. The IIA does 
not alter the budgetary powers of the various institutions, as laid down in the 
Treaties—the Council will act by a qualified majority and the European Parliament 
by a majority of its members and three fifths of the votes cast. 
 In compliance with the voting rules laid down in the fifth subparagraph of Article () of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (the ‘EC Treaty’).
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Box  Structure and contents of the IIA
IIA on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure
PART I—FF -: DEFINITION AND IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS
A. Contents and scope of the FF
B. Annual adjustments of the FF
C. Review of the FF
D. Revision of the FF
E. Consequences of the absence of a joint decision on the adjustment or revision of the FF
F. Emergency Aid Reserve
G. EU Solidarity Fund
H. Instrument of Flexibility
I. European Globalisation Adjustment Fund
J. Adjustment of the FF to cater for enlargement
K. Duration of the FF and consequences of the absence of a FF
PART II—IMPROVEMENT OF INTERINSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION DURING 
THE BUDGETARY PROCEDURE
A. The inter-institutional collaboration procedure
B. Establishment of the budget
C. Classification of expenditure
D. Maximum rate of increase of non-compulsory expenditure in the absence of a FF
E. Incorporation of financial provisions in legislative acts
F. Expenditure relating to fisheries agreements
G. Financing of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP)
ANNEX I : FF -
ANNEX II: INTERINSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION IN THE BUDGETARY 
SECTOR
ANNEX III: CLASSIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE
ANNEX IV: FINANCING OF EXPENDITURE DERIVING FROM FISHERIES 
AGREEMENTS
DECLARATION on the adjustment of Structural Funds, Rural Development and the 
European Fund for Fisheries in the light of the circumstances of their implementation
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Any amendment of the IIA requires the consent of the institutions which are 
party to it. Changes to the multi-annual FF must be made in accordance with the 
procedures in the IIA. The IIA has two parts and four annexes (Box ):
• Part I contains a definition and implementing provisions for the multi-annual 
FF  to  and applies for the duration of that FF,
• Part II relates to the improvement of inter-institutional collaboration during the 
budgetary procedure.
The IIA enters into force on . January . It replaces with effect from the same 
date:
• the IIA of  May  between the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary 
procedure (OJ C , ..),
• the IIA of  November  between the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission on the financing of the EU Solidarity Fund.
The  to  FF (set out in Annex I) is an integral part of the IIA. It is the 
reference framewor for inter-institutional budgetary discipline. The FF ensures 
that, in the medium term, EU expenditure, broen down by broad categories, 
develops in the limits of own resources.
Simultaneously with a proposal for a new FF, the Commission will present a 
report on the application of the IIA, accompanied where necessary by amendments.
 The multi-annual financial framework is also referred to as ‘the financial framework (FF)’ in the 
agreement.
 OJ C , .., p. . This IIA replaces and declares obsolete the following instruments:
• the Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of  June  on 
various measures to improve the budgetary procedure (OJ C , .., p. );
• the IIA of  October  between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure (OJ C , .., p. );
• the Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of  March  on the 
incorporation of financial provisions into legislative acts (OJ C , .., p. );
• the Joint Declaration of  December  concerning the improvement of information to the budgetary 
authority on fisheries agreements (OJ C , .., p. );
• the IIA between the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission of  July  on 
provisions regarding financing of the common foreign and security policy (OJ C , .., p. );
• the IIA of  October  between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on legal 
bases and implementation of the budget(OJ C , .., p. ).
 presented pursuant to point  of the IIA.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND PRECEDING THE ADOPTION OF THE IIA 
FOR THE PERIOD 
Agenda  and the Inter-institutional agreement of  managed to fulfill its 
main purposes concerning financial discipline, the gradual growth of expenditure 
and inter-institutional collaboration in the budgetary procedure. The Budget of the 
EU has been adopted on time each year, and the two budgetary authorities have 
jointly adjusted the financial framework - to cater for the enlargement of 
the Union with ten new members.
On  July  the Commission presented a proposal for the renewal of the 
Inter-institutional Agreement (IIA) on budgetary discipline and improvement of 
the budgetary procedure for the period - (COM()).
On  June  the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Policy 
Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union - (P_
TA()), followed by a resolution on the IIA on budgetary discipline and 
improvement of the budgetary procedure adopted on  December  (P_TA 
POV()).
On - December , the European Council reached a political agreement 
on the Financial Perspective - (Document /, CADEFIN ). On 
 January  the European parliament adopted a resolution on the European 
Council’s position on the Financial Perspective and the renewal of the IIA -
 (PE ., B-/).
MAIN FEATURES OF THE IIA FOR THE PERIOD 
In the IIA for the above period the basic features of the financial framework are left 
unchanged, namely:
• for each year of the - period expenditure is classified in broad categories 
called headings;
• maximum amounts (called ceilings) are established in the FF for appropriations 
for commitments and payments for each heading. Expenditure levels are based 
on the assumption that Bulgaria and Romania join the EU on  January , 
if their accession takes place later, the expenditure ceilings will be revised 
accordingly;
• overall annual amounts are expressed both for commitment appropriations and 
payment appropriations;
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• the annual ceiling for payment appropriations must respect the own resources 
ceiling currently established at . of the EU gross national income (GNI).
In the perspective of future institutional developments, the present IIA 
proposes to replace the term ‘financial perspective’ with ‘multi-annual FF’ or ‘FF’. 
Box  The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF)
The EUSF allows rapid financial assistance in the event of major disasters occurring 
in the EU or a candidate country. There is a ceiling on the annual amount available 
for the Solidarity Fund of   billion. On  October each year, at least one-quarter of 
the annual amount will remain available in order to cover needs arising until the end 
of the year. The portion of the annual amount not entered in the budget may not be 
rolled over in the following years.
In case the financial resources in the Fund in the year of disaster are not sufficient 
to cover the amount of assistance deemed necessary by the budgetary authority, the 
Commission may propose to finance the difference from the following year’s Fund. 
The annual amount of the Fund in each year may not exceed   billion under any 
circumstance.
When the conditions for mobilising the EUSF are met, the Commission shall propose 
to deploy it. Where there is scope for reallocating appropriations under the heading 
requiring additional expenditure, the Commission shall take this into account when 
making the proposal in accordance with the Financial Regulation in force, by the 
appropriate budgetary instrument. The decision to deploy the Solidarity Instrument 
is taken jointly by the two budgetary authorities.
The corresponding commitment appropriations shall be entered in the budget over 
and above the relevant headings in the FF as laid down in Annex I of the IIA.
Parallel with its proposal for a decision to deploy the EUSF, the Commission must 
initiate a trialogue procedure, if necessary in a simplified form, to secure the 
agreement of the two budget authorities on the need to use the fund and on the 
amount required.
The IIA of .. on the EUSF is outside the FF for - but has the same 
features in terms of maximum annual amount ( billion), trialogue procedure, joint 
adoption by the budget authority after a Commission proposal, no possibility for 
carry-overs for non-budgetised portions of the Fund.
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It also proposes to insert a new provision in  or  by which the Commission 
will present to the European Parliament and Council a wide-ranging review on all 
aspects of EU spending and resources.
The IIA renews the IIA of  May , comprising, at the same time, the experience 
acquired during its implementation. It consolidates all the joint declarations 
and IIAs concluded on budgetary matters since . It simplifies the financial 
framework in three aspects wherever justified and possible:
a) The IIA incorporates the separate supplementary IIA of  November  on the 
creation of the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF). The fund maintains the current rules 
for its mobilisation (Box ) and when it is mobilised, corresponding expenditure 
is entered in the budget over and above the relevant headings of the FF.
Box  The Instrument of Flexibility
The Instrument of Flexibility finances clearly identified expenditure of one-year or 
multi-annual character, which can not be financed within the limits of ceilings for other 
headings for a given year and up to the amount indicated. It has an annual ceiling of  
 million euro.
The Commission makes a proposal for the instrument to be used after it has examined 
all possibilities for re-allocating appropriations under the heading requiring additional 
expenditure.
The proposal is presented, for any financial year, during the budgetary procedure. The 
Commission proposal is included in the preliminary draft budget or accompanied, in 
accordance with the Financial Regulation, by the appropriate budgetary instrument.
The decision to deploy the instrument of f lexibility is taken jointly by the two budgetary 
authorities. Agreement will be reached by the conciliation procedure according to Part 
II of the IIA. 
So, the existing flexibility instrument is reinstated and the reallocation flexibility 
removed. The annual amount of the f lexibility instrument is increased to   million 
and its scope broadened to cover also needs extending beyond one year. These changes 
ensure sufficient f lexibility within lower ceilings for commitments.
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b) Simplification of the method for technical adjustment extends the predetermined 
 annual inflation rate used for structural funds and agriculture to the rest of 
expenditure.
c) The provisioning of the guarantee fund for loans to third countries is 
rationalised so that there is no longer need for a ‘reserve’ to this end. The related 
(reduced) expenditure becomes part of the instruments available for the EU 
external policy.
Flexibility of the multi-annual FF is essential for financial discipline. If properly designed, 
it enhances effective resources allocation while allowing spendings for unforeseen needs 
or new priorities. Several parameters influence the flexibility of the FF: 
• the length of the period covered by the financial perspective; 
• the number of expenditure headings and the margins available within each 
expenditure ceiling; 
Box  The Emergency Aid reserve
The emergency aid reserve is included in Heading  ‘the EU as a global partner’ of the 
FF. The reserve enters in the general budget of the EU as a provision. The purpose of 
the reserve is to provide a rapid response to specific aid requirements of non-member 
countries after unforeseen events take place after the budget is established—mainly for 
humanitarian operations and civil crisis management. Its annual amount is fixed at   
million for the duration of the FF.
When the Commission considers to call on the reserve, it presents the two budget 
authorities a proposal for a transfer from this reserve to the corresponding budgetary lines. 
Any Commission proposal for a transfer to draw on the reserve for emergency aid must be 
preceded by an examination of the scope for reallocating appropriations.
At the same time as it presents its proposal for a transfer, the Commission must initiate a 
trialogue procedure, if necessary in a simplified form, to secure the agreement of the two 
budgetary authorities on the need to use the reserve and on the amount required. The transfers 
are made in accordance with Article  of the Financial Regulation (OJ L , .., p. ).
The reserve for guaranteeing loans to non-member countries is deleted in the IIA -. 
The emergency aid reserve remains the only reserve, its scope is enlarged to civil crisis 
management and its amount is adjusted in  prices. If necessary, supplementary needs 
for this reserve can be covered by transfers from other operational budget lines or by an 
amending budget to use the available margin.
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• the margin below the own resources ceiling; the share of EU spending pre-
determined by ‘amounts of reference’ in co-decided legislation; 
• pre-allocated multi-annual programs; 
• the general attitude towards using the revision procedure.
The degree of flexibility has evolved over time with the changing mix of those 
parameters. Agenda  has succeeded to answer unforeseen budget challenges 
at the price of greater complexity and lower transparency, without necessarily 
improving effective resource allocation. For instance, the instrument of flexibility 
and the EUSF had to be created outside the financial perspective to respond to 
unforeseen needs.
Box  The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund
The EGAF is intended to provide additional support for workers who suffer from the 
consequences of major structural changes in world trade patterns and to assist them with 
their reintegration into the labour market.
The Fund can not exceed a maximum annual amount of   million which can be drawn 
from any margin existing under the global expenditure ceiling of the previous year, and/or 
from commitment appropriations de-committed during the previous two years.
When conditions exist for mobilising the EGAF, the Commission will propose to deploy it. 
The decision to deploy the EGAF will be taken jointly by the two budgetary authorities.
At the same time as it presents its proposal for a decision to deploy the Fund, the 
Commission must initiate a trialogue procedure, if necessary in a simplified form, to 
secure the agreement of the two arms of budgetary authority on the need to use the Fund 
and the amount required.
The corresponding commitment appropriations shall be entered in the budget under the 
relevant heading, if necessary over and above the relevant amount as laid down in Annex I.
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On - December , the European Council reached a political agreement 
on expenditure ceilings that are significantly lower than those proposed by the 
Commission. Tighter expenditure ceilings entail more rigidity in the FF and risks 
in the EU ability to address future challenges, they hinder rather than encourage 
effective resource allocation. This is why the Commission proposed three measures 
to balance between budgetary discipline and efficient resources allocation:
() The revision of the multi-annual FF remains the main instrument of response to 
significant and permanent changes in the EU policies in a fast developing context.
() Three flexibility instruments can be mobilised in the - FF to facilitate 
the deployment or redeployment of financial resources within the expenditure 
ceilings. These are:
 (a) The Emergency Aid reserve in Heading  that will respond to emergency 
situations in third countries. Its amount and mobilisation procedure remain 
unchanged.
 (b) A new European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGAF) will provide 
additional support for workers who suffer the consequences of major structural 
changes in world trade patterns and will assist them with their reintegration 
into the labor market.
 (c) The possibility for the budgetary authority to depart up to  from the so-
called ‘reference amounts’ of multi-annual programmes adopted under the co-
decision procedure (except for cohesion programmes). This possibility is based 
on a proposal of the European Commission in the framework of the annual 
budgetary procedure.
() Two other instruments can be mobilised above the agreed expenditure ceilings 
within certain limits. They can be used in the framework of the annual budget 
procedure under the relevant provisions defined in the IIA. These are:
 (a) the EU Solidarity Fund;
 (b) the Flexibility Instrument.
The experience with the - financial perspective has shown that there is 
no longer a need to maintain the agricultural guideline in Council egulation (EC) 
No / on budgetary discipline, since agricultural expenditure is already 
constrained by ceilings agreed till . The other provisions on budget discipline 
in agriculture are found in the new egulation (Articles -) on the financing of 
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the common agricultural policy. The shift from maret intervention towards direct 
payments to farmers and rural development measures maes agriculture expenditure 
more predictable.
The monetary reserve exists no longer and the Commission has proposed a new 
mechanism for the provisioning of the fund to guarantee loans to non-Member countries. 
According to the European Commission Council egulation (EC) No / should 
be repealed and it will propose separately the appropriate legal act in due time. 
INTERINSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION IN THE 
BUDGETARY PROCEDURE
Provisions included in Part II of the IIA aim at improving the annual budgetary 
procedure. They result from budgetary practice and previous agreements and 
declarations. They are related with the new financial regulation (OJ L , ..). 
The annexes I to IV form an integral part of the present proposed agreement. There 
are several steps in inter-institutional collaboration.
Step one
After the technical adjustment of the FF for the forthcoming year, taking into 
account the Annual Policy Strategy presented by the Commission and prior to its 
decision on the preliminary draft budget, a trialogue meeting will be convened 
to discuss the budget priorities for the year. Account will be taken also of the 
institutions’ powers and the needs for the next year and for the following years of 
the FF. Account will be taken also of the new elements of the FF that are likely to 
have a significant and lasting financial impact on the budget.
Step two
As regards compulsory expenditure, the Commission, presenting its preliminary 
draft budget, identifies:
(a) appropriations connected with new or planned legislation;
(b) appropriations arising from the application of legislation existing when the 
previous budget was adopted.
The Commission will mae a careful estimate of the financial implications of 
the Community’s obligations. If necessary it will update its estimates in the course 
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of the budgetary procedure. It will supply the budgetary authority with all the duly 
justified reasons it may require.
The Commission may update ad hoc the estimate of agricultural expenditure in 
the preliminary draft budget or correct the amounts and their breadown between the 
appropriations for international fisheries agreements and those entered in reserve. For 
this purpose an ad hoc letter of amendment must be sent to the budgetary authorities 
before the end of October. If it is presented to the Council less than a month before the 
European Parliament’s first reading, the Council will, as a rule, consider the ad hoc 
letter of amendment when giving the draft budget its second reading.
As a consequence, before the Council’s second reading of the budget, the two 
budgetary authorities will try to meet the conditions necessary for the letter of 
amendment to be adopted on a single reading by each of the institutions concerned.
Step three
. A conciliation procedure is set up for all expenditure.
. The purpose of the conciliation procedure is to:
 (a) continue discussions on the general trend of expenditure and, in this 
framework, on the broad lines of the budget for the coming year in the light of 
the Commission’s preliminary draft budget;
 (b) secure agreement between the two budgetary authorities on:
• the appropriations referred to in step (a) and (b), including those proposed 
in the ad hoc letter of amendment referred to in point ,
• the amounts to be entered in the budget for noncompulsory expenditure,
• and, particularly, matters for which reference to this procedure is made in 
the IIA.
. The procedure begins with a trialogue meeting convened in time to allow the 
institutions to seek agreement by not later than the date set by the Council for 
establishing its draft budget.
There will be conciliation on the results of this trialogue between the Council 
and a European Parliament delegation, with the Commission also taing part. 
Unless decided otherwise during the trialogue, the conciliation meeting will be 
held at the traditional meeting between the same participants on the date set by the 
Council for establishing the draft budget.
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. If necessary, a new trialogue meeting could be held before the European 
Parliament’s first reading on written proposal by the Commission or written 
request by either the chairman of the European Parliament’s Budgets 
Committee or the President of the Council (Budgets). The decision whether to 
hold this trialogue will be agreed between the institutions after the adoption of 
the Council draft budget and prior to the vote of the amendments on the first 
reading by the European Parliament Budgets Committee.
. The institutions continue the conciliation after the first reading of the 
budget by each budgetary authority to secure agreement on compulsory and 
noncompulsory expenditure and, in particular, to discuss the ad hoc letter of 
amendment referred to in point .
A trialogue meeting will be held for this purpose after the European Parliament’s 
first reading. The results of the trialogue will be discussed at a second conciliation 
meeting to be held the day of the Council’s second reading. If necessary, the 
institutions will continue their discussions on non-compulsory expenditure after 
the Council’s second reading.
. At these trialogue meetings, the institutions’ delegations are to be led by the President 
of the Council (Budgets), the Chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Budgets and the Member of the Commission with responsibility for the budget.
. Each arm of the budgetary authority takes steps to ensure that the results 
secured in the conciliation process are respected throughout the budgetary 
procedure.
Step four
In order for the Commission to be able to assess in due time the implementability of 
the amendments envisaged by the budget authority, like creating new Preparatory 
Actions and Pilot Projects or prolonging existing ones, both arms of the budgetary 
authority must inform the Commission by mid June of their intentions, so that a first 
discussion may take place at the conciliation meeting of the Council’s first reading. 
The three institutions agree to limit the total amount of appropriations:
• for pilot schemes to   million in any budget year; 
• for new preparatory actions to   million in any budget year; 
• actually committed for preparatory actions to   million. 
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STRUCTURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE
Annex III of the IIA classifies compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure by 
heading. The two budget authorities classify the new budget items within the 
annual conciliation procedure.
FINANCIAL PROVISIONS IN LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS
The principle set out in the Joint Declaration of  March  and incorporated 
in point  of the IIA of  May , according to which the institutions comply 
with the reference amounts adopted in the legislative co-decision procedure in 
the budget procedure, is maintained. The co-decision procedure, however, has 
Box  Compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure
CLASSIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE
HEADING  Sustainable growth
A Competitiveness for growth and employment Noncompulsory expenditure (NCE)
B Cohesion for growth and employment    NCE
HEADING  Preservation and management of natural resources  NCE
Except: Expenditure of the common agricultural policy concerning market measures 
and direct aids, including market measures for fisheries and fisheries agreements—
Compulsory expenditure (CE)    (CE)
HEADING  Citizenship, freedom, security and justice  NCE
A Freedom, Security and Justice    NCE
B Citizenship      NCE
HEADING  The EU as a global partner   NCE
Except: Expenditure resulting from international agreements which the EU concluded 
with third parties      CE
Contributions to international organisations or institutions  CE
Contributions provisioning the loan guarantee fund  CE
HEADING  Administration     NCE
Except: Pensions and severance grants    CE
Allowances and miscellaneous contributions on termination of service  CE
Legal expenses       CE
Damages      CE
HEADING  Compensations     CE
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been regularly extended since  and the strict provisions on reference amounts 
impose increasing constraints for budgetary policy. The Commission proposes that 
the budgetary authority and the Commission be able to depart from these amounts 
by a limited margin () in the course of the annual budgetary procedure.
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FOEIGN DIECT INVESTMENTS AND THE 
COUNTIES OF THE EUOPEAN UNION
ZSOLT PÉTER
INTRODUCTION
Between  and  the inflow of foreign direct investments extended  
dynamically in the world economy with the exception of a few unfavourable years. 
In ,  and  the average growth varied between  and  percent. In the 
year  it reached , billion dollars, more than six times larger than in . 
The vast majority of FDI inflows ( of world inflows in ) went to advanced 
industrialized economies.
In  this spectacular growth stopped and a dramatic fall could be observed 
in the context of the global FDI inflows especially in the developed countries while 
a moderate decline was reported in the developing and CEEC countries. There has 
been a less active presence of the European Union on global FDI marets since . 
While the EU invested more than  billion euros in other countries in , this 
figure was reduced to less than  billion in . 
One could reasonably as if it was a definite crisis but it is more legitimate to say 
that it was the result of several factors such as correction of the previous growth, an 
overall economic recession at the time, the downfall of the international enterprise 
fusion and expansion activity (alotay, ).
In this paper I would lie to get a closer view of FDI inflows and outflows 
concerning the European Union’s countries. First of all I will investigate the 
composition of the extra-EU FDI outflows and inflows of the European Union’s 
countries since the middle of the nineties. This will be followed by a review of the 
internal FDI outflow and inflow which will give a picture of the positions of the 
Central and Eastern European countries.
In spite of the generally stagnating situation experts expect increasing FDI 
inflows in the next few years because of an estimated higher growth in the 
developed countries and a more intensive cross-border activity of the multinational 
companies (alotay, ).
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GLOBAL POSITION OF THE EU ON THE FDI MARKET
In  EU FDI outflows reached their maximum with EUR  billion but two 
years later only EUR . billion was recorded on the global market. It meant a 
significant,  decrease. After a relative stability observed in , outward FDI 
fell again in , to EUR  billion, i.e.  less than the year before.
FDI inflows from outside the EU have run on a similar path. A steady decline 
has been noticed since . Proportionally the drop of  in  was more 
remarable when the FDI inflows from outside the EU reached the relatively low 
EU . billion.
A massive positive balance could be observed during the whole period regarding 
the EU FDI activity with the exception of  and  when EU outflows and 
inflows were almost balanced (EU Foreign Direct Investments).
Figure . EU outward and inward FDI flows and intra-EU FDI flows (EUR billion)
Source: UNCTAD
The reduction of the total amount invested abroad was combined with a 
modification in the main destinations of EU outward flows.
During the period analysed here the significance of North America fell 
dramatically while Central America gained a stronger position with its EU . 
billion thans to the EU . billion invested in Mexico. In  the United States 
suffered a disinvestment while the country was the most important destination (EU 
Foreign Direct Investments).
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Figure . EU outward FDI flows  (Total=)
Source: UNCTAD
The relative presence of outward FDI flows from the EU on the Asian maret 
became proportionally stronger. The share of Asian investments reached . in 
. In spite of the overall decline in FDI activity in , investments in Asia 
grew from EU . billion to EU . billion by , in a period of just one 
year. The figures mae it quite clear that the role of non-EU OECD countries 
decreased significantly regarding the EU outward FDI flows, while the developing 
areas maintained their positions. The single developed maret which reported 
improvement was Japan with its EU . billion in . 
Figure . EU outward FDI flows  in selected countries (Total=)
Source: UNCTAD
In  several non-EU countries reached their highest share of EU FDI 
outward flows during the examined  years’ period while Switzerland, a former 
important investment destination recorded a significant disinvestment of EU 
 billion. ussia, Norway and the candidate countries imported ., . and 
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. respectively of the total extra-EU FDI outward flows, the highest level since 
. omania and Bulgaria, the accession countries and the fast growing eastern 
European economies have also attracted EU investors.
Figure . EU FDI rate of growth for outward stocks in / ()
Source: UNCTAD
The data in Figure  show the rate of growth for outward stocs in  as 
compared to . The growth rate of EU outward stocs was the highest in the case 
of  omania (), followed by ussia, Mexico and China, whereas Argentina and 
Singapore registered the highest negative rates (-). 
Figure  . Inward FDI flows to the EU ()
Source: UNCTAD
The FDI inflows form outside the EU amounted to EU . billion in  
then dropped by  billion in . The downfall continued till  when it 
reached  of its  value thans to EU . billion invested. The relative 
presence of the United States showed a constant decrease during the  year period. 
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While in  an investment of EU . billion was reported, in  only EU 
. billion arrived in the EU. FDI inflows from Canada also decreased strongly, 
from EU . billion in  to a disinvestment of EU—. billion (EU Foreign 
Direct Investments).
The share of (non-EU) Europe became more significant; the importance 
of Switzerland was remarable in  with more than  of the total inward 
FDI flows to the EU arriving from the country. A relative improvement could be 
observed on the part of a few developing countries such as Brazil and China in terms 
of their investment activity in the EU. In  China was the third most important 
investor with its . share of the total FDI inflow. The overall performance of 
the (non-EU) OECD dropped dramatically since  and in  only EU . 
billion were reported. 
Figure . NET FDI outflows by Member State in the rest of the world (EUR billion)
Source: EUROSTAT
When EU achievements on the global FDI maret are examined it is done in 
overall terms but we must not forget that the EU is a heterogeneous composition of 
 different states. The  new Member States were net recipients of FDI funds in all 
the three years. They were very rarely able to invest on the international marets. 
Figure . shows the NET FDI outflows by Member State in the rest of the world. 
Member States with positive values are net investors in the rest of the world, while a 
negative value indicates that the Member State is a net recipient of FDI funds. Only 
France, Portugal, the Netherlands and Luxemburg could show a positive FDI flow 
balance during this three-year period. 
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While the United ingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden were the most 
significant net investors in , in  Spain became the largest net investor 
followed by Germany and France. The United ingdom, the main net investor in 
, became the largest net recipient of FDI in . 
It should be mentioned here that Figure . shows absolute values which are 
influenced by the different sizes of the countries. Extra-EU FDI flows as percentage of 
GDP are the highest in Luxembourg (Eurostat said the role of Luxembourg in EU FDI 
is mainly explained by the importance of its financial intermediation activity) with 
 of its GDP compared to  for Spain and  for Germany while the net inflows of 
the  new Member States were . in , . in  and . in .
Figure . Distribution of inward FDI to China () ()
Source: http://www.china.org.cn
Another interesting point is to examine the presence of the EU in China. In 
 China was the most significant FDI destination in the world. The inward FDI 
exceeded  billion US dollars while China remained a relatively insignificant FDI 
exporter on the Global maret. In  FDI stocs exceeded  billion US dollars 
which is equivalent to . percent of the country’s GDP. 
 of the investments arrived from or through Hong ong; the second most 
important investor was the epublic of orea with its .; and the third was Japan 
with .. More than  percent of the inward FDI to China arrived form Asian 
countries. The role of the ‘western’ countries remained minor as compared to their 
Asian competitors. The EU countries had slightly more than . of the total FDI 
invested to China, which is commensurable with the United States’ .. The most 
active European country was Germany with ., followed by the United ingdom 
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and the Netherlands both having . and France too the forth place with . 
while Italy had only a . share. 
It is clear that China is one of the most weighty investment destinations for the 
EU countries (in  . of the EU outward FDI flows arrived in China) and has 
preserved its importance since the  drop, but comparing it to the performance 
of the closer Asian counties we have to conclude that a more intensive presence is 
needed considering that China is one of the most attractive developing marets.
INVESTMENTS IN THE CEEC COUNTRIES
In   new member states enlarged the economic space of the EU. After 
, when an equivalent of EUR  billion arrived into all the CEEC- countries, 
investment activity appreciably grew in , when it reached EUR  billion 
(World Investment Report).
Figure . Aggregate FDI flow into the CEEC- (Euro m)
Source: UNCTAD database
Poland was the most important investment destination during the  year 
period shown in Figure , mainly due to its size. Besides Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech epublic were the main targets of FDI inflows in the second part of the 
nineties. Considering the per capita values of the FDI, indicator Hungary had the 
first position till . From  to  (except for ) the Czech epublic too 
the leading role. It can also be seen that the positions of omania and Bulgaria are 
getting stronger thans to their EU accession in the near future.
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Since  the positions of Slovaia, Slovenia and Croatia have become 
remarable; in  Croatia was the first in terms of per capita FDI in the CEEC- 
countries.
The source of FDI flowing into the CEEC- countries is an interesting point 
as well. Apart from Bulgaria more than  of FDI inflows arrived from the six 
selected EU investors; in the Czech epublic this figure was more than . The 
investment activity of the United Sates was significant in Croatia, Poland and 
Bulgaria but in the other CEEC- countries it was only around  or less than  
(World Investment eport).
Table . shows a surprising fact, namely that the Netherlands has a leading role 
in the area besides the very strong presence of Austria. Germany, compared to its 
size in the EU, has only a moderate investment activity. Hungary is the only one 
where it has a leading investment role.
There is a definitely weaer German and Austrian presence in Bulgaria and 
Slovaia seems that distance means lower activity. The Netherlands is in a different 
position. The country does not have common borders with any of the CEEC- 
countries, therefore distance is less important in the investment decision maing 
process. France and Italy have relatively small FDI activity in the area. France has a 
stronger presence in Poland and omania while Italy has quite a significant activity 
in Croatia, Slovaia and omania. All these facts lead us to conclude that cultural 
connections and cultural vicinity are the most important factors governing FDI 
activities of investors.
SUMMARY
 was a turning-point in outward and inward FDI flows of global FDI. The EU 
reported a similar process in the global trends. The EU FDI activity, especially in 
the non-EU OECD countries, fell dramatically. The decrease was not as significant 
regarding the developing, the candidate countries and the new member states 
thanks to their more attractive business environment. The United States (realizing 
. of the FDI in ) has lost its dominant role  since  and the investment 
activities of developing countries into the EU have become proportionally more and 
more important (Kalotay, ).
In  Spain, Germany and France were the main NET FDI investors and, 
at the same time, the United ingdom became NET recipient of FDI. The  new 
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Member States were net recipients of FDI funds in ,  and . The EU has 
an important but not leading role on the global FDI marets. Only , of the FDI 
arrived from the EU countries to China in . 
The analysis of the investment activities of the EU- countries shows that 
Germany has a leading position, but it is not strong enough compared to the 
country’s economic potential because FDI outflows represent only  of the GDP. 
Surprisingly, the Netherlands has quite a significant role on the global maret while 
big EU countries lie Italy, France and Spain have no really significant investment 
activities in the CEEC- countries.
It seems that physical and cultural distances are the main barriers for the EU 
countries. More intensive presence is needed on the global FDI marets otherwise 
the EU won’t be able to secure strong positions on the developing marets. After 
the analysis of the performance of the EU countries, our conclusion is that the 
Netherlands could be set as a model with its relatively strong global and regional 
positions.
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Table . FDI per capita in the CEEC- countries (EUR) (-)
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Czech Republic 192 111 111 323 579 528 616 878 223 437
Hungary 386 257 363 338 307 296 435 298 216 412
Poland 73 93 113 149 179 265 167 114 98 161
Slovakia 37 54 38 12 75 387 329 810 94 209
Slovenia 58 69 146 97 50 74 206 849 80 258
Romania 15 10 49 84 45 52 60 56 64 239
Croatia 20 91 106 187 310 265 393 268 341 242
Bulgaria 9 11 57 62 99 139 117 123 161 320
Source: UNCTAD database
Table . Origin of FDI in the CEEC- countries () ()
 AUT GER FR IT NL UK Total US
Bulgaria 10,95 8,29 2,23 6,33 9,89 5,7 43,39 8,52
Croatia 25,8 17,91 0,93 8,62 8,37 2,49 64,12 10,79
Czech Republic 11,82 20,57 7,92 1,07 30,92 4,25 76,55 5,16
Hungary 11,22 29,2 4,34 1,85 19,54 0,86 67,01 5,21
Poland 4,02 17,25 14,47 3,9 23,34 3,66 66,64 9,47
Slovakia 14,01 18,97 2,39 8,13 26,24 7,48 77,22 4,05
Slovenia 23,19 7,8 7,45 6,44 5,41 2,76 53,05 1,63
Romania 6,23 7,16 10,43 7,77 18,59 1,95 52,13 3,36
Source: UNCTAD database
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DECISIONMAING IN THE 
EUOPEAN UNION: THE CONVENTION 
ON THE FUTUE OF EUOPE
IOANA CRISTINA ILIESCU
The Amsterdam and Nice negotiations provoked a growing dissatisfaction with the 
intergovernmental conference as a method of treaty reform. The IGC model has 
come to a dead-end as far as ‘big politics’ are concerned, not being able to produce 
valid solutions to the constitutional challenges (Hoffman, ). The ratification 
process, especially in the case of the Nice Treaty, proved that there was a big gap 
between the political elites’ integrationist project and the actual expectations of 
the EU citizens. Therefore, the Convention on the future of Europe needed to offer 
a way out of the decision-making crisis, bring the Union closer to its citizens and 
avoid undesired situations such as the Irish ‘No’ to Nice.
This paper aims at analysing the Convention on the future of Europe from the 
perspective of the decision-maing process through treaty reform and integrating 
it in the broader context of this dissertation. It will present factual evidence of the 
evolution of the Convention and will try to apply the two main theories already 
introduced, liberal intergovernmentalism and institutionalism. It will evaluate 
whether the Convention offered a more democratic forum for institutional reform, 
or it was just a new preparatory method. 
Section  of this paper will loo at the context of the Convention and the reasons 
for establishing it. Section  will examine the Convention process looing at: its 
composition and the role of the presidium, the Laeen mandate and agenda setting, 
the role of public opinion, and the temporal context. It will evaluate the innovative 
aspects brought by the Convention method to the decision-maing process at the 
super-systemic level. Section  will assess the outcomes of the Convention and the 
positions adopted by the current and future member states before the grande finale 
of the  IGC. 
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WHY DOES THE EU NEED THE CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF 
EUROPE?
‘We have to give ourselves a Constitution, which marks the birth of Europe as a 
political entity’ in ‘a combination of realism and vision’, said Romano Prodi, President 
of the European Commission, expressing a widespread view that the EU finds itself 
in the middle of a new phase of constitutional development (Prodi, ).
In the wae of the largest enlargement, the reform of the actual institutional 
arrangements, addressing the well-nown democratic deficit and giving the Union 
a finalité politique became inevitable.
In this context, the Convention on the future of Europe mared a turning point 
in the history of European integration. However, this could hardly be defined as the 
‘founding moment’ because the EC/EU was established more than forty years ago 
and has already undergone several re-founding phases (Schmitter, ). 
Even though the Nice Treaty did not produce any leftovers, by adopting the 
Declaration on the future of Europe the heads of state and government implicitly 
acnowledged the importance of furthering the constitutional process. 
Since its foundation, constitution building in the EU has taen place within 
the framewor of the Intergovernmental Conference. Nice and Amsterdam led to 
a severe crisis of the classic diplomatic method of the IGC for several reasons: the 
questions of power distribution and representation addressed were more liely to 
lead to a deadloc in negotiations; there was a growing inflexibility in the positions 
that member states adopted; the division between member states increased and 
even traditional alliances, especially the Franco-German axis, were no longer 
convincing, and finally, the influence of European institutions was insignificant 
(Hoffman, ).
In order to increase the IGC efficiency, the member states opted for a new 
preparatory method: establishing a Convention, which would bring together 
representatives of the member states and the candidate countries as well as the 
European institutions to debate the future of the European Union. It should 
be stressed that the member states did not intend to abandon the IGC model. 
The Convention method does not replace the IGC. Without underestimating its 
importance we consider it only as a preparatory stage. This method was preferred 
to other alternatives because of the success achieved by the previous Convention, 
which drafted the Charter of Fundamental ights. 
D-   EU: T C   F  E D-   EU: T C   F  E
193
THE CONVENTION: A NEW METHOD OF TREATY DRAFTING?
The Convention raised many expectations. It should have solved all the Union’s 
sensitive issues regarding institutional arrangements, legitimacy and democracy 
issues, as well as the distribution of powers. It should have addressed the topics on 
the post-Nice agenda, set by the Declaration on the future of Europe (competences, 
status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, simplification of the treaties and 
the role of national parliaments) and enriched by the Laeken Declaration. In this 
context, its mandate was very broad but not very clear. The Laeken mandate did 
not provide the Convention with a direct focus on the constitutional question, but 
offered instead a general analysis of the state of the European integration process 
and the current challenges. For the first time in the history of the EU, the Laeken 
Declaration affirmed the possibility of a ‘Constitution for European citizens’ in the 
context of the need to simplify and reorganise the treaties. The Laeken Council gave 
the Convention certain indications in terms of deliberation and decision-making 
and the freedom to choose between submitting options and making a single 
recommendation. In his first speech, given at the opening session of the Convention 
on  February , President Giscard d’Estaing set an ambitious objective: the 
Convention was to draw up a ‘constitutional treaty’ (d’Estaing, ).
The ‘setchy’ mandate provided by the Laeen Declaration could be interpreted 
as an ‘opportunity structure’ for the Convention, on the one hand, authorising and 
enabling it, and, on the other, constraining it (eh and Wessel, ). 
The analysis of the Amsterdam and Nice agendas showed that decision-maing 
in the EU at the super-systemic level is not at all a deliberate process, but rather 
determined by past rules or political declarations. The way in which the current 
Convention’s agenda was structured by the complex and substantive heritage of 
the acquis as well as the post-Nice debate comes to confirm the path-dependency 
development of decision-maing. Although the Convention had the unique tas 
to draw up the Union’s blueprint, it did not operate ‘against the bacground of a 
constitutional tabula rasa in relation to either the process of constitution building 
or the substantive constitutional choices, which it is maing’ (Show, ). The 
previous treaties and the Charter of Fundamental ights represent sources of 
constitutional acquis, which the Convention had to tae into consideration. 
Constitution-building in the EU has always integrated a set of complex interactions 
and tensions between the treaty texts and other formal institutional documents, on 
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the one hand, and their interpretation by ey actors, notably the Court of Justice, 
but also the national courts, and the other non-judicial EU institutions, on the other 
(Show, ).
The Laeen European Council laid down the structure of the Convention:  
representatives of the governments of the member states, plus  of the candidate 
countries’ governments;  national parliamentarians plus  MPs form the 
candidate countries;  members of the European Parliament; and  members of the 
European Commission. The Convention comprised a total of  members and the 
same number of alternates. 
One of the innovations brought by this Convention was the presence of the 
representatives of the candidate countries as well as the observer status granted to 
the representatives of the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the 
egions and the social partners. Given its diversity, the Convention was expected to 
represent the interests of all those affected by the EU reform. 
Not everybody welcomed the presence of the candidate countries though. ‘What 
could be the impact of the presence and the input of these  members (please note 
that this is more than a third!) without any European experience?’(van den Burg, 
). There was a fear that they would strongly focus on preserving national 
independence and the competences that most of their countries have only recently 
acquired, and that they could act as a bloc (even though they cannot obstruct the 
consensus). 
The Presidium, at the top of this structure, was composed of twelve outstanding 
political figures: the former French president Giscard d’Estaing as the chairman, 
and former prime ministers of Italy, Giuliano Amato and Belgium, Jean-Luc 
Dehaene as vice-chairmen; two Commissioners (Michel Barnier and Vitorino); two 
representatives of the EP and two of the national parliaments; three government 
representatives of the member states that hold the presidency during the Convention 
(Spain, Denmar and Greece). At the beginning, the candidate countries were not 
represented in the Presidium. Later, in response to the applicants’ insistence, Alojz 
Paterle, a member of the Slovene parliament, was elected to represent the candidate 
countries in the Presidium but only as an invited guest. The Presidium played a 
dominant role in the proceedings of the Convention. Based on the woring groups’ 
results and the plenary debates, the Presidium drew up the constitutional treaty, 
acting on its own initiative.
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Given its heterogeneous composition, the ‘one person-one vote’ principle could 
not be applied in the Convention. Therefore, the President of the Convention should 
mae efforts to reach consensus. The Laeen European Council did not establish 
the woring methods of the Convention. Consequently, the Presidium submitted 
a draft of the procedures, which provoed dissatisfaction among the members of 
the Convention because they conferred too powerful a role to the Presidium and 
especially to its chairman. 
The Convention’s wors proceeded in three phases (Barbier, ). The first 
phase presupposed ‘listening’ and drawing up a ‘questionnaire’ on European 
integration and Europe’s future over the next fifty years. The second phase was 
devoted to seeing answers to the questions raised in the Laeen declaration. Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing grouped these into six categories: fundamental questions on 
Europe’s role; the division of competence in the European Union; the simplification 
of the Union’s instruments; how the institutions wor and their democratic 
legitimacy; a single voice for Europe in international affairs and the approach to 
a Constitution for European citizens. Other questions regarded the election of the 
President of the European Council; voluntary withdrawal from the Union; the 
definition of Europe’s borders, a spin-off from the question of the EU’s relations 
with its neighbours. Solutions to the issues of how the future treaty should come 
into force and how to prevent the impasse liely to occur when the time comes to 
conclude or ratify the future treaty were also envisaged. 
In order to answer these questions, eleven thematic woring groups were 
established dealing with: subsidiarity, integration of the Charter of Fundamental 
ights, legal personality of the Union, role of national parliaments, complementary 
competences, economic governance; external action, defence, simplification of 
legislative procedures and instruments, area of freedom, security and justice and 
social Europe. The third phase was to formulate proposals for the IGC, either in 
the form of options or a single recommendation, as the President of the Convention 
proposed. 
Although the Convention was expected to be more open and democratic, in practice 
the process of deliberation was not entirely transparent and public. The Presidium 
always deliberated behind closed doors and did not produce minutes of its meetings. 
The woring groups’ meetings were not open to the public either. The only public and 
even broadcasted deliberations were those of the plenary of the Convention.
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An important aspect of the current convention is the role played by history 
maing personalities, such as Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The heads of state and 
government nominated him as the President of the Convention ‘bearing in mind 
that he was a man nown to have a capacity for strong leadership, a reputation 
for independence, but perhaps most crucially a proven bacground of support 
for a view of European integration which preserved a strong role for the states’ 
(Shaw, ). Some praised him for being able to simultaneously control and show 
flexibility in relation to the process of compiling the treaty (Shaw, ), while 
others accused him of imposing his will rather than broering deals (Watson, ). 
Nevertheless, he was a ‘towering influence to the Convention. His arrogance and 
patronising style infuriated the  other members, but they respected his stamina 
and vision’ (Watson, ).
While the Convention met in public and was monitored by the civil society, 
the academia and the media, the question remains whether there was a real public 
debate on the future of Europe.
Jean-Luc Dehaene, one of the vice-chairmen, was responsible for setting up a 
Forum in order to ensure that the civil society was heard. Four European networs 
representing NGOs in the social sector, environmental protection, development co-
operation and human rights, as well as the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) established a civil society contact group. The topics covered by the civil 
society were expanded to include democracy, institutions and culture. Academics 
and ‘thin tans’ were also invited to tae part in the debate. These hearings of 
the civil society were attended by significant numbers of the members of the 
Convention, but it is difficult to determine their impact on the Convention’s 
proceedings (Barbier, ).
The national parliaments and the governments of the member states organised 
public debates on the future of Europe at the national level. 
There is also a Convention’s website hosting an overwhelming quantity of 
written material. On the one hand, the website provides a lot of information to a 
visitor familiar with the various aspects of European integration, but, on the other 
hand, it does not explain to the general user how and why the Convention was in 
fact woring towards a new Constitutional treaty (Shaw, ).
The media coverage of this event was very fragmented. In the U, the press 
tended to focus on the meaning of the terms ‘intergovernmental’ and ‘federal’. 
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The German media covered the Convention’s wor very well, but offered little 
profound commentary. In France, Finland, Greece, Ireland and Sweden, media 
interest increased after the publication of the preliminary draft of the constitution 
in October  (Euobserver, ).
In spite of all the official efforts, a survey conducted by ‘Eurobarometer Flash’ 
immediately after the Thessalonii European Council and focusing on the results 
of the Convention showed that although people’s awareness of the Convention had 
increased, it still remained very blurry:  of people in the enlarged EU had at least 
heard of the Convention, compared with only around  in March. However,  
of people said they had never heard of the Convention, and  were unaware of the 
ind of text the Convention had produced. When questioned on the substance of 
the proposals,  of the respondents said they were in favour of a Constitution as 
a way of reforming the EU.  said they would prefer the Convention text to be at 
least partially amended by the heads of state and government.
As in the case of the previous treaty revisions, international events had an 
important impact on the wors of the Convention. The Iraq crisis caused a delay in 
the drafting of the constitutional treaty and also influenced the discussions on the 
common foreign policy. Some even affirmed that international events, such as the 
Iraq crisis, could undermine the Convention, which would ‘end up lie Franfurt 
, a gathering of high-minded people intent on writing a constitution for a new 
nation (Germany), whose efforts were swept aside by history.’(The Economist, 
) But, in the end, their prophecies were not fulfilled. 
After this short review of some of the Convention’s processes, we should 
analyse it in the light of two theories: liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-
institutionalism. While there are no new theories to explain the Convention as a 
method of treaty drafting, the existing ones offer—to a certain extent—interesting 
‘mental maps’ of the process of the Convention (eh and Wessel, ).
There is a minimalist reading of the Convention, which corresponds 
to the conceptualisation of European integration in the spirit of liberal 
intergovernmentalism’ (eh and Wessel, ). Accordingly, the decision to create 
the Convention would be seen as an act of rational state behaviour with the member 
states interested in increasing the efficiency of interstate bargaining. The Convention 
is merely a preparatory stage of the IGC, meant to draft a set of non-binding options 
from which the member states will choose during the IGC. This scenario attributes 
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the main role in the EU’s constitutional evolution to the European Council. The 
Convention would be expected to present the member states with acceptable 
options for improving the status quo. There is a clear principal-agent dynamic in 
this scenario, with the governments willing to delegate certain responsibilities to the 
supra-national institutions while retaining a strict surveillance. The supra-national 
institutions would have a passive role. In the Convention’s internal negotiations, the 
modus operandi would continue to be bargaining rather than problem-solving. The 
role of the civil society would be ept at a minimum within a Convention, which is 
seen to be project driven by Euro-conscious elites. 
Textual evidence could be found in the Laeen Declaration to support this 
minimalist perspective. The European Council established the Convention ‘in 
order to pave the way as broadly and openly as possible’ and ‘the final document 
will provide a starting point for discussions in the IGC, which will tae the ultimate 
decision’. 
An intergovernmental reading of the Convention would interpret its 
composition, mandate and leadership as ‘safety features’ attached by the Laeen 
European Council in order to mae sure that the Convention would not deviate 
from its original purpose, which is to prepare the future IGC (Hoffman, ).
First, the Laeen Declaration ensured that the Convention consisted of 
representatives of a wide range of institutions and that the possible number of 
alliances was larger than in an IGC. The decision taen in the framewor of the 
Convention would depend on how the alliances would be formed, which force 
would be the strongest and how much of a compromise the different players were 
willing to mae. 
Second, the heads of state and government were very cautious not to lose control 
over the Convention. Even if the Convention’s mandate was relatively broad and 
open: ‘it will be the tas of that Convention to consider the ey issues arising about 
the Union’s future development and try to identify the various possible responses.’ 
As soon as its wor had started, member states came up with ideas and suggestions, 
lie the Franco-British initiative regarding the Presidency of the Council. 
Third, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the man chosen to lead the Convention, is a 
former statesman with an intergovernmental approach to the Union. 
Another safety feature is the time limit imposed on the Convention: twelve 
months to draft a document that should answer the questions posed by the Laeen 
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Declaration. This put a lot of pressure on the conventioneers because they had other 
assignments as well. The only ones with a real advantage were the delegates of the 
EP: based in Brussels, they had their internal and external networs and resources 
and were used to woring as a group usually together with the Commission and 
against the Council. They were also able to allocate more time to the Convention 
than the national parliamentarians and the governments’ representatives. 
This model of the Convention as a thin tan of the IGC is challenged by 
a perfectionist reading, which would regard the Convention as a full-fledged 
constitutional assembly (eh and Wessel, ). The actors would use the Laeen 
mandate as an opportunity to develop a wide vision of Europe’s institutional 
and political future in a draft Constitution, which would be used as a catalyst 
for European constitution building. This would recall the neo-institutionalist 
understanding of institutions as developing ‘lives and deaths of their own’. The 
Convention would be seen as a representative of the ‘European people’ rather than 
a thin-tan of the heads of state and government. 
The Convention could be understood as a truly trans-national assembly with a 
constitutional mission. Its composition would facilitate a dynamic search of consensus. 
The governments’ representatives would be perceived as less important and less 
dangerous. The heads of state and government would be challenged in their conceptual 
monopoly of agenda setting by a broad, democratic assembly. Although it recognises the 
role of the European Council, neo-institutionalism would propose a more normative 
understanding of the EU’s future constitutional evolution (eh and Wessel, ).
The neo-institutionalist interpretation would not regard the institutions as 
’passive structures’ or ’mere facilitators’ controlled in a principal-agent chain. 
Institutions will develop into independent agencies and have an impact on the 
values of actors associated with the institutions (eh and Wessel, ).
The perfectionist interpretation would see the Convention as woring with an 
implied mandate from the peoples of the Europe. This would be reflected by a broad 
public debate on the finalité politique of the Union and the ratification referenda.
The final document would contain clear recommendations for the heads of state 
and government. Its aim would be regarded not only in terms of optimising the 
efficiency of the Union but it would represent the nucleus of the future blueprint, 
replacing the current treaties (eh and Wessel, ).
 Olsen quoted in Reh and Wessels.
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THE DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY: AN UNFINISHED AFFAIR 
Everybody expected the Convention’s outcome to be a panacea to most of the 
Union’s well-known problems: the lack of efficiency, transparency, accountability 
and public support or the democratic deficit. Has the constitutional draft actually 
met all these expectations? 
On June  , Valéry Giscard d’Estaing proclaimed a consensus in favour 
of the draft constitutional treaty without any voting or even using the word. He 
urged the members of the Convention to ensure that ‘our Constitution remains as 
intact as possible and it would not be deviated from its path by the IGC’ (d’Estaing, 
). According to the draft constitutional treaty, the EU will have a single legal 
personality, allowing it to sign international treaties. The Charter of Fundamental 
ights will be integrated into the Treaty text. 
The institutional arrangements envisage that the size of the European Parliament 
shall not exceed  members. epresentation of European citizens shall be 
digressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of four members per member 
state. The European Council shall elect its president for up to five years (two possible 
terms of . years) to chair summits and move forward its wor. This will replace the 
present six-month rotating presidency. Member states shall hold the presidency of 
Council formations, other than that of Foreign Affairs, on the basis of equal rotation 
for at least one year. The current composition of the Commission will be maintained 
until . After that, the Commission shall comprise a number of commissioners 
corresponding to 2/ of the number of the Member States. The Commission’s president 
shall appoint non-voting commissioners coming from all other member states. A new 
minister for foreign affairs shall conduct the Union’s common foreign and defence 
policy, sitting in the Commission with access to its resources but answerable to the 
member states. The European Council will appoint him/her with approval from the 
Commission. Member states may create, by unanimous decision, a European public 
prosecutor to combat cross-border crime and terrorism. 
Most decisions will be taen by majority vote. The European Parliament’s role 
in decision-maing will be nearly doubled. The national veto will be preserved 
in a few politically sensitive areas, such as taxation and foreign policy. The 
QMV—the double majority ( of the member states and  of the Union’s total 
population)—will become the principle in decision-maing. Until , the Nice 
Treaty rules will continue to apply. 
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Under a new solidarity clause, member states will provide mutual assistance in case 
of terrorist attac. Member states will be able to subscribe to a mutual defence clause. 
The members of the Economic and Monetary Union will be able to set their own 
economic policy guidelines and enforce Euro-zone rules, without involving non-
euro countries. A new exit clause will allow Member States to leave the Union. 
In the area of justice and home affairs, EU policy on asylum and refugees and 
certain aspects of immigration policy will be decided by majority vote. Although 
the Convention did manage to reach consensus, the battle has not been won yet. 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed by the Heads of 
State or Government of the  Member States and the  candidate countries the 
on . October  as the result of an IGC. The Treaty can only come into force 
when it has been ratified by each of the signatory parties in accordance with its own 
constitutional procedures. So far  Member States and the two accession countries 
have ratified it. France and the Netherlands rejected the text of the Constitution on 
 May and  June . A solution is still needed for this ambitious project. 
The June  European Council extended the reflection period, which should 
now focus on the delivery of concrete results and implementation of the projects. On 
the other hand, the Presidency will present a report to the European Council during 
the first semester of , based on extensive consultations with the Member States. 
This report should contain an assessment of the state of discussions with regard to 
the Constitutional Treaty and explore possible future developments. Furthermore, 
the European Council called for the adoption, on  March  in Berlin, of a 
political declaration by EU leaders, setting out Europe’s values and ambitions and 
confirming their shared commitment to deliver them, commemorating  years of 
the Treaty of ome.
Some say that the Constitutional Treaty is dead. Others, especially Germany, 
which will hold the EU Presidency in the firs semester of , strongly supports 
its revival. 
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to analyse the Convention on the future of Europe in the 
context of the decision-making process at the super-systemic level. Based on factual 
evidence, it tried to give an account of the Convention as a method of treaty reform 
and as a process of deliberation. Although it aimed to underline the innovations 
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brought by the Convention, it did not intend to provide a comparison with the 
IGC method. The IGC is still in place as a model of decision making at the super-
systemic level. The Convention is a preparatory stage, more open and democratic 
indeed, but it does not replace the IGC. At this time in the history of the EU and 
given the stakes of the European integration, the member states are still not willing 
to give up inter-governmental bargains. 
Table  offers a summary of the two theoretical perspectives: liberal inter-
governmentalism and neo-institutionalism used to analyse the Convention.
Table : Theoretical approaches to the Convention on the Future of Europe
Indicators Liberal-intergovernmentalism Neo-institutionalism
Overall role Facilitator of the intergovernmental 
bargaining; ‘think tank’; a 
Reflection Group
Constitutante; resembling the Philadelphia 
Convention
Working procedures
• Presidium ‘Executive agent’; ‘mini IGC’ Limited to formal functions
• National 
representatives
De facto, veto players with stable 
preferences
‘Parliamentarisation’, gradual convergence 
of opinions
• Heads of state and 
government
Principals with control strategies Subordinate role compared with 
parliamentarians as citizens’ representatives
• Civil society Forum ‘Distraction’, alibi function Participation and input as prerequisite to 
mobilise support
Output
• Draing powers Presidium/Secretariat Working committees, trans-national party 
groups
• Final Document ‘Pick and choose’, catalogue of 
options
Constitution (maximum), coherent, 
legal text (minimum)
• Relation with the IGC Preparation IGC ‘locked in’ through consensus and 
public support
Legitimacy
• Legitimacy basis Indirect, based on a mandate from 
heads of state and government




No broad mobilisation of public 
support, democracy guaranteed 
through national governments 
‘Demos-building’ via trans-national 
democratic practice
Initially, both liberal inter-governmentalism and neo-institutionalism were 
used to study the IGC and, consequently, it is rather difficult to extrapolate them to 
the Convention, which, in the end, represents only a part of the complex IGC model. 
Certain aspects of the Convention would satisfy an intergovernmental approach: 
the ‘safety features’ imposed by the member states or the attempts to impose certain 
institutional arrangements such as proposal on the Presidency of the Council. But 
 Adapted after Christine Reh and Wolfang Wessels – ‘Towards an Innovative Mode of Treaty Reform? 
Three Sets of Expectations for the Convention’ – Collegium, No. , Summer , p. -.
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a perfectionist neo-institutionalist interpretation is supported by the fact that the 
Convention offered a more democratic and open forum for discussions and it did 
produce a single draft constitutional treaty that could become the nucleolus for the 
future EU constitution replacing the existing treaties.
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A MINIMAL DEFINITION OF DEMOCACY
THE EU’S OLE AS DEMOCACY POMOTE 
IN THE AAB WOLD
LUANA DINU
DEMOCRATISATIONA POPULAR SUBJECT 
Democracy and democratisation are nowadays popular subjects for politicians, 
journalists or scholars, but, in spite of the fascination the subject exerts in these 
various environments, there is no consensus on the most likely ways of explaining 
democratic expansion or resistance to democratisation. Sometimes, the specific 
terms at hand in different situations are the same, but they nonetheless refer to 
different things. Considering the frequency of confusion and the probability of the 
practical consequences of theoretic ambiguities becoming dramatic, democracy 
remains a theme of special interest for both decision-makers and researchers in the 
field of political science. 
We start with the observation that the importance of internal governing 
options has obviously increased at supranational level, becoming one of the main 
characteristics of contemporary international relations. Although the enthusiasm 
following the process believed to be an inevitable expansion of democracy in the 
‘s seems to have diminished, this continues to be seen as the champion regime of 
the modern world. Considering the positive connotation of the word family, some 
states tend to proclaim their own institutional functioning and their own set of laws 
to be ‘the most democratic’, as opposed to those of their competitors or adversaries, 
who are accused of having an inferior type of democracy or another regime type 
(Schmitter, ). These, in turn, have different response strategies, from promoting 
the virtues of dialogue and a minimum set of democratic behaviours to violent 
rejection reactions. Accepting he idea that there is no ideal model for democracy, 
either in a universal or in a regional context could actually represent the ey to 
peaceful relations between actors in the international arena. 
How could we evaluate the ascending trend of democracy on the ‘international 
ideas maret’? How could we explain the opposition to democratic principles and 
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what are the arguments of democracy promoters? Who are the relevant actors in 
such an analysis and how could we understand their actions? At the confluence 
of comparative politics and international relations studies, at the intersection of 
intellectual trends and developments in global reality, democratisation remains a 
theme worthy of the attention of political science researchers.
THE THEORY
We start by observing that the multitude of existing academic definitions of 
democracy and democratisation has a considerable impact beyond the academic 
debate. According to the way in which democratisation is understood, the 
assessments on progress made towards democracy can be optimistic or pessimistic, 
inciting political actors to different forms of behaviour. We shall follow Rustow’s 
() assumption, which opened the conceptual space for separately considering 
democratic transitions and democracy: ‘the factors that keep a democracy stable 
may not be the ones that brought it into existence; explanations of democracy must 
distinguish between function and genesis’. 
We shall refer to democratisation as a dynamic process, initiated in national 
unity conditions, where identifiable political actors have an important role in 
institutional construction; the model deliberately leaves open the lielihood of 
democracy appearing even at low levels of economic development (ustow, ). 
This is a movement from less responsible to more responsible government, from 
less competitive or inexistent elections to freer and fairer elections; from restricted 
civil and political rights to guaranteed ones; from wee or absent civil society to 
autonomous and numerous associations (Potter, ). The democratisation process 
supposes (whatever the definition, whatever the political, economic, cultural or 
social context, without considering the assumed goals and the speed of the process), 
an adjustment of the relations between the governing and the governed, in the sense 
of a gradual approach, tending to coincidence.
The outcome is a regime nown in theory as polyarchy, a wider concept, 
which could be approximated as a transposition into practice of the democratic 
ideal: a bi-dimensional regime, supposing, on the one hand, contestation (allowed 
opposition and public competition) and, on the other hand, participation (the 
right to participate in public contestation). Dahl () suggests that a functioning 
democratic system is defined by the existence of eight institutional guarantees: 
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liberty of association and organisation, liberty of thining and expression, right to 
vote, right of the political leaders to compete for the electoral support, alternative 
sources of information, possibility to be elected, free and fair elections, institutions 
that mae the government policies depend on the vote. The rule of law must be 
added to all these instruments. It comprises not only respect for the existing 
laws, but also the realization of an efficient administration, the existence of an 
independent magistracy and woring system to solve private and public conflicts, 
the absence of corruption and criminality, the presence of a pluralist system of 
information. 
If we are to proceed to an empirical analysis of democratic transitions and 
instaurations, it is very important to give a minimum definition of democracy. 
In this perspective, we shall retain at least the idea that all political regimes with 
universal suffrage (both male and female), free, fair, competitive and periodic 
elections, more than one political party and different and alternative sources of 
information should be considered democratic. 
IGNORED EXTERNAL FACTORS 
In the last decades, the study of democracy and democratisation has occupied a central 
place in comparative politics and international relations analysis. Between the late ’s 
and early ’s (a time when democratic governments were the exception and not the 
rule) new and exciting arguments appeared, to quote only Lipset (), Dahl () 
or Rustow (). Empirical arguments were progressively added to the debate on 
democratisation, the study of concrete examples reflecting more or less the preceding 
theoretical thinking. After the mid-seventies, authoritarian regimes began to be 
replaced by democratic regimes, and by the ’s the waves of democratisation reached 
even the states without traditions, allowing the prediction of such developments. 
Research adapted itself to these developments, proposing new explaining frameworks 
for the phenomenon of ‘democracy expansion’. The degree of diversity in these 
analyses is highly interesting, since they favour certain dimensions or specific factors 
(economic, political, cultural, security), while failing to synthesize them. 
Literature proposes various explanations for the start of the process but the areas 
of theoretical convergence remain limited and generalizations are geographically 
and temporally limited. Firstly, democratisation studies consider the significant 
impact of economic development on the existence of democracy, as well as on its 
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survival. Secondly, there is a general agreement on the central role played by the 
elites in the democratisation process. Thirdly, regarding the effects of institutional 
options on political dynamics, the studies refer to the superiority of parliamentary 
systems over presidential systems in the consolidation and survival of democratic 
governing systems.
As to the role of external factors, we should emphasise that this issue occupies 
only a peripheral place in the studies on the democratisation processes, while interest 
remains focused on the analysis of internal reform dynamics and state-society 
relations affecting these dynamics. The global context in which the democratisation 
process unfolds is ignored in most cases mainly because of the difficulty to quantify 
the impact of external actors’ actions on the consolidation of democracy (for 
instance, in the case of democracy assistance programs), a complex process which 
progresses in a irregular manner and unfolds over long periods of time. 
Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the fact that the globalization process, the actions 
of international organisations, especially the financial ones, or the increasing role of 
non-governmental organisations have diminished the capacity of individual states to 
act on their own, isolated from the international system. Given the fact that historical 
evidence suggests a strong impact of external economic, diplomatic or military 
influences, we believe that in order to construct a comprehensive approach to the 
topic, we should identify, analyse and explain the role of external factors (at regional 
or international level) in shaping the actual and potential democratisation processes.
Starting with Dahl’s approach (), we shall refer to the lielihood of external 
domination (the only considered form) influencing the chances of polyarchy, 
through actions affecting the beliefs of the political elites, even reducing the 
regimes’ options, or through direct domination. This perspective can be broadened 
by considering the relations between equal states with open options on internal 
politics, who nonetheless shape these options in accordance with the international 
context. On the other hand, without considering pro-democratisation external 
pressures as a hegemonic instrument, we shall admit the obvious connection 
between political principles supported by democratic states and their long and 
medium term economic and security interests. 
Literature developing analytical typologies of external influences on regime 
change focuses mainly on two central issues: the ‘identity’ of actors sustaining 
democratisation and the mechanisms favouring democracy. Instead we shall begin 
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with a different type of question: what is the motivation of states and organizations 
for promoting democracy? We believe there are three types of objectives: the 
satisfaction of normative concerns, the need to improve the security situation and 
the promotion of economic interests. In order to reach these goals, different actors 
produce different strategies, using a wide range of instruments. We shall try to 
evaluate the practical application and the efficiency of these strategies. 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE ARAB WORLDA MULTIFACETED 
RELATION
If our objective is to understand the phenomenon of democratisation, an attempt 
to explain the way in which regions with significantly different traditions and 
approaches to the topic interact can prove to be more than interesting. We shall 
examine the relations between the European Union and the Arab world for several 
reasons: firstly, we are dealing with two neighbouring areas, which can be defined 
as opposed entities as well as interdependent entities; secondly, even though they 
show block characteristics, each block remains a conglomerate of distinct states 
with divergent interests, where the common voice in external relations represents 
more an exception than a rule. 
We shall tae into account the way in which the two perspectives of democracy 
are articulated, and loo into the recent relations between Arab and European 
states, trying to find out whether the position of the EU concerning the Arab world 
corresponds to a real commitment to democracy or is instead a mere reflection 
of economic and security interests. The role of external impulses in initiating the 
democratisation process shall not be neglected either, since the democratisation of 
third regimes seems to have recently become a priority for West-European actors. 
In our case, the analysis shall focus on the way in which the states pursue their 
objectives and individual interests in the framewor of multilateral formats; we 
refer to inter-regional institutionalized co-operation, manifest in different areas: 
politics, economy, culture and security. The relations between the European Union 
and the Arab world shall not be considered as a classic interventionism/imperial 
politics scheme; we believe that the proper perspective is to loo at these relations 
as connections between states seeing to attain their own goals and some common 
objectives, while betting on the co-operation card and hoping that all the players 
face a win-win situation.
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Before the end of the Cold War, the efforts aimed at stabilising allied regimes 
were mainly focused on the security dimension, and additionally, on the economic 
dimension; the instruments used were mainly military assistance and some 
development assistance, initially in the form of US support to the states in the front-
line of anti-communist fight (in Western Europe and South-East Asia). In recent 
years a shift can be observed in the understanding of the political dimension and 
the (bilateral or multilateral) ‘partnerships’ of democracies with actors from outside 
the ‘democratic area’ seems to be essential. 
In their specific relation to democracy, consolidated democracies have a major 
interest in stabilising the periphery, while the neighbouring states are interested 
in getting closer to credible partners, in order to enhance their reputation and to 
identify new ways of ensuring the predictability of internal developments. Although 
at first glance these positions seem irreconcilable, the existence of convergent 
interests gradually leads to language alteration and adaptation of action strategies. 
On one hand, supporters of democracy tie the development of economic 
relations to the maintenance of a political dialogue, but sometimes tend to reduce 
the dialogue on democratisation to a minimum set of elements, thus introducing 
double standards in critical assessment, applied according to their specific 
momentary interests. On the other hand, non-democratic states, motivated by the 
need for legitimacy or the desire to strengthen their position as constant economic 
partners, can mae concessions at the discursive level or turn to adjustments of 
the internal institutional framewor, so that it can be described as democratic. In 
this way specific institutional dialogue framewors are constructed, with a view of 
pursuing jointly assumed objectives, and the dialogue areas are usually extended in 
a progressive manner (from economic to political an even security dialogue). 
In the European case, the development assistance offered to the states of the 
Arab world set out as a continuation of politics from the colonial age (preferential 
trade agreements, public investment, and fixed export prices). The promotion of 
democracy was used more as a pretext for undermining communist dictatorships 
than as action following the logic of some universally valid rule. After the collapse 
of communism, the policies of western states changed simultaneously with the 
start of ambitious reforms in the neighbouring states. The end of the Cold War cut 
off international support for many of the authoritarian regimes in the developing 
states, thus offering new opportunities for democratisation. Democracy and maret 
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economy/capitalism began to be presented as a universally applicable solution. 
Given the interdependence between democracy and prosperity, the transformation 
of neighbouring regimes into democratic maret economies seemed to be the best 
way of ensuring stability. The post-communist transition countries formed the 
avantgarde of what was supposed to be a global democratisation process. 
What has happened so far? The current state of the European Union’s 
neighbourhood is far from being a perfect testimony of the Union’s major success 
in stability export. None of the instruments used, including trade liberalization, 
foreign direct investments, financial assistance and political dialogue, has proved 
to be  efficient. Economic incentives seem to wor only if the states are 
already well governed, therefore donors tried to induce reforms recommending 
to aid recipients the adoption of democratic policies permitting good economic 
relations, and also appealed to a variety of labels: conditionality, political dialogue 
and democracy promotion. However, political dialogue has never been a purely 
technocratic exercise: the choice among the different reform strategies, reflecting 
different values and interests, affecting the income-wealth distribution, has always 
been a political problem which can determine the survival of governments and 
social peace in partner countries. The actions suggested by the donors involve the 
ris of unpredicted and unintended consequences. 
EUROPEAN DEFINITIONS OF DEMOCRACY
From a juridical outlook, the European Union recognizes the principle of 
democracy as a fundamental principle for the Union and as a common principle 
for the Member States (a recent acknowledgement from , when the Amsterdam 
Treaty came into force). A similar reference can also be found in the Charter of 
the fundamental rights of the European Union, proclaimed in  in Nice, which 
reiterates that the Union is based, among others, on the principle of democracy. 
As to the external action sphere, the Treaty on the European Union, signed 
in Maastricht in , included two references to democracy, which have not 
been amended by the later Treaties. The first is found in the framewor of the 
provisions on a common foreign and security policy: article  () stipulates that 
the development and consolidation of democracy is among the objectives of the 
Union’s common foreign and security policy. The second is in the framewor of 
the provisions on the development of co-operation: article  () of the Treaty 
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Establishing a European Community (TEC) stipulates that Community policy in 
the sphere of the development of co-operation should contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy. The Treaty of Nice contains a 
new reference to democracy, in the framewor of provisions on economic, financial 
and technical co-operation with third countries. ‘Community policy in this 
area [economic, financial and technical co-operation with third countries] shall 
contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and 
the rule of law, and to the objective of respecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’ (Article a() TEC).
At a first glimpse, we could conclude that the principle of democracy, as a 
common value of the Union, should be respected not only within its borders, but 
also in the Union’s external relations, particularly in the common foreign and 
security policy, in the development and co-operation policy and in the economic, 
financial and technical co-operation with third countries. The EU’s democracy 
promotion activity seems to have a strong juridical basis. The problems arise only 
when it comes to identifying the precise meaning of ‘democracy’ and ‘democratic’ 
actions, since these meanings differ as interlocutors differ.
In the case of candidate countries, the ‘democratisation through enlargement’ 
strategy proved to be a remarable success: political conditionality (the Copenhagen 
criteria) was the major instrument of the EU, progress toward membership being 
measured in terms of compliance. States in Central and Eastern Europe had to 
ensure the ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities’, by implementing the following 
main political priorities: reform of the judiciary (in particular independence 
of the judiciary), fight against corruption, reform of the administration and 
decentralization, real guarantees of political, civil, economic and social rights and 
the protection of minorities. 
In the case of neighbouring states, the Union declared its intention to promote 
democratic reforms in the framewor of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 
Eastern Europe, the Southern Mediterranean and Southern Caucasus, aiming 
to create a ‘ring of friends’—i.e. states that do not have the perspective of EU 
membership, but can anyway enjoy privileged political, economic and cultural 
relations with the Union (data from www.europa.eu.int). The ENP was developed 
in the context of the EU’s  enlargement, with the objective of avoiding the 
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emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and 
strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It was first outlined 
in a Commission Communication in March , followed by a more developed 
Strategy Paper in May , outlining in specific terms how the EU proposed 
to wor more closely with these countries. The ey elements of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy are the bilateral ENP Action Plans mutually agreed between 
the EU and each partner country, which set out an agenda of political and economic 
reforms with short and medium-term priorities. Originally, the ENP was intended 
to apply to the immediate neighbours—Algeria, Belarus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and 
the Uraine; in , it was extended to also include the countries of the Southern 
Caucasus with whom the candidate countries Bulgaria, omania and Turey shared 
either a maritime or land border.
The EU offered its neighbours a privileged relationship, building upon a 
mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, 
good governance, maret economy principles and sustainable development), and 
going beyond the existing relationships to offer a deeper political relationship and 
economic integration. The level of the relationship was supposed to depend on the 
extent to which these values were effectively shared. According to the European 
Commission, in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and 
effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including 
aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from 
the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU … the prospect of a stae 
in the EU’s Internal Maret and further integration and liberalisation to promote 
the free movement of—persons, goods, services and capital. (COM()  final, 
.., p. ) 
The Commission made clear some essential prerequisites for political stability: 
democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law and 
core labour standards, and described the political situation in the two regions of 
neighbourhood policy as follows: ‘nearly all countries of the Mediterranean, the 
WNIS and ussia have a history of autocratic and non-democratic governance and 
poor records of protecting human rights and freedom of the individual. Generally, 
the countries of the WNIS and ussia have taen steps towards establishing 
democracy and maret institutions over the past  years. Yet political reform in 
214
T EU’ R  D P   A W
215
T EU’ R  D P   A W
the majority of the countries of the Mediterranean has not progressed as quicly as 
desired’. (COM()  final, .., p. ) 
In the southern Mediterranean, the ENP brought added value to the provisions 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process started in  (data from 
www.europa.eu.int). It is considered ‘a unique and ambitious initiative’, and its goals 
are, according to the Barcelona Declaration, () the definition of a common area 
of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue 
(Political and Security Chapter), () the construction of a zone of shared prosperity 
through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a 
free-trade area (Economic and Financial Chapter), and () a rapprochement between 
peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging 
understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (Social, 
Cultural and Human Chapter). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership comprises 
two complementary dimensions: a bilateral one (through the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements that the Union negotiates with the Mediterranean Partners 
individually and which reflect the general principles governing the new Euro-
Mediterranean relationship, although they each contain characteristics specific to the 
relations between the EU and each Mediterranean Partner), and a regional (regional 
dialogue representing one of the most innovative aspects of the Partnership, since it 
covers at the same time the political, economic and cultural fields).
In the case of the EU’s relations with other countries in the Arab world, 
references to democracy are less maredly present although respect for human 
rights remains a precondition for commercial agreements; Article  of the 
TEC, which refers to the development of co-operation, lays down the objectives 
of development of co-operation with reference to human rights, particularly by 
opening the door to ‘human rights’ clauses: ‘Community policy in this area shall 
contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and 
the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’. 
Gradually, the clauses containing provisions related to violation of human rights 
have been incorporated in all bilateral trade and co-operation agreements. Article 
 also states that ‘The Community and the Member States shall comply with the 
commitments and tae account of the objectives they have approved in the context 
of the United Nations and other competent international organisations’. There is, 
however, no specific requirement related to democracy in its political dimension.
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EU’s relations with the countries of the Co-operation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf (a regional organisation created in May  by Bahrain, uwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) are channelled through a 
Co-operation Agreement signed in  between the European Community and the 
GCC (data from www.europa.eu.int). The objective of this Agreement is to contribute 
to the strengthening of stability in a region of strategic importance and to facilitate 
political and economic relations, but even though officials stressed their political 
will to further relations and co-operation in all areas besides trade and economic 
issues, little if no progress followed. There were positive signs on specific security 
areas such as counter-terrorism or non-proliferation; however, even the negotiations 
for a Free Trade Agreement (initiated in , soon bloced and resumed in ) are 
facing difficulties and the partners have not yet reached consensus. 
The enhancement of co-operation in political, economic and social fields 
remains a desideratum, reaffirmed, in the aftermath of the Iraq war, by the 
establishment of an EU Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East, which provoed a renewed interest in EU-GCC relations. The EU believes 
that such enhanced co-operation will also open up possibilities for the European 
Commission to support the region’s domestic reform efforts, including areas such 
as education or human rights.
Once more, there is no specific reference to democracy in its concrete political 
dimensions. Could it be because Europeans carefully respect the sovereign right 
of third states to decide on internal affairs (and  human rights represent the only 
area where the large freedom of action traditionally belonging to States has been 
restricted in many respects by international law)? This could be an explanation. But 
it could be argued against very easily after one closer loo at some statements made 
by EU officials, who, at a discursive level, continue to critically address internal 
developments in third states, where elements characterizing democratic regimes 
(free elections, freedom of speech or of association) are absent. 
It is noticeable that the declarations often differ in intensity, and one possible 
reason is the difficulty of EU member states to reach a compromise on the meaning 
and consequences of their assessments (regardless of whether they are Conclusions 
of the Council or statements by the EU epresentatives); the EU’s external relations 
remain, for the most part, an area where the level of decision is not communitarian, 
but inter-governmental, where decisions are taen not by majority, but by consensus. 
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And consensus is difficult to reach when  (or soon ) actors with often divergent 
individual interests have to negotiate priorities and budgets. Consequently, EU’s 
critics seem to be right in stating that the EU is applying double standards and 
avoids any actions that involve the ris of irritating some of its potential ‘strategic’ 
partners, in terms of geopolitics/security/trade. 
They could also be right in criticising the inefficiency of the Union’s actions as 
democracy promoters. For the moment, there is no democratisation in the Arab 
world: even though the need for reforms is no longer a taboo theme, and steps 
have been taen toward liberalization, the reform discourses of administrations 
in the Arab World are far more generous than their actual actions of reform 
implementation. More than that, it will come as no surprise that short-term plans 
to export stability rarely fit cultural, political and social realities on the ground; 
although no one can deny the local elites’ desire to question the existing regimes 
and to build alternatives for the future, there are no widespread popular movements 
favoring change and it is difficult to predict the moment when the debate on 
democratisation will spread over to politics, encompassing large-scale norms and 
values. There is still potential for conflict between liberal values and democracy 
as reflection of the majority will (hence the ris of oppression), and there is still a 
gap between the need for economic liberalization and the subsequent budget cuts 
(hence the ris of paralysis of state institutions). Furthermore, it is hard to imagine 
that elites will easily support reform processes comprising measures which could 
put drastic limits to their wealth and power resources. But abandoning the mission 
is not an option for democracy promoters.
POSSIBLE CONCLUSIONS
The promotion of democracy remains a favoured objective of the European Union 
in its relation to other parts of the world. Even if democracy’s supremacy in not 
universally endorsed, even if the ‘end of history’ seems to have been postponed, 
the factors blocking democratisation are regarded more as accidents and less as 
permanent roadblocks to the triumphal procession of democracy. The lack of open 
political systems, the temptation of authoritarianism and the violent conflicts between 
governments and opposition movements are seen as key-factors limiting the potential 
for economic, social and human development of societies in some parts of the world. 
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Although the difficulties of transition from autocratic to democratic systems 
can be anticipated in the case of the Middle East or Northern Africa, there 
is still support, amongst European officials, to the idea that only authentic 
democratisation can lead to peace, justice and prosperity. Avoiding a normative 
approach (as long as democracy promotion is looed upon as an instrument for 
stability and predictability of regimes in the Arab world, rather than as a per se 
objective), the majority of decision maers proclaim the long term advantages 
of liberal democracy for the region. The only ‘compromise’ in the ‘recipe’ is the 
acceptance of the fact that immediate assertion of ‘western—type’ democracy is not 
a must, and that a gradual process, conducive to increasing participation of people 
in the economic, social and political life, in harmony with the specific religious 
norms, is preferable for the states in this area. Even if the ‘clash’ between western 
and Arab political and spiritual values is sometimes brought up as an obstacle to 
stability, Europeans believe that, without constant pressure and pro-liberalisation 
arguments from external factors, without exposure to the political ‘model’ in place 
in the European states or in the US, the icoff of the ‘democratisation race’ in the 
Arab world seems impossible.
What would be the proper course of action for the EU in this complex context? 
One solution could most liely derive from the understanding of democratisation as 
a long term objective, or, in other terms, from the construction of ‘consumer targeted 
mareting strategies’ in the process of ‘democracy export’. Another answer should 
probably relate to the ‘product’ itself. This well-nown ‘soft-power’ could probably 
become a more successful actor on the international stage if it were to resolutely (not 
audaciously) resort to the same arguments that served the European construction. 
A good example of efficient institutional power-sharing; an illustration of economic 
performance derived from political will; on the whole, a successful model of co-
operation based on shared values: this is what the EU stands for. 
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Owing to globalisation workplaces where employees working together got socialised 
in different social surroundings are emerging in abundance. Significant value and 
attitude differences within a multicultural company make it more difficult for people 
to work together even though they do not come from significantly different cultural 
blocks. People from different European countries, for example, are in direct working 
contact with each other. This study aims to highlight those differences in values and 
attitudes which are of importance in a working environment. To this end it uses data 
obtained from EVS survey results. The data presented make it quite obvious that 
although work is the second most important life component after the family within 
the system of values, the characteristic features of work and the circumstances (high 
income, long holidays etc.) are valued in quite different ways by those working in 
different European countries. Their views also differ regarding reliability of people. 
There also differences in their attitudes towards a number of different social groups.
INTRODUCTION 
This study attempts to find answers to the following questions: What kind of basic 
assumptions, values, norms and behaviour regulation characteristics should an 
individual possess within a multicultural company if the company is made up of 
individual employees who were socialised in a number of different national cultures? 
What kind of clashes are to be expected if—let us suppose—the company employs staff 
members originating from Denmark, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, and Romania to work 
together? The answers to the above questions are not provided on the basis of a survey 
carried out within a particular company, but by using—as a secondary basis—the 
results provided by EVS research and data. Data was obtained in / with a 
uniform methodology and questionnaire, and allowed a good comparison of the moral 
standings, attitudes and values preferences of European nations, including Hungary.
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THE EVS
A longitudinal value survey entitled European Values Study was started by 
researchers from Tilburg University and Leuven Catholic University at the end 
of the s. The initiating question was the following: Does European cultural 
unity which was formulated earlier under the influence of Christianity, still exist? 
The objective was to get a basic understanding of the fundamental value attitude 
of Europeans, with empirical methods of research. The first round of the survey 
involving members of the European Union at the time and Spain was completed 
in . This survey very soon excited the interest of experts outside Europe, 
and through Ronald Inglehard, professor from Michigan University, overseas 
institutions joined in and became participants of data collecting. All participants 
used the questionnaires and data processing methods developed by the EVS. This is 
the way the World Value Survey (WVS) developed from the EVS, and covered the 
whole world.
In order to measure changes during the s a new data collection was 
completed. With the exception of Greece, all countries of the European Union 
participated in this round together with a few East European countries and the 
Scandinavian countries.  
The new, third survey carried out during / repeated the topics raised 
during the earlier rounds. The questions were concerned with the significance of 
the most important life issues (for example: family, wor religion, etc.), attitudes 
towards issues of society, the presence of politics and environmental awareness 
within society, and, in addition, a number of moral issues (for example: abortion, 
euthanasia, illegal profits etc.) as well as attitudes towards different social groups 
(for example: immigrants, ethnic minorities etc.).
The project raised the following main issues:
Do Europeans share a homogenous and lasting set of values?
Are values changing in Europe and, if so, in what direction? 
What are the implications for European unity? 
The third round of EVS (which together with the results of WVS cover the 
whole world) involved  European countries and processed opinions of . 
respondents from Europe. Between  and  individuals were questioned 
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in each country. The representative survey carried out with the uniform 
questionnaire was conducted by experts (mainly from the Gallup Institute). The 
most comprehensive value orientation survey carried out up to the present time is 
of outstanding importance, because the data gathered simultaneously provide an 
excellent basis for the comparison of the national and cultural characteristics of 
European countries, including the East European countries. The presentation is 
based on the findings of the latest survey. 
From the enormous data base I selected only data which are of special 
significance regarding the worplace cooperation between people. This is the 
reason why the selection of data is confined to the basic life components (family, 
wor, friends, leisure time etc.), certain expectations regarding wor, management, 
attitude towards competition, attitudes towards certain human groups, and certain 
moral issues playing a significant role in the woring environment. The comparison 
is limited to extreme average values, although the available data would allow for a 
more sophisticated comparison (for example of characteristics by nation, by gender, 
age group, and education). 
SOME IMPORTANT COMPONENTS OF EUROPEAN VALUES 
The importance of certain life components has a significant effect on employment 
and the way people work. For example the motivation for work well done, and the 
loyalty factor are influenced also by the roles that family, friends and acquaintances, 
leisure time and even religion play in the life of the individual. 
The importance of family, work, friends, leisure time, religion, and politics 
The individuals answering the questions formulated their opinion regarding the 
importance of individual components of life for them. They could select among very, 
quite, no, and not important at all answers. It was found the family is outstandingly 
important within European values. Out of the total number of respondents (,) 
. marked ‘very important ’ and only . said the family is not important at all. 
Comparing different countries only small deviations were found, even within the 
possible answers given. Among the six factors work takes the second place. On the 
average . of Europeans ranked it as very important and only . said it is not 
important at all. However, the national differences are more significant among the 
respondents selecting ‘very important ’: the Poles are in the lead (for  of them it is 
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‘very important ’ and for only . it is not). The Danes do not seem to be generally 
‘workaholic’: only . of them think work is very important, while the majority 
class work as ‘quite important ’. 
The average European value regarding the high importance of friends and 
acquaintances is .. The difference between extreme values is even greater than 
in the case of wor. While . of Swedes thin this is a very important factor in 
their life, only . of Latvians thin the same. Similarly, the differences are very 
big in relation to the importance of leisure time. The Swedes, the people of the 
Netherlands, and the British are in the front (with their values above  ) while 
less than  of the Latvians, Lithuanians and ussians consider leisure time as 
very important. Within the order of importance of life components religion taes 
fifth place. The European average of answers ‘religion is very important ’ is .. 
But in the bacground of this average a great difference can be seen between the 
Maltese (.) and the Czechs (.). There is a similarly big difference between 
those who thin religion is not important at all (Malta ., the Czech epublic 
.). Last in the order of life components is politics, where the European average 
is .. Malta is in the lead with . of answers ‘politics is very important ’, and 
omania shows the strongest response level saying ‘politics is not important at all ’  
(.). (Fig. )
Fig . : The importance of most important life components in Europe
THE IMPORTANCE OF WORK  
If we dig deeper in the comparison of the importance of work we find significantly 
more ‘very important’ values in East Europe and Malta than in North and Western 
Europe.Scores of Poland(), Romania (.) and Latvia (.) are significantly 
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higher than the European average of .. Slovakia, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia 
are also above average. It has to be added that the French (.) and the Belgian 
() values are also high, especially if we include the ‘quite important’ category too. 
Among the French only . say that work is not important or not important at all. 
Among the Maltese this group represents only .. It is surprising, however, that 
.  of the Irish think work is not important, or not important at all. (Fig. )
Fig. . The importance of work in the European countries
VALUE PREFERENCES RELATED TO WORK 
A significant role is played in cooperation within a workplace by the individual’s 
value preferences and the expectations connected to work. The EVS lines up  
points of view which the respondents were asked to rank by order of importance. 
They are the following: good pay, pleasant people, not too much pressure, good job 
security, good chances for promotion, a job respected by people in general, good hours, 
an opportunity to use initiative, a useful job for the society, generous holidays, meeting 
people, a job in which you can achieve something, a responsible job, an interesting job 
and a job that meets one’s abilities. 
Good pay, regarding European average and in nearly all countries is important 
(.) (Fig. ). Similarly important is woring together with pleasant people. (.). 
The remaining factors are rated differently by Europeans.
Hungarians thin several aspects are very important, scoring higher than the 
European average and higher even than the Northern or Southern averages. They 
lead the list regarding several aspects. It loos as if they would lie to secure several 
aspects of wor at the same time: secure job, good chances for promotion, the 
possibility of meeting other people, the possibility of doing a responsible job. This data 
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significantly contradicts the statement of foreigners, according to which Hungarians 
(similarly to other post-communist countries) do not readily accept responsibilityat 
their wor. Appreciation by the community was also given a high value. 
Apparently it is very important for Hungarians to do a ind of wor which 
is respected by people in general (.) in contrast with the Danish employees 
(.). The greatest difference in this category was found in comparison with the 
European average of .. Attitude towards stressful situations is also significantly 
different. While . of the Maltese thin that their wor should not lead to high 
stress, only . of the Latvians have the same opinion.
Fig . Work-related expectations
The importance of ‘good pay’
HUMAN RELATIONS 
One of the cornerstones of organisational culture is the quality of relationship 
among employees. The requirements of mutual respect, correctness, and humane 
behaviour at the workplace are getting stronger nowadays. Trust is one of the most 
important values in human relationships. 
Trust 
Trust means belief in the correctness of other people, rather than their devious 
behaviour, in their moral steadfastness, and that they will not abuse our weaknesses. 
Trust may replace the control exerted by a third party, the direct enforcement 
of legality; it makes the exchange of goods and information easier and facilitates 
communication among co-operating partners. On the other hand, distrust is a 
negative attitude and destroys communications. 
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Societies and organisations based on trust spend less time, money and energy 
on documenting and checing. EVS data strongly suggests that within Europe 
the differences are great regarding judgement of trust. In answer to the question 
concerning trustworthiness of fellow citizens (‘Generally speaing, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing 
with people?’) the highest percentage was provided by the citizens of the North 
European countries and the lowest by the East Europeans. On the European average 
one third of the citizens thin that one can trust most of the people and two thirds 
thin one has to be very careful.
Behind this average, however, very different, even extreme data can be found. 
omanians are the most distrustful (only . trust in others) followed by the 
Slovaians (.) the Latvians  (.) and the Poles (.). The highest percentages 
are shown by Denmar (.), the Netherlands (.) and Finland () where 
respondents thin that most people could be trusted. , of Hungarians have 
trust in other people. These findings suggest  that trust-based clashes might easily 
occur during co-operation between the Central Eastern European countries 
(including Hungary) and the Scandinavian countries, for example about the 
division of information (Fig. .).
Fig .: The issues of trust
Most people can be trusted 
Negative attitudes
Negative attitudes (prejudice, hostility) are phenomena, which make interpersonal 
relations or communications very difficult. Regarding communications those 
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phenomena are interpreted as ‘psychological noise’, which prevents the individual 
with prejudice and hostility from interpreting the message without distortion. 
Because of a negative attitude towards the communication partner, the hostile 
individual will detect hostile and non-desired signals even if the sending party has 
not encoded those. His or her behaviour will be hostile even if the partner makes 
efforts to avert it. 
Prejudice means aversion, hostile feelings, negative attitudes towards a single 
person, or a group of people, based exclusively on the fact that the given individual, 
or group is a member of a certain (larger) group of people. It plays a significant role 
in cultural, value related conflicts. 
The issue raised by the EVS (‘On this list are various groups of people. Could 
you please sort out any that you would not lie to have as neighbours?’) has 
revealed negative attitudes towards people. It selects  social groups: people with 
criminal record, people belonging to different race, left wing extremists, right wing 
extremists, heavy driners, large families, emotionally unstable people, Muslims, 
immigrants and foreign worers, people whith AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals, 
Jews, Gypsies. The survey regarding Hungary provided shocing results. 
Attitude to immigrants and guest worers is very hostile:  out of  
interviewed individuals said that would not lie to have an immigrant or foreign 
worer as a neighbour, and only . of Bulgarians, the next in the level of hostility 
thin similarly! The most accepting nations are the Portuguese followed by the 
Swedes (only ., and . of them respectively have a rejection attitude to the 
above mentioned groups). (Fig. .)
As regards the other social groups listed the Hungarians are not less hostile. 
Among all European countries Hungarians reject individuals with criminal records 
(.) drug users (.) and people belonging to other races the most strongly 
(however in this  last case the rate is ‘only’ ). The Bulgarians are again the next 
in line:  of them reject the mentioned groups. The Swedes are the most tolerant 
again: . of them have no objection to neighbours of a different race.
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Fig .: Prejudices
Whom you would not like to be your neighbour? Immigrants, foreign workers
Similarly, Hungarians are the leading nation regarding the rejection of alcoholics 
(), the emotionally instable (.), those suffering from AIDS (.), the 
extreme left (.), the extreme right (), Moslems (.) and  Jews (.). 
The above data raise concerns regarding the acceptance of otherness, the 
willingness to live together and co-operate with people socialised in different 
cultures. Even if the data presented here contain statistical distortions the managers 
of multicultural companies have to tae into consideration the appearance of 
negative emotions. 
Moral issues
EVS deals with a large number of issues relating to the morality of society, 
connected to different walks of life. Of the range of issues involved only a few of 
will be analysed here, for example those, which could be summarised under the title 
of illegal benefits and relating directly to economic activity (claiming state benefits 
which one is not entitled to, cheating on tax if one has a chance, accepting a bribe 
in the course of one’s duties, lies made for personal interest and paying cash for 
services to avoid taxes). 
It is quite clear from the answers given that Europeans reject and deem 
unallowable those inds of advantages. Differences are observed only in the 
strength and measure of rejection. Out of the above listed five illegal actions leading 
to personal gain, bribery is rejected most strongly by Europeans. On a ten-point 
scale (where  means ‘can never be justified’ and  means ‘can always be justified’) 
the European average is .. Similarly, ‘claiming state benefits which one is not 
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entitled to’ is unaccepted (the average is .). ‘Paying cash for provided services to 
avoid taxes’ is judged to be the most forgivable issue.
Claiming state benefits which one is not entitled to is judged similarly by the 
northern and some of the western countries but the reactions of East Europeans are 
very sensitive. Croatia (.), Hungary .), omania (.), Bulgaria (.) and the 
Czech epublic (.) are very near the ‘can never be justified’ category. It seems 
that Greece and France are the most allowing nations, their values are . and . 
respectively. The strictest are Malta and Denmar with the averages of . and . 
(Fig. .)
Fig . Morality of society
Claiming state benefits which one is not entitled to
Can always be justified:  points. Can never be justified:  point 
The European average of rejecting tax evasion is .. Concerning this issue 
Malta is again the nearest to the ‘can never be justified’ opinion with .. The 
Belarus average is, however,  ., that is in their opinion tax evasion is not judged 
so strictly. The averages of Lithuania (.) and Uraine (.) are relatively high, 
similarly to Belgium, Luxemburg and France where the average value is above . 
Hungary, with the value of , is stricter than the European average. 
While the Hungarians have higher levels of rejection regarding the first two 
questions than the European average, bribery is judged more mildly. The European 
average is ., and Hungary is not very far behind the most permissive Belarus (.) 
and Slovaia (.), with their average of .. 
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It is Malta that judges the lie in self-interest most negatively (.) while the 
Hungarians with their . value are somewhere in the middle range and the French 
have proved to be the most permissive towards liars with a value of ..
Concerning the method of payment in cash to evade taxation within Europe the 
Latvians, the Danes and the Belgians deem the action to be most acceptable. 
It is significant, that the respondents expressed their view on the extent to 
which their fellow citizens (countrymen and women) practice those morally 
rejected actions. As to ‘claiming state benefits which one is not entitled to’ Hungarians 
have the most negative opinion in Europe according to respondents’ statements. 
Their answer that ’nearly everybody obtains illegally state benefits’ has the highest 
score (.). The European average regarding this issue is .! Similarly, the 
majority of Hungarians thin that among the Europeans nearly every individual 
commits tax evasion, when it is possible (.), while only . of the Finns have 
such a negative opinion of their fellow citizens (the European average is .). 
The picture regarding cash payments made to avoid taxation is just as bad. . 
of the Hungarian respondents thin that nearly everybody uses this method of tax 
evasion, while the European average is merely .. 
MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Although the EVS does not deal with values belonging specifically to management, 
several important data can be found in the database that are relevant to this 
field. They include obeying a manager’s instructions and the issue of judging 
competition. 
Obeying the manager’s instructions
The core of the issue is ‘Should one follow instructions of one’s superiors even when 
one does not fully agree with them, or should one follow one’s superior’s instructions 
only when one is  convinced that they are right? ’.  The respondents could choose from 
the following answers: ‘follow instructions’, ‘be convinced’ and ‘it depends’. As to the 
European averages, the answers revealed only small differences (., ., and 
.). However, it is significant that it is the Northern Irish, the British and the 
Hungarians who had the highest percentage of the answer: ‘the employee must follow 
the managers instructions even in if the employee does not agree with them completely’ 
(Northern Ireland ., Britain ., Hungarian ), while the lowest percentage 
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was provided by Belarus and Slovenia (. and . repectively). The conviction 
is supported to the greatest extent by the Finns (.). Using the above data, for 
example, for a joint project between British and Slovenian participants we can easily 
forecast clashes developing around managers’ instructions. 
Competition is a very important sphere of behaviour and activity. Significantly 
differing judgements were made by the respondents coming from various national 
cultures to the following statements, when they were ased to place their views 
on a  point-scale: Competition is good.  It stimulates people to wor hard and 
develop new ideas. Competition is harmful because it brings out the worst in people. 
Altogether, the European opinion tends to favour the view that competition is good. 
However the individuals from Western Europe thin it is significantly less useful 
and less positive than East Europeans do. In other words West Europeans thin 
its adverse effect is more important than its positive side. The French, the Belgians 
and the Dutch are the least enthusiastic about competition, while the omanians, 
Croatians and Icelanders are of opinion that its bed effects are less significant. 
SUMMARY 
Within the European value orientation there is mostly unity in judging the 
importance of basic life components. In every country the family is the greatest 
value, followed by work. The Europeans are relatively united in their judgement 
of the importance of politics. However, as far as religion, leisure time, friends and 
acquaintances concerned, we find significant variations. The differences in opinion 
are even more significant regarding values and priorities tied to work. In this 
context Hungarians represent an exceptional view because for them everything is 
important: high wages, secure working place, pleasant colleagues, important job for 
the society, the work has to be respected by the society, etc. Also attitudes towards 
others, especially trust and tolerance, opinions on civil morality, on obeying 
superiors’ instructions differ from country to country.
The differences outlined by the EVS results and the significant differences 
within Europe strengthen the supposition, that within multicultural worplaces 
or joint projects in Europe  harmonious interactions and maintenance of good 
communications require the conflict solving ability of a very able management.
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JOB OPPOTUNITIES IN BUSSELS
SOME IDEAS ON A STATEGY FO YOUNG 
GADUATES FOM THE DANUBE EGION
BRIGITTE KRECH
INTRODUCTION
Brussels is regarded as one of the most important European capitals in political 
terms. The colourful shape of European politics, such as the process of European 
integration, the administration of projects (co-funded by the European 
Commission), the activities of the European civil society on the European decision-
making level, active European citizenship and many more issues are, to a certain 
extent related to the Belgian capital. More than , people are supposed to be 
working in the ‘EU-environment’ of Brussels. This includes the EU institutions 
themselves as well as organisations related to the EU. What kind of jobs exist in the 
specific framework of the political landscape? How should one apply for a job in 
Brussels, especially while living abroad or not coming from an EU member state? 
How to build up a job strategy, especially as a young graduate from the Danube 
region? The following essay will provide information as ‘food for thought’ on job 
opportunities in Brussels, especially for young graduates from the Danube region. 
The essay can be seen as a starting point for the further development of an individual 
job seeking strategy. In the annex several internet sites will be introduced which can 
help potential candidates applying for vacancies in EU-Brussels. 
This essay will mainly focus on practical information and less on the academic 
analysis of European integration. However, it might be useful to bring both 
aspects together—scientific research as well as (the analysis of) job opportunities 
in Brussels, where academic experience will finally be initiated by graduates in 
European or international relations, for example. Young researchers from the 
Danube region are part of the ‘European project’. The content of this essay is based 
on several years of work experience the author gained in EU Brussels—including 
experience in job applications.
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Brussels—what kind of a job market?
It is estimated that about , people work for the European Union in Brussels. 
The job market seems to be very dynamic. What kind of jobs are there? What 
kind of special fields are relevant in the EU environment? By breaking down the 
positions that are potentially available, we can end up with several clusters.
They mainly include posts as civil servants in the EU institutions, in the field 
of diplomacy in the permanent representations to the EU, assistant positions to the 
Members of the European Parliament, jobs as policy officers or advisors in European 
associations and federations, NGOs, researchers in thin tans, consultants woring in 
consultancies, office managers/administrative assistants, project managers, and so on. 
Here are some examples
EU officials 
Many people are interested in working in the European public administration. 
Civil servants work in the EU institutions and committees in Brussels (European 
Commission, European Parliament, the Council as well as the Committee of the 
Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee). In order to become an 
EU official, one has to pass a competition in order to get on the reserve list and finally 
to apply for a permanent post in the EU. (The EU institutions also employ a certain 
number staff with non-permanent contracts) The European Personnel Selection 
Office is responsible for the competitions and all questions regarding the employment 
policy of the EU institutions. The competitions vary in their prerequisites, (e.g. 
language skills) and some competitions are open only for certain nationalities.
Diplomats
Each EU member state has a permanent representation delegated to the EU. Other 
countries have a mission to the EU. The diplomatic field is more relevant for officials 
who are already woring for their foreign ministry and have been deployed to 
Brussels. In general the diplomatic field can be of high interest for young graduates 
with an international bacground. 
Assistants to a Member of the European Parliament
Each Member of the European Parliament (currently  MEPs) generally employs 
at least one assistant. The assistant manages and organises the political activies 
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and busy schedule of the MEP. Young graduates often start their working career as 
assistant to a deputy. Sometimes the assistant does not have the same nationality as 
the MEP or is not politically active in a party. Some assistants have a traineeship at 
the MEP’s office prior to their work as an assistant. 
Lobbyists
Lobbying activities have increased in the last couple of years. Lobbying at EU 
institutions, mainly the European Parliament, has become an increasingly important 
political activity in Brussels. European federations and associations are being 
established, which may vary in size, budget, activity, and influence, but offer an 
interesting job market for (international) graduates. Non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) as representatives of the civil society are also active on the European level and 
are looking for (campaign) personnel and policy officers. Their activity covers human 
rights, the environment, consumer protection, youth activities etc. 
Researchers
Several think tanks and political foundations have been established in Brussels 
and might offer research opportunities,in topics like the Western Balkans, the 
geostrategic aspects of energy supply or climate change.
Consultants
Consultancies are mainly responsible for managing EU projects. Experience in European 
project management (e.g. project cycle management) and field experience in a specific 
sector with a combination of foreign languages might be of interest for the consultancies. 
Members of regional representations
Regional offices have increased their presence in Brussels. There are around  
regional offices in Brussels—representing European regions. Their activities 
are mainly related to the Committee of the Regions, the Directorate General of 
Regional Policy of the Commission as well as fund-related matters. 
Internships 
A lot of students and graduates gain first-hand job experience through internships 
(internships, traineeships or ‘stage’ in French). 
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An internship can lead to a wor contract. On the other hand, many job 
advertisements contain the requirement of a ‘stage’ in an EU institution. The 
European Commission offers several hundred traineeships for a five-month-period 
each, starting in October or March. The application procedures are well-explained 
on the Commission’s website. Other EU institutions also offer training experience 
to a lesser extent. Many other organisations, which have been mentioned before, 
have interns and volunteers. 
‘Concours’—sharing personal experiences gained during an EU competition
‘Between July  and April  I took part in an EU competition for administrators in 
the field of environment (the previous administrative level—A). The Concours required 
a degree in an environment-related field with no specific work experience. EPSO received 
around  applications for  posts (and  people on the reserve list).
During the same time EPSO published several other competitions for civil servants (e.g. 
in the field of fisheries, agriculture as well as sustainable development). 
It is useful to check the EPSO website on a regular basis.
We—a group of five people with different backgrounds, languages and work experience 
in the EU environment—decided to study together for the competitions. 
N.B. Why did I choose to prepare in a study group? It can be difficult to study for 
a concours—especially in terms of motivation, the high number of competitors, the 
challenge of studying while working and having other commitments. Therefore we 
decided to form an informal study group in order to prepare ourselves as efficiently as 
possible – without being too isolated during the time of preparation. 
The exams of my competition comprised a pre-selection test, a written exam and 
finally an oral exam. I chose German and English as my main languages. In the study 
group, we mainly used English and French. My pre-selection test contained multiple-
choice questions in numerical and verbal reasoning, EU related questions, and my 
special field, the environment. 
What kind of study material did I use? There are many books avaiable for the 
numerical and vebal reasoning. One main source for the EU related questions was the 
‘ mcq on Europe and European policy’, published by a union (SFE) and available 
in several languages. Other main sources included the treaties of the Union as well as 
the internet sites of ‘Europa’. For the special field, I mainly used the internet sites of 
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the Commission (DG Environment) and thoroughly studied EU environmental policy 
in the last couple of years. 
It was useful to attend conferences related to environmental policy as well as study 
reports of environmental NGOs on EU policy.
After passing the pre-selection test, I sent my application with all the relevant 
documentation to EPSO. The next step was the written exam. In our preparation for 
this exam we mainly dealt with EU documents. We wrote summaries, briefing notes, 
notes, short reports, press releases, and speaking notes in the required languages in 
order to become familiar with EU documents. We wrote tests at home in order to 
become familiar with the time pressure of the exam. Some fellow candidates took part 
in preparatory trainings as well. 
After passing the written exam, I took the final exam consisting of an oral test. (Several 
months passed by between the different steps.)
In order to be thoroughly prepared for the oral exam, I took part in a coaching seminar, 
which was organised by the German Foreign Office. 
The oral exam took part in the EPSO building in Brussels. The jury consisted of several 
civil servants from different units and nationalities as well as representatives of EPSO. 
I took my exam in my main language; in the end of the oral exam my second chosen 
language was used. Interpreters translated into different languages. 
It is useful to try how to work and deal with headsets. 
The oral exam took around  minutes. 
The first  candidates with the highest scores achieved were put on the reserve list. 
Candidates on the reserve list  will apply for vacant posts in the EU institutions.  
Conclusion: some thoughts on a job-seeking strategy 
In order to find the ‘right’ job-seeking strategy, applicants need to deal with 
questions regarding the best approach. 
It can be useful to use manuals of business strategy for developing a job strategy. 
Marketing theories have a cognitive psychological background and can be 
transferred into supporting tools for building up the framework of a job strategy. 
Management strategies are relevant to finding a market niche for products/services. 
As a progressive approach—looking at a job strategy as a service—this knowledge 
can be transferred. 
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Some of the following questions will support the candidate and summarise the most 
important aspects of this essay:
Where do I want to be in the short-term (one year), mid-term (three to five 
years), and long-term (more than five years) regarding my woring career? 
Does it mae sense to continue my studies after finishing my graduate 
programme? This leads to another question: is it possible for me to e.g. apply for 
the College of Europe, which is regarded as an excellent preparation for a European 
career? Is it possible/feasible to do evening classes/part-time degree? 
Do I want to live abroad? If living abroad: what does it mean for my career, 
which I could have started in my home country? What does it mean for my personal 
life? Did I chec the regulations concerning wor and residence permit? What ind 
of regulations are there to observe? 
What languages do I spea? Level of foreign language sills? Do I need to learn 
additional languages in order to become more competitive, e.g. French or German?
My CV/profile: what are my comparative advantages? How can I attract 
attention to my comparative advantages?
egarding the applications: How many applications have I sent? Should I send 
some more CVs? Should I stop for a while and wait for responses? Where have I 
sent my CV? Have I found my own maret niche, which is suitable for me? Which 
organisation might be interested in my profile? Did I spend enough time preparing 
my application documents?
Concerning internships: If I do an internship, can I afford to pay the living 
expenses if the internship is not remunerated or just partly remunerated? Is it 
possible to get financial support from a foundation in my home country or a foreign 
foundation, which supports candidates from e.g. the Danube region in gaining 
European experiences? If I enter the so-called blue boo of successful applications for 
a training in the European Commission, who is going to promote my application?
Is it possible to get in touch with a mentor/or an organisation committed to 
support my application/my future career? How could I find one? 
Have I collected all relevant information available on the job/traineeship/EU 
competition/specific degree/scholarship for a training/from the organisation I 
applied for? 
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Concerning an EU competition: If I decide to tae part in a competition, will 
I have enough time to prepare for the exams? If I enter the reserve list, who will 
support my application? 
The idea of initiating young people in job opportunities—as an important step 
after finishing higher education and entering the job maret—is challenging. The 
phenomenon of globalisation has an impact on the job maret in many ways. People 
are willing to move for wor, training experience is getting more international, 
competition for jobs has increased. European integration continuously opens up new 
job opportunities since the European project needs to be managed and as a result, 
new job opportunities arise for young graduates from the Danube region as well. 
REFERENCES
Internet sites for further job seeking in Brussels.
The following internet sites provide information concerning job search on the European 
level. All internet links were downloaded on October . . 
www.europa.eu.int   
The official site of the EU provides links to all EU institutions. The European Personnel Office 
(EPSO) deals with employment matters and recruitment procedures (see next site).
www.europa.eu.int/epso/index_en.htm 
The internet site of the European Personnel Selection Office provides information on career 
opportunities in the European institutions. It explains the application process as well as 
regulations on competitions, non-permanent posts and staff engaged under contracts. 
http://europa.eu.int/epso/career_en.htm 
EPSO provides a leaflet called ‘careers at the EU institutions’. 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/coneccs/index_en.htm 
CONECCS is the database for Consultation, the European Commission and Civil 
Society. The directory of non-profit organisations provides information of non-
profit organisations at European level. This database is an excellent source of 
contact addresses of NGOs and civil organisations. It is also useful in searching for 
organisations to whom unsolicited applications can be sent. 
www.europeanvoice.com 
The European Voice is a weekly newspaper and provides in-depth information on 
current EU issues with job ads in the EU environment. The European Voice might 
be a helpful newspaper source in preparing for the concours.  
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http://www.xpats.com (‘The Bulletin Job Ads’)
‘The Bulletin’ is an English magazine for the expatriate community in Brussels and 
provides job ads for international personnel in Brussels. 
www.euractiv.com 
EurActiv is an internet service with news on Europe in several languages. A link with EU 
jobs has been established. See: http://jobs.euractiv.com/, www.libeurop.be/home.php 
This is the internet site of the European bookshop, which was founded in late ’s 
and provides books specialised in European Union domains. The bookshop is 
also the sales agent of the Office for the Official Publications of the European 
Communities.  
http://europass.cedefop.europa.eu/htm/index.htm 
This internet site offers the template for a European CV, a commonly used format for 
the Curriculum Vitae.
OTHER SOURCES
. Foreign ministries 
Several foreign ministries provide special preparation courses for EU competitions 
(e.g. Germany, Spain, UK). It might be useful to get in touch with one’s own 
foreign ministry. Civil servants of the EU member states are sent to work in the EU 
institution (mainly European Commission) as national experts. It could be useful 
to check with the specific ministry.




The topic of this paper is ‘competition versus co-operation’ and the question I seek 
to answer is whether we could choose between them ont he ground that one of 
them is better than the other. The answer is difficult because both of them have 
advantages and disadvantages too.
Before going into this analysis I find it necessary to say some words about 
maret forms because co-operation does not characterize all types of maret. 
First of all in some maret forms there are few sellers or customers (for example in 
oligopoly situation) who can wor with each other. But what can be the motivation 
for firms to choose co-operation? The answer is information, that is the most 
important thing for competitors on the maret.
In economics, the main criteria by which one can distinguish between different 
maret forms are: the number and size of producers and consumers in the maret, 
the types of goods and services being traded, and the degree to which information 
can flow freely. 
The major market forms are the following:
• Perfect competition, in which the market consists of a very large number of firms 
producing a homogeneous product. Everybody accepts the price which evolves 
in the equilibrium of supply and demand of the market. Anybody can enter or 
leave the market free of charge.
• Monopolistic competition, also called competitive market, where there is a large 
number of independent firms which have a very small proportion of the market 
share. All sellers differentiate their products in package, in size or in other 
characteristics, so they are their own products’ single sellers (monopoly). At the 
same time, they are in competition for the  costumers at the market.
• Oligopoly, in which a market is dominated by a small number of firms which 
own more than  of the market share. Its position is between monopoly and 
perfect competition. This market form occures frequently in practice.
• Oligopsony, a market dominated by many sellers and a few buyers. 
• Monopoly, where there is only one provider of a product or service. 
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• Natural monopoly, a monopoly in which economies of scale cause efficiency to 
increase continuously with the size of the firm. 
• Monopsony, where there is only one buyer in a market. (Kopányi, )
Competitive maret systems require sellers and buyers to be well informed 
about supply, demand and prices. Large, well-organized wholesale marets facilitate 
the attainment of this ideal situation by providing information on maret trends, 
prices and quantities mareted. The information system providing this service 
not only enhances the efficient management of wholesale marets, but also acts 
as a basis for the sale of similar products outside the maret. The importance of 
information on maret trends and prices is recognized in all countries with well-
developed mareting systems. The establishment of new wholesale marets offers 
special opportunities for setting up maret information systems, with emphasis 
being placed on full, fast and reliable information. Full information in this context 
covers the quantities of products mareted, stored and transported; the range of 
products, stocs, sources, destinations, varieties, quality and pacaging; as well as 
maret and price trends. The maret can be described as truly ‘transparent’ when 
such information is available. eliability of information depends on the training, 
personal abilities, honesty and experience of reporters. Unqualified personnel with 
other responsibilities should not be entrusted with collecting and disseminating 
information. Frequent cross-checing of information should be undertaen, even if 
it is collected by qualified and trained staff since inaccurate or distorted information 
can harm the interests of producers and consumers. Speed in collecting, recording 
and disseminating data is vital in a competitive economy. 
Competitive marets involve a large number of buyers and sellers transacting 
on the basis of available information. Large-scale operators, however, tend to have a 
comparative advantage over small-scale operators by investing in private networs 
and systems (both formal and informal) that enhance access to maret-sensitive 
information and the capacity of processing and storing it. Small-scale operators 
often base their decisions on incomplete or even inaccurate information. The state 
has a ey role in promoting efficient and reliable maret information systems 
because competitive, effectively coordinated marets require that all maret 
participants should be perfectly and equally informed since basic information is 
a public good. This facilitating role of the state should be perceived as an ongoing 
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process and not as a single act. It must also be seen as a logical sequence of the 
fundamental decision to expand the economic role of the private sector and the 
commitment to maintain competitive marets. The problem is that there is no 
perfect competition in practice. The goal of regulation is to facilitate and maintain 
competition on the marets, but oligopolies and monopolistic competitions are 
often found in economies where the information system is not perfect. Persons have 
to co-operate because of the information which can effect extraprofit or survival.
There is a very good example for successful co-operation: China. With an 
average annual GNP growth rate of . over the last  years, China has become 
the world’s third largest economy. The most important factor was the development 
of relationships with Chinese customers, partners and employees based on shared 
goals, co-operation and trust. Many interviewees spoe of the importance of 
developing relationships with local Chinese companies or individuals based on a 
willingness by both sides to help each other achieve their objectives, a willingness 
to place a high priority on each others’ goals, and the development of trust through 
long term reliability. And what is the ey? 
• Building relationships with Chinese customers, partners and employees based 
on shared goals, co-operation and trust. 
• Building culturally sensitive marketing and promotion strategies. Constantly 
evaluating and improving these strategies. 
• Having more extensive international and China-based experience. Learning to 
assume that the Chinese should be treated by international standards. 
• Investing locally in China using joint ventures to a greater extent. 
• Using less formal interaction patterns as the basis for relationships with Chinese 
customers, partners and employees. 
One question arises quite naturally in this context: Besides getting information 
can co-operation be useful in other fields as well? And if the answer is yes, are they 
licensed?
American consumers have the right to expect the benefits of free and open 
competition—the best goods and services at the lowest prices. Public and private 
organizations often rely on a competitive bidding process to achieve that end. The 
competitive process only wors, however, when competitors set prices honestly and 





is cheated. Price fixing, bid rigging, and other forms of collusion are illegal and 
are subject to criminal prosecution by the Antitrust Division of the United States 
Department of Justice. In recent years, the Antitrust Division has successfully 
prosecuted regional, national, and international conspiracies affecting construction, 
agricultural products, manufacturing, service industries, consumer products, 
and many other sectors of the economy. Many of these prosecutions resulted 
from information uncovered by members of the general public who reported the 
information to the Antitrust Division. Woring together, they can continue the effort 
to protect and promote free and open competition in the maretplaces of America. 
A primer was issued containing an overview of the federal antitrust laws and 
the penalties that can be imposed for their violation. It briefly describes the most 
common antitrust violations and outlines those conditions and events that indicate 
anticompetitive collusion so that one might better identify and report suspicious 
activity. Most criminal antitrust prosecutions involve price fixing, bid rigging, 
maret division or allocation schemes. Each of these forms of collusion can be 
prosecuted criminally if they occurred, at least in part, within the past five years. 
Proving such a crime does not require us to show that the conspirators entered into 
a formal written or express agreement. Price fixing, bid rigging, and other collusive 
agreements can be established either by direct evidence, such as the testimony of 
a participant, or by circumstantial evidence, such as suspicious bid patterns, travel 
and expense reports, telephone records, and business diary entries. Price fixing is 
an agreement among competitors to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at 
which their goods or services are sold. It is not necessary for the competitors to 
agree to charge exactly the same price, or that every competitor in a given industry 
should join the conspiracy. Price fixing can tae many forms, and any agreement 
that restricts price competition violates the law. Bid rigging is a conspiracy of 
competitors to effectively raise prices where purchasers—often federal, state, 
or local governments—acquire goods or services by soliciting competing bids. 
Essentially, competitors agree in advance on who will submit the winning bid for 
a contract let through the competitive bidding process. As with price fixing, it is 
not necessary that all bidders should participate in the conspiracy. Under the law, 
price-fixing and bid-rigging schemes are per se violations of the Sherman Act. 
This means that where such a collusive scheme has been established, it cannot be 





prices were reasonable, the agreement was necessary to prevent or eliminate price 
cutting or ruinous competition, or the conspirators were merely trying to mae sure 
that each got a fair share of the maret. (Antitrust Division)
AND WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN HUNGARY?
The newly introduced Section /B of the Penal Code established the felony of 
‘restriction of competition in public procurement proceedings and concession 
tenders’. The amendment has been in force since st September  and to the best 
of my knowledge no criminal proceedings have been initiated yet. (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development)
Since Hungary’s accessiom to the European Union there has been a very good 
and successful initiation for co-operation called cluster. 
Clusters are company alliances based on geographical proximity. Clusters 
are driven by competition; the relationship among companies within a cluster 
is characterised by rivalry, harmonisation of common, local interests and the 
existence of trust as social capital. Cluster enterprises are in informal contact with 
one another. Their transaction costs can be decreased by joint innovation adjusted 
to maret needs through information flows within the networ. In this way, the 
competitiveness of enterprises or a given region can rise.
Clusters are co-operative networs of businesses organised on a product basis and 
concentrated on a specific territory. They mae use of co-operation opportunities 
among manufacturers, consultants, training institutions and the service industry 
in order to intensify their maret presence. The endeavor for new, better and more 
efficient products and services, more advanced technology and better quality is 
present at all levels of the co-operation. nowledge, intellectual and technological 
potential concentrated within the Cluster together with an inclination for co-
operation can provide a proper environment for the development of innovations 
and/or their application to serial production or service provision on a large scale.
In today’s global economy nowledge is the ey to staying competitive. While 
many small and medium-sized companies are the bacbone and pride of their 
region’s economies they can find it increasingly hard to compete with the huge 
multinationals that dominate global business. To stay ahead of the game they need 
to invest constantly in new products and in innovating their production processes, 
which many small players just cannot afford. One approach government officials are 
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using to encourage innovation in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is the 
formation of clusters—local groupings of businesses whose activity is connected, 
either horizontally or vertically. By assisting collaboration among SMEs or between 
companies and research institutions that are involved in related activities, a cluster 
can help improve the capacities and competitiveness of businesses in a given region. 
The approach has proven especially effective in assisting the growth of businesses 
providing new technologies. EGINS, a project that receives most of its funding from 
INTEEG IIIC East, uses cluster management to encourage business activities 
among companies in Oberösterreich, Austria, the Stuttgart egion in Germany, the 
Lombardy egion in Italy and the West Pannonian egion in Hungary. egins is 
a grant-giving egional Framewor Operation (FO), a programme that launches 
calls for sub-projects involving different types of partners in several regions. FOs 
unite institutions that might otherwise not wor together, opening the way for their 
international co-operation. By establishing clusters, FOs lie EGINS also bring 
immediate results. Most of the more than  EGINS sub-projects are involved in 
research and development, or new technologies. These businesses support the ind 
of nowledge-oriented economy that Europe is trying to encourage. The objective 
of EGINS is to stimulate now-how transfer between the partners on such topics 
as cluster management, regional innovation and SME support policies focusing 
mainly on the automotive, logistics and biotechnology sectors.
The concept of clusters has been part of official Hungarian economic policy 
since the late s. Under the Széchenyi Plan introduced in January  and 
meant to boost the Hungarian economy, Hungarian clusters received funding in 
an effort to support domestic entrepreneurial community. Groups of firms could 
qualify for financial support if they complied with the cluster definition and could 
fulfil a number of other requirements under the E- programme.
In , the Orbán Government elaborated the Széchenyi Plan, named after a 
famous th century Hungarian count and economic reformer. This was a strategy 
document outlining priorities for economic development to improve convergence 
with European Union by mobilising the business sector and the regions. The plan, in 
terms of which the state would co-finance implementations of development projects, 
did not encompass all areas of the economy, but—for efficiency reasons—concentrated 
on ey priorities. It promoted enterprise support, regional development, housing 
construction, tourism, research and development, motorway construction and 
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infrastructure development. By concentrating - of Hungarian GDP on its 
defined goals, it intended to set the Hungarian economy into motion, particularly 
through the mobilisation of the domestic entrepreneurial community. However, 
the main part of the Széchenyi Plan did not explicitly focus on cluster development. 
Nonetheless, the regional economic development sub-programme of the Széchenyi 
Plan aimed at combating Hungary’s regional inequality has a strong focus on 
SME development at regional level. One of the regional development programmes 
introduced was the Cluster Development Programme (E-). The policy follows 
a top-down approach and sees to improve the competitiveness of enterprises, 
develop co-operative production systems and networing, strengthen the 
innovation capabilities of the subcontractors of the present multinationals as well 
as exchange information and raise awareness. 
Although studies on clusters show that top-down policies meant to build 
clusters from scratch are often unsuccessful, public intervention has played 
a catalyst role in supporting budding clusters. Seen in this light, the Cluster 
Development Programme can be considered a suitable cluster-building model in 
Hungary. Of course, this does not mean that clusters would not and will not emerge 
without official support but the Cluster Development Programme was conceived 
to significantly accelerate this process. During the existence of the programme 
from  January  to  August , thirteen projects were allocated a total of 
approximately EU . million. The most important results, apart from the birth 
of these officially sponsored clusters, included a change in mindset with regard to 
networ-type co-operation, helping SMEs to wor together and build social capital 
from below.
When the Széchenyi Plan officially came to an end with the change of 
government in , the support for clusters continued in the framewor of 
the Technology Development and Innovation Plan launched by the Ministry of 
Economy and Transport. Cluster development in Hungary was also shaped by EU 
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The first cluster in Hungary was established at the end of . Since then many 
more have been created, but these are still at an early stage of discovering, learning, 
managing, experiencing clusters. Officially there are  clusters in Hungary. Why 
are there so many? Because there are no laws or regulations on clusters, which 
would determine what exactly a cluster should loo lie, so anybody can call its 
networ a cluster. The Company Law will be (should be) modified in the future to 
include regulations on clusters as well. Organisations which won the E- tender 
’Establishment of regional clusters’ in  are called clusters and the definition 
given in this tender is used now as a criteria for clusters. This large number 
of clusters () could emerge because the Ministry of Economy and Transport 
supported  of them, and bureaucracy hardly ever faces its mistaes. 
The clusters represent various industries: automotive, wood and furniture, 
electronics, thermal, food, building, textile, tourist and optomechatronic, that is 
they mainly come from traditional sectors. The number of ‘real’ clusters is about 
 to , of which the best are: PANAC (Pannon Automotive Cluster, PANNONFA 
Pannon Wood and Furniture Cluster, South Great Plain Textiles Cluster and 
Pannon Thermal Cluster).
The first was the Győr-based Car Industry Cluster – Panac, established in 
 (Győr is a county seat in Northern-Transdanubia). Its founders include 
Hungary’s five most prestigious automotive companies (Audi Hungaria Ltd, 
Opel Hungary Ltd., Hungarian Suzui Inc., Lu Savaria Ltd., ába Automotive 
Holding Plc), representatives of financial and advisory service companies and the 
West-Transdanubain egional Development Council. The Industrial Economic 
esearch and Advisory Society has become member of Panac too. GM Fiat, 





Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency (ITDH) also participated 
in realizing Panac’s conference and business forum plans for the year . They 
organized special training programs: in France entrepreneurs could study the 
process of becoming suppliers, and together with the car industry clusters in 
Vienna, Upper-Austria, Stuttgart, and Lombardy they have prepared co-operation 
projects in metal-wor and tool engineering. PANAC is determined to fill the gap 
and play a co-ordinative role among the partners. PANAC views this as a crucial 
tas in its effort to strengthen the automotive industry in Hungary, one of the most 
important sectors in Hungarian economy. The  official PANAC members receive 
information on PANAC activities on a regular basis. PANAC is now nown as a 
reputable information centre for the Hungarian automotive industry.
And now here is a brief summary of the objectives, tass and tools of the 
Pannon Automotive Cluster.
Objectives of the Pannon Automotive Cluster
• Foster the creation of a co-operative network of automotive enterprises in the 
region and increase the efficiency of this co-operation via the development of 
inter-company co-ordination. 
• Accelerate the establishment of new supplier links and the process of becoming 
a supplier. 
• Support the launch of investments for the improvement of competitiveness, 
supplier capabilities and quality. 
• Encourage the innovation activities of businesses in the region. 
• Initiate and actively participate in the establishment of the commercial and 
service providing network in the region. 
• Encourage the settlement of foreign automotive ventures in the region. 
Tasks of the Pannon Automotive Cluster
• Support businesses with real supplier potential interested in improving their 
supplier position, with special regard to Hungarian small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
• Map supplier links, survey the competence of potential participants, establish 






• Collect innovative project ideas, co-ordinate their implementation, mediate 
between potential project partners. 
• Create a common PR and marketing operation. 
• Act as a liaison between SME’s and multinational corporations, business actorrs 
and organizations engaged in economic development, and various subsystems 
of public administration. 
Tools available for the Pannon Automotive Cluster
• The information and communication platform offered by the PANAC portal 
(www.autocluster.hu), which is a primary organisation interface for the virtual 
community of the cluster. Portal services to be launched include on-line 
member registration and data management, automotive and business news; 
information on new projects, funding opportunities, professional (public, 
member and closed group) forums, newsletters, on-line databases of members, 
service providers, training organisations, R&D, as well as BB techniques. 
• Development and implementation of a company diagnostics method, free of 
charge, completion of corporate SWOT, establishment of personal contacts, 
opportunities for customised services. 
• Arrangement of training sessions and education courses for quality 
development, encouragement of company innovation processes and creation of 
a learning organisation. 
Finally, let me introduce PANFA, another important Hungarian cluster. Panfa, 
a timber and furniture industry cluster in Zalaegerszeg (a county seat in Central-
Western-Transdanubia) was also established in , at the initiative of the Zala 
County Enterprise Development Fund. The timber- and furniture industry is a 
determinative activity in the West-Transdanubian region. About  small and 
medium-sized enterprises operate in this sector. Panfa, which has already more 
than  members, was established by  companies. Two-thirds of the members 
produce wooden goods, timber and plans and one-third of them are service 
companies. Panfa will build the Timber Innovation and Technological Center in 
Zalaegerszeg in  or  years. The site has already been selected and the plans of the 





Summarising briefly the benefits of clusters we can say that they utilise the 
advantages of their geographical position, which enable them to
• decrease transaction and transport costs;
• have a faster and more reliable information-system;
• get to know the learning-by-doing process;
• spread the risk;
• have common R&D activities;
• change constantly the expertise of industries. (Lengyel, )
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Institut für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa (IDM)
Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe 
A- Wien, Hahngasse // 
Tel.: (+ )   , Fax: (+ )    
E-mail: idm@idm.at, http://www.idm.at
 Years of Research for the Danube Region
e IDM was founded in  as the ‘Research Institute for Issues of the Danube 
Region’. For years, it was the only scientific institution in Austria that dedicated itself 
specifically to research of the Danube region. In  the research institute  now the 
Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM)  received new impetus in 
its work and extended its activities to all of Central and Southeastern Europe under 
the chairmanship of Prof. Dr. Norbert Leser and his successor Dr. Erhard Busek (since 
), Austria’s former Vice Chancellor. 
Today, the IDM is an Austrian scientific institution. It sees its role in carrying 
out research projects on current topics concerning the Danube region and Central 
Europe. The Institute’s educational activities and events as well as its own publications 
serve as a means to mae research nowledge available to both a specialised audience 
and to interested persons among the general public.In doing so, the IDM places 
particular attention upon its role as the clearinghouse for all matters relating to the 
Danube region, Central European countries and Southeastern Europe. The Institute 
is funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, the 
Austrian Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Austrian Federal Chancellery as 
well as by the Austrian provinces, individual cities, by professional associations, the 
Austrian Nationalban and numerous private sponsors. 
Groundwork
As a think tank, the IDM performs groundwork for governmental agencies and 
institutions from politics, education, science, culture and business. It also supports 
the Austrian commitment in the Danube region and in the rest of Central Europe.
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Research
e IDM carries out research projects dealing with current political, sociological, 
social, economic, cultural and ethnic issues of the countries of the Danube region 
and Central Europe. is activity is supported by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for 
Central European Research of Current Events established at the IDM. 
Educational Activities and Events
Within the framework of internationally represented seminars, symposiums (e.g. 
summer schools) and the post-graduate curriculum ‘Interdisciplinary Balkan Studies of 
Vienna’, the IDM also performs a function of instruction and training.
Furthermore, the Inﬆitute organises numerous ecialised conferences, 
workshops and presentations.
Publications
• ‘Der Donauraum’ the scientific journal of the Institute ( times per year/price per 
copy:  ./subscription:  .) to be obtained through the Böhlau Publishing 
House, Sachsenplatz -,  Vienna
• ‘Book Series of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe” to be 
obtained through the Böhlau Publishing House
• ‘IDM-Info Sonderhefte’ Conference publications, EU arguments, cultural guides for 
Central Europe, regional publications
• ‘IDM Studies’
• ‘IDM-focus Europa’ The journal for the enlargement of the EU ( times per year)
• ‘IDM-Info’ the newsletter of the Institute including the programme of events ( 
times per year/subscription:  ./for members of the Institute free of charge)
e current events programme and the publications can be found on the homepage of 
the Inﬆitute: http://www.idm.at 
Documentation
e IDM maintains a documentation centre with publications relevant to the 
current developments in the countries of the Danube region and Central Europe. 
is documentation is supplemented by regular reports provided by country 
correspondents that work for the Institute on a voluntary basis.




H- Pécs, Jakabhegyi út /E
Office and postal address
H- Pécs, Ifjúság útja .
Tel./Fax: +  -, +  -
Mobil: +  -
E-mail: tarrosy@idresearch.hu
Internet: www.idresearch.hu
ID in the name of our enterprise indicates first the significance of possible 
research and co-operation between different disciplines (InterDisciplinary) in 
today’s globalising world; second, refers to the ability of developing creative ideas 
(Idea+Development) and third, covers Innovative power and Dedicated aspect of 
the enterprise.
Since , a team of young researchers, students and Ph.D. aspirants from the 
University of Pécs have been organising various national and international symposia, 
conferences, seminars and summer schools about different aspects of social and 
political changes in Central and Eastern Europe (ranging from regional co-
operation, the place and role of the V countries to security dilemmas of our global 
world). IDesearch is a young company based on the experiences and achievements 
of the past years, with a special intention of generating and shaping collaborations 
among young researchers in Central Europe. The aim of the company is to become 
a well-nown generator of co-operations between national and international actors 
in the field of human sciences and research, project development and training. 
IDesearch Ltd. is interested in strengthening a new generation of social scientists 
who can search for and interpret affects of global processes appearing on the 
local level, and contribute to expressing social demand by establishing a new co-
operation culture. For this aim the company plans to develop accredited trainings 
for young scientists to help them obtain complementary and pragmatic sills useful 




· the DRC (Danube Rectors’ Conference) Summer School series on Regional Co-
operation (www.d-r-c.org; www.drc.idresearch.hu); 
· ECIPARDIS ‘Europe and Citizenship in Parliamentary Discourses’ (a -nation 
research scheme recently submitted in the th Community RTD Framework 
Programme (-) of the EU; 
· the Publikon project (portal for social science research (www.publikon.hu); own 
development); spin-off agency for the University of Pécs (innovating summer 
school development strategies, promoting international student recrutation, 
comprehensive surveys);
· consulting agency for the Hungarian Tourism Board Regional Marketing 
Directorate (regional strategies for youth turism);
· publisher of African Studies (Afrika Tanulmányok) periodical and initiator of 
several researches, conferences and workshops on African issues; 
· SIEN Quarterly (www.icwip.hu); in co-operation with SIEN Foundation.




Publishing Books and Journals 
Grant-writing and Fundraising
International Partnership (network) Building 
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